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ABSTRAC7 
The Language of Equality is contained in three, parts. 
The first part is an elaboration upon the theory of modern 
legality as largely understood in the vierr of E. B. Pashukanis. 
in this connection legality appears., firstly, as an antithesis 
betr, een individuality (as many different individuals) and (their) 
equality in law. 'Ibis antithesis appears as the most basic 
category of modern legalityp namely, the equal or abstract 
individual, or, ''more concretely, the "persona" of private law. 
Secondlyq this element itself appears in antithesis with the state, 
which cannot be considered as simply another co-equal legal 
individual. This latter opposition comes foreTmrd, for instance, 
in the traditional dualism of lau and state, and of private and 
"Publielt law, ihe material elements behind these antitheses are 
considered as subsistingo respectively, in the generalised form 
of private commodity-ormership and, in the second case, as 
subsisting in the opposition of private and social interests. ' 
11he second part is a development of this form of legality as 
expressed, in modern-classical thought (primarily Rousseau and Kant). 
tiere the emergent language of equality coincides with the historical 
emergence of generalised commodity relationsg and certain lessons 
that are to be learned from this.. process- are considered in detail. 
The third part is a criticism of historical Jurisprudence and 
Legal Sociology in the views that are hero expressed of nodern 
legality, Roman law, feudal lav and Natural La-. T; criticism, 
for oxp--%Dle, of Gierke, mine, Ehrlich, and Weber. 
i. 
Introduction 
Tlie principal concern of this work is with the 
form of modern legality, and as with all other subject- 
matters that are constituted in their essential 
nature tlirouýffja man's social activity, it is a process 
waich laas been thoroughly steeped in tdc manifold 
of idealistic sentiment. This is perlaaps more so 
in the case of law than anything else and its 
treatment from a properly scientific standpoint, 
despite innumerable appearances to the contrary, is 
therefore a rare event. Such is the state of affairs 
that I can naine, without hesitation, only one 
solitary fiCure of recent times who has actually 
lived up to this requirement: B. B. Pashukanis, who, 
taking Marx's theory of commodity relations as a 
point of departure, established the investigation 
of r3odern legality upon a scientific footing 
hitherto unparalleled - and since unimproved. 
The theoretical - material of the present work is 
cut here. 
The question of le--, ality, or rialit, 
1 has always 
1. The term "r; Lghtft, used here and elseivrhere is 
used in what has become recognised as the 
"German" sense, namely, the sense which denotes 
the principle of ri, ýý; Lts in concrato, which 
conveys the principle of law as distinct from 
the iiwnediate or sensuous empirical manifold 
in which it comes -dressed. "It is the merit 
of the German term "Recht' that it maintains 
the connection between law and the spirit of law.. " - Dosanquet, Tao, PI. -Ulosophical Theory 
of the State, p. 4"-40. 
ii. 
appeared inextricably bound up with idealism of 
one kind or another. With astonishing tenacity 
such tUings as justice, morality, nature, will and 
so fortU Uave again and again been confounded with 
the specifically legal form, even in the most 
profound reflections thereupon, indeed, especially 
tl2e "most profound" -I mean here those characteristic 
of modern-classical thought, from Grotlus to Kant 
- wUicli, with an apparent immunity from the passage 
of time, Lave at all events done a remarkably good 
job of keeping the form of legality sealed off from 
a more doini-to-oarth scrutiny. This has rei-, iained 
t-I, e case, moreover, notwit1istandinG tUe. kncreasinC; 
frequency, since the early nineteentL century, of 
"more realistic" appraisals of law. The positivistic 
stance in relation to legal subject-riatters, for 
: Lnstarmo, has not establisaed its spokesman in any 
significant position beyond the theoretical boundaries 
set by modern-classical idealisia, and even those who 
laave reco,, -nised this and explicitly made t1le return 
to modern-classical ideas of riglit have generally 
failed to acknowledge that- tLiese ideas had already 
begun their eclipse in Adam Srnit; ils day and in 
Smit'_, Vs work). So given tus state of affairs, '4111ae 
iii - 
criticisin of the inodern-classical Ideas of rib-lit 
still retains a laigh siarificarice today in tie 
criticism of modern legal culture generally. 
There is nothiiic entirely tongue-in-cheek, 
then, in stating that modorn-classical Idealism 
presents us with some of the finest and "most 
profound't exai-iiples of reflection upon the form 
of modern legality, even in the face of the almost 
ystical conundruins -Waich It produced in this 
regard. Here is an example: 
Rights are not based on polfers: because of 
the moral nature of justice, they are based 
on the fact that in eacU man the same will 
to live appears ýt the same staGe of its 
objectivisation. 
This statement is pure metaphysical hocus-pocus. 
But it Is'not merely this. Just as Preud showed 
how the most fantastic dream conceals within itself 
the sublimated elements of very real repressed 
anxieties, so here it becomes possible to show how 
the dream-like content of Schopenhauer's statement 
hides certain very important objective elements of 
the form of modem legality. 
Schopenhauer, Essays etc., p. 148, - who, strictly 
speaking, is an ciGhteenth-century idealist 
of the ninatoenth. 
iv. 
"Rights are not based on powers ... What this 
statement like so many sintilar ones really expresses 
is the truth that modern rights, in principle, 
consist in a generalised form of equality; they 
are the same for all and therefore the principle 
of a right becomes opposed to the relation of 
power. An equally crucial point, however, Is that 
this is only true of modern, that is to say, bourgeois 
society. Rights are opposed to power only when they 
are held equally by all, w1hen in principle, so far 
as rights and rights alone are concerned, no one 
person can appear in a superordinate position in 
relation to any other person. Only in bourgeois 
society is this the case, and therefore only here 
does it appear that "rights are not based on powers'?. 
Here rights are equal rights, which is the case in 
no other previous society. And, as a generalised 
form of equality, the legal form appears in opposition 
to the formal logic of power relationships, which 
are always at all events the eml. )odiment of inequallty, 
of super- and subordination, and hitherto manifest 
as such, in pre-capitalist societies, in unequal 
legal rights. 
V. 
Still, the generalised form of equality which 
becomes the principle of modern rights has nothing 
to do i-rith. "the fact that in each man the same will 
to live appears at the same stage of its objectivisation. " 
If we may continue icitli the dream-analogy, this 
"fact" is like the kind of fact which appears in 
the dream-thought: it does not really happen, yet 
neither is it unconnected with reality. The real 
basis of rights, as involving tleach inaai... at the 
sama stage, " as involving, In other words, a 
generalised form of equality, is bourgeois society. 
Only here Is "each man ... at the same stage" froia the 
legal standpoint, i. e. as a matter of right. In 
previous societies there Is no sucli thing as "each 
man ... at the same stage" in this connection; 
hence, t1iore is no such thing as "man" as a legal 
subject, only freemon, slaves, knights, vassals, 
serfs, guildmasters, landed nobility etc.. 
Essentially, the problem of rigUt in modern- 
classical thought was not wrongly posed: How do 
tae mass of individuals, who are all by nature 
different, becomiý equalised under the form of a 
riaht? 14"aat is tLLis equal standard which brings 
vi. 
with it the abstraction of "man"? 11here it went 
adrift was in the answers it gave: by reason of 
nature I'man" has equal rig1its ( Rousseau, for 
example), or at least, by nature of reason (Xant). 
What was generally overlooked in these solutions 
were the conditions under which I'mant' found himself 
with equal rights. For, nature and reason in modern- 
classical thought were universal, and if "man" had 
equal rights under such auspices, then he had had 
them since the time of Prometheus, or at any rate 
since the time ieaen he emerged from the forests and 
began to live in a civilised kind of way (WLIiCI]L is 
urliat Rousseau had to conclude) NUan", however, 
had equal rigLits neither in civili6ed antiquity nor 
in the Middle Ages. Only in bourgeois society had 
this result come about, namely, Vae abstract legal 
subject, and as Marx often pointed out, the condit: Lons 
of this lay neither in nature nor reason, but rather 
in the emarging configuration of social relations 
dominated by tile form of commodity-oimership in 
which I'man't appears predominantly as the bearer of 
property in exch: ange. Th6 generalised form of 
commodity-ownersUp, i. e. ownersUp of property in 
its emchanae forn, its equivalent form, is the real 
basis of modern legality. 
vii - 
Nevertlieless, returning to our little piece of 
Schopenaauerian mysticism (1, ehic-11 comes, incidentally, 
directly from Kant as does tlie theoretical part 
of ScliopenUauerls pUlosopLiy as a whole), we find 
that it is highly instructive. For, concealed here 
are Vie essential material elei-, aents of the modern 
forra of le,,, -al±ty. Firstly, that it consists in a 
generalised form of equality k1teach man... at the 
same staue"), and secondly tLiat, as suc1l, it becomes 
opposed to ti2e relations of pwer ("not based on 
powers") . TIlese two theses, or rather antitheses 
(since tile y both contain a unity of opposing elements), 
contain the key to tile scientific investigation of 
the process of modern legalit. y. 
As we :. lave already intimated, modern Ypost- 
classical legal thouglit has never really criticised 
the Idealist formulations of right; it has observed 
their "obviouslyu impossible character without feelina 
the need to state any real reasons in this regard 
and Las, consequently, fallen foul of the same 
fundamental error of conflatine the Ceneralised 
form of rights with riahtf in General, of confluting 
the specifically modern form of law with the form of 
vii. i. 
law in all aistorical periods. Tae same is true, in 
particular, of legal sociology, wl ich frequently .3 
observes corroctly t! ie connection between the 
generalised form of rights and the general±sed form 
of con=o di ty-relat ions, but taen proceeds to conflate 
tai. s lattor with commodity-re lat ions in general, 
i. e. in all historical periods, and as a result of 
this equally impossible notions become commonplace, 
e. g. the ttreception" of Roman law, the Itsecularisation" 
of natural law, the Itsubstitution't of status by 
contract all of which in different ways and with 
varying degrees of obscurity suppose the existence 
of bourgeois society In pre-bourgeois social f. ormations. 
Only in bourgeois society does the form of 
legality coincide with a form of equality encompassing 
the. great majority of people. Only here, therefore, 
does the form of. legality come up against the 
prirýcipla of organised state power, i. e. the 
domination of one particular ft-tvill" over all others, 
since. only here is it an essential principle of law 
that no one particular class of right-holders have 
any priviledge-distinction over any other such class. 
The form of modern legality is therefore characterised 
specifically by these problems: Firstly, the problem 
of gencralised equality - Uoif do the great niass of 
ix. 
pT eople become abstracted and equalised under the 
form of a riGUt? Secondly, the problem of power - 
how does this fundamentally equivalent form accomodate, 
and become accomodated under, the pox-ter relationships 
of the state? These are the connections in w4ic1i 
the forri of niodern legality are to be coi-, ipreliended, 
namely, ilia connections which are peculiar to 
bourgeois society. It is only here that its basis 
is to be revealed, in other words, neither in 
nature nor in reason, neither in the 1,11ddle, Ages 
nor even in Rome. 
Since each of the parts of this work naturally 
bear their oini introduction of the subject-inat. ter, 
it would lie superfluous to go into any further 
detail with the issues glanced upon here. But 
from the few remarks that have been made, it will 
be apparent that. the aims of this work are those 
recapitulated in the following three divisions: 
Pirstly, the investigation of the conditions 
in whiel'i the foriq of modern legality appears as an 
abstraction and equalisation of a large mass of 
different individuals. Materially, this is the 
investigation of the connections between the legal 
x. 
equivalent form of "persons" and the J 
structure of generalised private oi-mership of 
property in exchange 
(commodities) 
. Fron this 
follows an inquiry into tae condItions of the 
antitaesis which develops out of this, nanely, the 
opposition as between the legal equivalent form and 
state power, or, in other words, the opposition of 
generalised private interests 
(reflected in the 
legal form) and social interests 
(whence the 
character of the state's activity as a guarantor of 
social production vis a vis private interests). 
Secondly, and in a sonewhat different style, 
to look in some detail at the modern-classical 
cohnections of the form of legality 'as has been 
more-taan-Iiinted in these introductory remarks)- 
Quite deserving of the tenn "classical", we have 
here a still-admirable yet still-powerful representative 
language of equality. From the most material end 
of the legal spectrum in part one, we come here in 
part two to the more "spiritual" end, as it were, 
and look at some of the issues surrounding the tllilgh- 
points", or points-of-no-3ýeturn, of modern legal 
culture. Here, I'believe, the project turns into 
an aestUetic exercise, quite distinct from tlie, 
scientific character of part 1. But I shall leave 
xi. 
tLie reader himself to judge t! 2e foria of the connection 
between parts 1 and 11. 
Thirdly, to observe some of t: ie more historically- 
inclined views of the connections of modern legality 
wit! a sucli things as Natural Law, Roizian Law, 
" rationality", tlie "Ifarket" econoiiW, "contract" 
and so forth. Here, in Historical Jurisprudence 
and Legal Sociology, these connections are derived 
under erroneous conditions, i. e. under the form of 
modern legality itself. Thus we observe what is, 
in general, the error of historicism, whicd in this 
case resembles the reproduction of the modern- 
classical error of conflatina t1ne generality of the 
modern legal form (in bourgeois society alone) witU 
tae form of leGality in general. In the case of 
Historical Jurisprudence tae isolated abstract 
legal subject,. the specifically bourgeois legal 
form. (bourgeois because abstract, undifferentiated, 
because "persoiiat' and not freeman, slave, vassal etc. ), 
this-historically particular foriii, is taken back 
to antiquity; in Lejal Sociolo-gy, t1ae 11freell 
contract. comprising t3iis same abstract legal persona, 
is o; jserved in Rome and Via I-liddle Ages, and Roman 
law becomes "received" as bourooois law; "status" law 
"becomos" contract. But this is not the place to go 
into these issmes. 
Indeed, nothing further needs to be said here 
except that it is time to begi. n. 
Part I 
Cla. 1. RiSht and Equality: Some Preliminary 
Remarks. 
Right-and Equality: Some Preliminary Remarks 
1. Despite the fact that legal right always inhabits 
the area of state authority and thus appears In 
connection with relations of super- and subordination, 
It is only fitting to suppose that legal thought has 
not been entirely in error over the past two hundred 
and more years and that right of this kind subsists, 
first and foremost, as a relation of equality. But 
equality a ngst whom? And, why, if this principle 
Is true, should It appear prJmn ily In connection 
with legal thought merely "over the past two hundred 
and more years"? The two questions are not unconnected, 
because It Is. in fact, only in bourgeois society 
that the Idea of right coincides with the principle 
of equality and this, in turn, arises on account of 
the fact that it Is only here that the mass of people 
become Included under the same categories of legal 
right# and therefore as equals. Accordingly, the form 
of right Is not merely af orm which expresses equality, 
but a form which expresses equality which Is of a 
particular social nature. 
It is true that the notion of right in general 
implies an equivalent form. But this doesn't tell 
"Right by Its very nature can consist only In 
the application of an equal standard, *. "- Marx, 
M, E,, S,, W, (1 Vol. ), P. 320. , 
us a great deal about Its actual naturet which is not 
at all to be considered "In general" but only "in 
particular"* The fact that right in general consists 
in a form of equality merely provides us with the 
meagre information that, for instancog the right of 
Roman citizenship supposes a form of equality amongst 
all those who are Roman citizens and, by the same 
token,, that the right of the slave (there are examples; 
thus, in the later Roman empire, the right to be treated 
without cruelty) entailed a form of equality amongst 
slaves, or, similarly, that the rights of the feudal 
serf meant equality with other serfs sharing like 
conditions of land tenure, and so on and so forth. 
In other words, there is a great deal which Is left 
wanting In the identity of right and equality when 
It is considered only in generalo If right is always 
conceivable as a relation of equality, that Is fair 
enough, but what really needs to be known Is who 
shares this equivalent form and upon what basis* 
Clearly the equivalent form of right In general 
leads hardly anywhere. In the examples given above, 
the equivalent. form. of right has the significance of 
mere tautology: Roman citizen equals Roman citizen, 
slave equals slave, serf equals serft and so one But 
the equivalent form of right in particular, I. e. In 
bourgeois society, Is of tremendous Importancog for 
here we get the relatlonj person equals person. In 
other words# the category of right no longer requires 
any differentia In respect of a particular social 
class* Consequently, we get the Interesting .,, riddle 
that the equivalent form of right in partloularp in 
specifically bourgeois societyp can be defined as 
the form of right in general* 
However, the definition of bourgeois law as law 
In general depends upon a fundamental sleight-of-hand 
trick. Lot us give an Illustration of how convincing 
this can be: 
The form of bourgeois law is universal, It Is 
neither distinguished from other forms of law by the 
fact that It embodies equal rights, nor even by the 
fact that it embodies equal rights for all* A momentts 
reflection makes this clear* The form of right In 
general, i. e. regardless of the specific societyp is 
equality. Right therefore means, In general# equal 
right. Thusl equal rights for all meanst sJjxm_1y, 
rights for all -a condition which Is conceivable 
even In a society based upon slavery. 
The supposition that this kind of argument Is 
correct underpins the whole of modern legal thought. 
But let us see what is wrong with It* The proposition 
that the form of right in general, regardless of any 
Particular society, consists in a form of equality, 
is correct* However, the second proposItionp that 
right therefore meanst in general, equal rIghtt Is 
a non sequitur. If right in general Is an equivalent 
form, we can use either of the terms to denote the 
same thing, that Is to say, we can use either Itright" 
or "equivalent form"a But if we say "equal right",, 
we are not doing this; we aret in fact, saying "equal 
equivalent form"s This "equal" of the "equal equivalent 
form" thus becomes an entirely unaccounted for addition 
which creeps In without our notice* What It, in fact, 
stands for Is the generalised character of right or, 
what Is the same thing, the generallsed character of 
the equivalent form -v which is the precise differentia 
of bourgeois law. 
The Important distinctions to be borne in mind 
are therefore these: Right in general Is an equivalent 
form* But equal right Is not right in general. The 
equivalent form Is only equalt that is to say, right 
Is only generallsed and shared in common by the mass 
of people, without distinction, as a condition of 
specifically bourgeois society. 
The foregoing example illustrates logically what 
has been the persistent error in modern legal thought. 
It is the error of turning the form of bourgeois law 
Into the form of law in general by confounding one very 
definite and specific principle of equality with one 
which Is not. 
In pro-bourgeois societies, in feudal society 
for instance, the form of law is heterogeneous* For 
what it Is worth, It may still be made to conform 
with the form of law In general in that a given right 
may be said to reflect an equivalent form; but this 
Is only true in regard of the members of a given one 
of each of the many separate classes of rIght-holderso 
Feudal law Is, in fact, a manifold of different 
equivalent forms, or, what Is the same thing, a 
manifold of unequal rights. Thus it Is impossible 
to speak here of right in general, except to say that 
it Is heterogeneous, I. e. that there Is no such thing. 
As a result of this, the expression "subject of a 
right" Is, by Itself, meaningless in connection with 
feudal society because there is no one single class 
of right-holders. In bourgeois society, on the other 
hand, there is no additional information required in 
respect of such an expresslonp because It Is Immediately 
clear'who the subject is without asking: the subject 
of a right is here neither lord, vassalt serf etc., 
but simply t he abstract "subject". 
1 
it Is, of course, merely supposed here and elsewhere 
that this abstract legal subject automatically bears 
the qualities of non-infancy, non-id: Locy. The 
negative terms are preferable to adulthood, sound- 
mind etc. because we shall see, this "subject" Is 
essentially a property relation. 
These kinds of conclusions are Important even if 
they seem obvious. Thus It is only in bourgeois 
society that the "subject of a right" becomes actuated 
as a category of legal thinking, because It is only 
here that such an abstraction can have any meaning 
Independently of being qualified in respect of some 
particular social class of one kind or another. 
Accordingly, something so innocently universal in 
appearance as the notion "subject of a right", when 
it finds application as such, is marked at the outset 
as particular, for It Is uniquely an achievement of 
modern legal thought that a simple right-bearing unit 
has application without further specification in 
regard of the subject to whom it is applicable. 
20 In purely formal terms: the form of right in 
general, i. eo as merely a form of equality, stands 
opposed to the form of Individuality In general* 
Individuality and equality are mutually exclusive 
categories, each repulses the other. This is because 
individuality means that which Is different and 
distlnctp whereas equality is sameness. In so far as 
X is an individual, he Is-unlike all others. 
Consequentlys individuality is never the basis of a 
legal right. The only exception to this Is the case 
where a right exists for the sake of one person and 
one person alone. As soon as a right is shared by two 
peoplep Its basis ceases to be individuality. The 
foundation of legal right is therefore always non- 
individuality - which Is precisely what makes the 
character of law always a social question, a question 
that has to do with the nature of the social ties 
between man and man& 
Naturally the attempt to make individuality the 
basis of legal right has been the source of the most 
incredible feats of philosophical acrobatics in the 
history of modern legal thought.. This Is because 
beginning with Individuality, In the above-mentloned 
sense of the word, has entailed Its Immediate negation 
In order that the members of this class may be subsumed 
under the category or right, that is, In order that 
individuals (who are all by nature different) may 
be made equal. Now unless the form of right is to 
disappear completely by being sundered Into the 
manifold of individuality, the Inevitable result of 
such a procedure is that individuality Is turned Into 
something other than that which It Is supposed to be, 
whereupon the category of "abstract individuality" 
(or something of the same essential nature) makes an 
appearance., 
The above procedure of making Individuality the 
basis of law Isp needless to sayp characteristic of 
specifically modern legal thought, because only In 
bourgeois society does law appear as "abstract 
individuality". Again, this appears to coincide with 
the form of right in general where a rIght9 whatever 
the society, Is always the abstraction fromp and In 
this way an equiLlIsatIon of , Individuals. But It Is 
only In bourgeois society that this category of 
"Indkviduals" operates as such, -that Is 1, wIthout any 
further specification as to which social class of 
individuals is being reckoned with, Consequently, 
the abstract antithesis*of individuality and equality 
Is a specific expression of the form of modern law 
and It naturally finds its classic formulations at a 
time when bourgeois society Is making Its revolutionary 
advances In the face of the decaying fetters of the 
anclen regime. Thus Kantq for example, makes the 
individual give himself up to the equal measure of 
right by giving Individuality a "faculty" for so 
doing; and Puchta says, "The principle of right has 
been bestowed upon -an as a spiritual element inherent 
in his constitution"p 
I 
while Savigay claims that, 
Puchtaq G*F. q Outlines of Jurisprudence as the 
Science of Rightt p. 20. 
"All law exists for the moral freedom IndwellIng in 
every Individual mnn. " In all these cases the 
individual man Is made out to be source and foundation 
of law* Accordingly, part and parcel of his 
Individuality must be turned into its opposite, 
into an Inherent ability to cast aside his Individuality 
so that he can actuate something In common with others 
and thus reallse the principle of right* Tho result Is 
"abstract indIviduallty"t which, as sucho as a 
category In its own right, is tu: iiquely an expression 
corresponding with the form of boureois law. 
To talk merely of "man". the "Individual". the 
"subject", or to use one or another expression which 
abstracts individuality, to do this In connection with 
the form of law, is to talk specifically about a 
particular form of law which subsists as a generallsed. 
equivalent form, that consequently recognIses, no 
distinctions as regards this or that class of 
individuals* To do this, in other words, is to 
express the form of bourgeois law. 
The indivIdualp as such# acquires rights plainly 
in spite of his individuality, because holding a right 
means that he shares It with someone else. This does 
not mean that the time-honoured phrasev "the rights of 
1. Savignyp System of Modern Roman Lawq Bko 2, p. l. 
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the Individual", Is contradictory. Clearly# It is 
only In bourgeois society that the Individual (without 
distinction as to which particular social class he 
belongs In) has rights, but this Is not to say that 
this character holds rights because he Is an individual. 
No-one holds rights as an individual, but individuals 
certainly hold rights. It may also be rema ked here 
that It Is not contradictory to demand that individuality 
be respected; -this only becomes so when such a demand 
brings wIth It the view that individuality can be 
enshrined In the form of a right. Forp as soon as 
individuality is properly reallsed, then, by defln: Ltion# 
It determines Its own course and becomes what It is 
entirely of Its own accord* Similarly, the demand 
that nations respect the right of other nations to 
determine their own affairs Is anything. but superfluous 
in the modern age of imperialism, but once a given 
nation does determine properly Its own affa: Lrsp once 
it Is'truly self-determinate, It is precisely that,, 
i. e. It gets by without guarantee from outside and the 
right becomes superfluous. To properly respect a right 
for an oppressed nation toL determine Its own affairs Is 
just the opposite of demanding that some other nation 
do the legislating to that effect. 
ýl 
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The fact that an individual holds a right bears 
testimony to the fact that he is not, In this connectiong 
an Individual at allv but a member of society. The 
fact that the right-holder appears as an individualp 
that isp as an abstract subject, without need of any 
further differentlaq is a condition of bourgeois 
society which achieves this result on the basis of 
a wholesale erosion of individuality proper. 
3. In bourgeois society, right becomes equal right, 
which is to say, right becomes an equal eqiUvalent form, 
or# to put It yet another wayp right becomes an 
equivalent form that is goneralised,. shared by the 
mass of persons who are thus distinguished merely as 
individuals. The secret of this equivalent form lies 
in bourgeois society Itself. But what Is It In 
partIcular about bourgeois society that makes the 
mass of "persons" equal in this way? This Is a question 
to which we shall address ourselves in the next chapter. 
Here, 'we may just antIcipate the answer w: Lth an 
illustration. 
In his cr: Lt: Lclsm of the Gotha programmep a series 
of demands drawn up by the-German Social Democratic 
Worker's Party, Marx rigorously exposed the one-sided 
character of the idea that producers have the right to 
be rewarded equally, that is, in proportion with the 
labour which they provide while engaged in a given 
a-12- 
productive process. He says: 
But one man Is superior to another physically 
or mentally and so supplies more labour In the 
same time, or can labour for a longer time: 
and labourt to serve as a measure, must be 
defined by Its duration or intensItyp otherwise- 
it ceases to be a standard of measurement. 
This equal right Is an unequal right for unequal 
labour.. olt Is, therefore, a right of Inequality# 
in Its content, like every right. Right by Its 
very nature can consist only in the application 
of an equal standard; but unequal individuals 
(and they would not be different individuals if 
they were not unequal) are measureable by an 
equal standard only In so far as they are 
brought under an equal point of view, are taken 
from one definite side only, for instance, in 
the present case, are regarded as workers only 
and nothing more is seen in them, everything 
else being ignored. Further, one worker is 
married, another not; one has more children 
than anothers, and so on and so forth* Thus, 
with an equal performance of labourg and hence 
an equal share In the social consumption fund, 
one will In fact receive more than another,, and 
so on. To avoid these defects, right InTtead 
of being equal would have to be unequal. 
This statement Is highly Illustrative of the conceptual 
equipment required in grasping the form of law. Marx's 
criticism here is essentially that the German workers 
had ensna ed their demands within the principles of 
bourgeois law. Now this is not immediately clear 
because the-statement doesn't even mention the term 
"bourgeolst'; on the contrary, Marx talks explicitly 
of law in general., Thus: "**a right of inequality.. 
like every right, " and 11(r)ight by Its very nature.. " et 
1. MarxO Marx/Engels Selected Worksp 1 Vol-, P- 320* 
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In other wordsp these criticisms have nothing to do 
with bourgeois right in particular. The criticism Is 
universally applicable, namely, equality is not achieved 
by considering the same measure in relation to different 
things (even though these different things must In at 
least one regard be the same in order that they may be 
logically subsumed under the measure). Org to use a 
numerical analogy# if we have the numbers 5,69 7v 8 
etc., and then add to each of them the equal measure of 
1, we do not equalise those numbers (even though. they 
all avail themselves of the measure - because they all 
have the logical character of numbers); clearly by 
such a process we sustain exactly all the initial 
differences of each with every other. This is the 
criticism of right In general, I. e. of right as an 
equal standard. 
But Marx doesn't just crIticise right as an equal 
standard9 he crIticises; it as a particular equal standardp 
as an*equal standard which consists In the measure of 
labour-time (duration) or labour-intensity (non-duration, 
I. e. a measurable amount of some other quality of labour). 
Now It is precisely this equal standard, the equality of 
human labour, that lies at the roots of the modern legal, 
form. In no other society than bourgeois society Is the 
principle of equal human labour, and hence of equal right, 
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fully realised. But the precise connections between 
the two, we must leave until later. 
These connections, however, are what are at the 
back of Marxts mind In the foregoing criticism& The 
principle of equal right on the basis of equal human 
labour is a very particular equal standard and is by 
no means characteristic of the form of law in general. 
It is the yardstick of specifically bourgeois law. 
Thus, although the demand of the German workers that 
labour be rewarded In proportion with the labour provided 
has the appearance of a progressive focus of struggle 
In the face of productive relations which reward labour 
only in proportion with the labour expended over the 
production of exactly what It gets9 i. e. the wage-value, 
which excludes that labour which is expended over the 
production of not only the value of equipment, tools etc., 
worn out over the course of the given productive operation, 
but also a surplus value which appears in the form of 
profit, interest etc. p although this demand appears 
challenging, It Is in fact based upon the exact same 
principle. Under bourgeois conditionsp labour isp on 
average, rewarded equally,. I. e. In proportion with the 
labour-time embodied In the product of a given productive 
operation* But this riddle we shall also leave to be 
elaborated later on. 
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All that needs to be said here is that equal 
right means an equal standard, and if that equal 
standard has for its basis human labour, then for the 
latter to serve as such it must be commensurablet 
because there is no equality without commensurability, 
Moreover, for human labour to be commensurable, for 
It to be reckoned by time or intensity, It must be 
homogeneous social labourv which, In turn, supposes 
very definite social conditions under which the manifold 
of productive tasks are In common undertaken. Again, 
we shall come to these things in detail later on, but 
It Is precisely these conditions that are concealed 
behind the generalised equivalent form of modern law. 
Only where labour has become homogeneous social labour, 
where, consequently, the products of labour and labour 
Itself are all commodities, where In other words, the 
dominant social relation between man and man 3-9 that 
of commodIty-ownership; only here does It become 
possible for the mass of people to be subsumed as 
equals under the legal form of an abstract right- 
bearing unit The generallsed form of commodity 
ownership Is the key to thqý generalised equivalent 
form of modern law. 
4. The foregoing remarks all take very seriously 
the form of law as an equivalent form, and In particular, 
the form of law as an equal or generalised equivalent 
form, which is the special form of modern law, But 
the need to make this kind of remark Is symptomatic of 
a very profound antithesis, because law is "obviously" 
a relation of power, or at least It always comes dressed 
with the trappings of power. The consideration of the 
form of law as an equivalent form eventually has to come 
to terms with the following antithesis: law as such Is 
opposed to power. This at least is the case with 
bourgeois law since the equivalent form Is here 
generalised and as such it recognises no differentiation 
of rights in respect of any particular social grouping* 
If the form of law consists In an equivalent form of 
persons (and by this word "persons", It is to be noted, 
we can only mean bourgeois law, -when it stands In this 
way without any qualification in regard of any particular 
social class), then, on Its own terms, there can be no 
one or more persons holding sway over any one or more 
of the others. If we suppose that law consists in a 
Senerallsed relation of equality, theng as such, It Is 
completely antithetical to the relation of power, which, 
merely In formal terms, consists always in the domination 
or preponderance of one "will" over that of another. 
In other words, we have a profound contradiction on 
our hands: on the one hand, the form of law Is 
essentially a generalized equivalent form; on the 
other hand, It always appears under the auspices of 
state power. 
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Clearly, this antithesis Is already supposed Ing 
and develops directly out of, the primary antithesis 
of law, i. e. as an equivalent form of Individuals* 
The solution to the riddle of this primary antithesis 
we have already anticipated: as the opposition of 
individuality and equalltyp in other words, as 
"abstract individuality", it becomes basically a 
question that concerns the generalised form of 
comm dIty relations in bourgeois society* Individuals 
become equallsed as such under the form of law as a 
condition of generalised commodity ownership. But 
this solution, since we have merely an t1cipated it 
rather than actually demonstrated it* naturally 
remains to be fully elucidated. It is, therefore, 
to take too much on trust to anticipate further the 
solution to the riddle of the second antithesisp the 
dualism oflaw and state power, which develops directly 
out of this primary one. On the other hand, the 
character of this second antithesis is already clear 
(and posing the problem clearly is always a step In 
the direction of Its solution), It is the opposition 
of law, as a generalised equivalent form,, with Its 
natural resting place In the domain of political power. 
In fact (if 'we may be permitted to anticipate one 
final time) the solution of this second antithesis In 
the process of modern law Is that It Is never reconciled, 
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except as a contradiction* We shall deal with this 
In detail In chatper three andp in a rather different 
fashion, elsewhere. Here, it will suffice to say 
that law, as essentially an abstract equivalent form,, 
Is not actual as such, but only becomes so when It is 
"touched". so to speak, with the trappings of external 
authority. But, the moment that this occurs# howeverp 
the equivalent form Is negated and the language of 
equality whicht figuratively speaking, It came 
propared to pronounce, is immediately compromised. 
This dualism, which appears in numerous formst has 
Its roots in the specifically bourgeois condition 
that the Individual Interest (upon which the legal 
form Is premised as an equivalent form) stands 
opposed to the social Interest. 
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The form of modern legality is to be considered,, 
thereforet-as a process consisting in two essential 
antitheses, Firstly: as an antithesis of Individuality 
(as many different Individuals) and equality, 19e. as 
the problem of the abstract subject, which somehow 
manages to suppose In this way that the mass of the 
community can be brought t! ogether under one uniformly 
equal legal standard. Secondly: as an antithesis of 
this legal equivalent form and state power, I-e* as 
the problem of how an essentially equivalent form 
accomodates and becomes accomodated under a relation 
ýl 
that is logically opposed to itp namelyt the relation 
(just in purely formal terms) of super- and 'subordination. 
Our alm in chapters 2 and 3 will be to get at 
the material elements working behind these antitheses. 
Firstly (In chapter 2), the material elements behind 
the (first) antithesis of Individuallty as such, as 
concrete Individuality, and equality; that Is to say, 
the material elements of the generallsed commodity 
structure which Ile behind the notion of the abstract 
subject. And secondly (in chapter 3)9 the material 
elements behind the (second) antithesis of this legal 
equivalent form and state power, namelyg the opposition 
of private and social Interests premised in the 
opposltlon. of private property In general, I. e. as 
generallsed commodity ownership (whence the legal 
abstract subject)v and private property In partlcularg 
i. e. in regard of px-1vate ownership of the means of 
productlong whereupon the state becomes increasingly 
compelled, In the Interest of capitalist production 
as a whole, to compromise the narrow shell of 
egotistical private Interest upon which the form of 
legality is grounded. 
Par tI 
Ch. 2. Ledal Relations and the Relations of 
Production and Exchange: Basic 
Interconnections. 
a. The Equivalent Form of Property 
in Exchange 
b. The Equivalent rorm of Co=odities 
and the Equivalent Form of Persons. 




2. Petty Coi-muodity Production. 
ý20- 
Legal Relations and the Relations of Production and 
Exchange: 
Basic Interconnections. 
In bourgeois society, unlike in any other previous 
societyp the mass of people become subsumed under the 
equivalent form of an abstract right-bearIng unit. 
Here, each becomes the subject of the same general 
set of rights and the category, Usubject of a right", 
becomes historically quite distinct as something that 
is synonymous with a general social equivalent form. 
Now It is a very old lesson that there can be 
no equality without commensurability* No tvo things 
can be equated without measureg'but measure needs 
to be of something. 
' From the standpoint of modern 
law# theng, It seems that the mass of people are 
commensurable In a rather mysterious wayt for right 
Is not height* To cut the matter shortv this measure 
Is, in a wordq money, or, at leastr money furnishes 
the secret of this particular commensurabIlItyi. -of 
"persons" in bourgeois society. 
Measure can neither be just a quantity# nor 
simply a quality* It Isp In fact, a unity of 
the-two, a qualitative quantum. cf. Hegelp 
Logicp p. 172 et seq. 
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However,, with this magic word, the problem of 
the form of modern law Is far and away from Peing 
solved* Indeed, In the same way that the modern 
"subject of a right" Indicates a general social 
equivalent form which remains a riddle to be solved., 
so Is It the case with the notion of money and the 
commodities which It somehow renders equal In the 
act of exchange* Just as the Individual gives 
himself up to. the measure of lawt so the problem 
Is transferred in the comm dity giving Itself up to 
the measure of money, That it Is the same problem 
which Is here transferred Is. of course, merely a 
supposition yet to be justified. The supposition 
: Ls,, that the "econom1drelation contains the secret 
of the t1jurldIcal" relation. 
It follows that one of our primary tasks In this 
chapter will be to consider the nature of the equivalent 
form of commodities In bourgeois society. It Is this 
which. furnishes the material basis of the equivalent 
form of "persons" In the modern "subject of a right" 
or, using Sa: vigny's termp "Jural relatlon"o Thus, 
It will also be our task to show how the equivalent 
form of-commoditles ort what Is the same th: Lngp the 
equivalent form of property In exchange, becomes the 
equivalent form of "persons". in other words, how the 
"Juridical'# moment grows out of the "economic" relation. 
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- Before we set about these tasks, one especially 
important point must be observed. We are here 
dealing with the form of law as an equivalent form, 
which as a general equivalent form is specifically 
the form of modern law, The-basic category of modern 
legal thought, the general right-bearIng unit, Is a 
form under which the mass of "persons" become thus 
subsumed as equals* As we have already made clear 
In the Introductory remarks upon right and equality, 
there Is a great deal more to the matter than just 
this, In other words, it is not simply a matter of 
some kind of legal authority declaring its will that 
all men of sound mind etc. be treated equally. Howevert 
as an equivalent formg law logically stands In an 
antithetical position via a via the relation of power, 
considered just simply as a relation of super. and 
subordination. Yet it Is quite clear that law always 
appears merged with political authority and ultimately.. 
depends upon It. Consequently, to suppose the form 
of law as an equivalent form.: Ls to suppose at the 
same time that It is just the opposite of the form 
in which It actually appears, as a relation of power, 
the dominance of one will over that of another. In 
what follows vA shall merely suppose this antithesis 
and shall defer discussion of It until chapter three. 
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The Equivalent form of Property in Exchange 
Property in exchange Is the commodity-form of 
property. As such, It possesses a two-fold character: 
the commodity, as an article of exchange, is also a 
use-value. This dual nature of commodItIesp as 
articles of consumption and as articles of exchange, 
was aPknowledged by Aristotle, who says: ".. every 
article of property admits of two uses.. To take, for 
example, a shoe, there is its use as a covering of 
the foot and also its use as an article of exchange.. 
The same is true of all other articles of perperty; 
there is none that does not admit of use In exchange. " 
Aristotle could not, however, get to the bottom of 
the equivalent form embodied in commodities, the form 
rendering possible their "use in exchange". Marx 
presents Aristotle's difficulty as follows: 
In the first place, he (Aristotle) clearly 
enunciates that the money-form of commodities 
Is only the further development of the simple 
form of value - I. e. of the expression of the 
value of one commodity In some other commodity 
taken at random; for he says: 5 beds mI house, 
is not to be distinguished from 5 beds = so much 
money* - 
fie further sees that the value-relation which 
gives rise to this expression makes it necessary 
that the house should. be made qualitatively the' 
equal of the bed, and that, without such an 
equallsationg these two clearly different things 
could/ 
Arlstotiev Polltics, p. 22o 
could not be compared with each other as 
commensurable quantities. "Exchange"p he says, 
"cannot take place without equalityp and equality 
not without commensurability". Here, however, 
he comes to a stop, and gives up further analysis 
of the form of value. "It is, however,, In reality,, 
Impossible that such things can be commensurable" 
- I. e. qualitatively equal. Such an equalisation 
can only be something foreign to their real 
naturet consequently only "a makeshift for 
practical purposes. 10 
So, for Arlstotlet althou. -h both the properties of . )I 
use and exchange value inhere in the commodity, the 
one is "proper to the article and the other not. " 
2 
Later on, Marx adds, appropria-celyg that the greatnessý 
of Aristotle's genius is illustrated by the fact 
that lie got this far# that he recognised exchange 
value as a problem which apparently thwarted all 
attempts at a rational solution. 
Aristotle fully understood that money could only 
express an equivalent form In commodities themselvesp 
that the measure Itself does not render things 
commensurable. Today# over two thousand years after 
Aristotle* vulgar economists still carry on as if It 
were self-evident that money, having supplanted God's 
old role, Is "the measure of all things". In the same 
way the equality of "persons" Is self-evident to the 
modern lawyer with his right-bearing unit of currency. 
1. Marx, Capital Vol. 1., P*65- 
2., Aristotle, Politics, p. 21. cf. Ethics, P- 103-4. 
In factt the equivalent form of commodities, of which 
both money and, in a different way, the modern right- 
bearing person are expressions, is a very complicated 
matter. 
The equivalent form of commodities, or, property 
in exchange# Is the problem of value in exchange. 
Returning to Aristotle, It Is the problem of how the 
bad Is made the equal of the house, the shoo etc. p or 
rather, how so many beds equals so many houses etc. 
The answer, the secret of the equivalent form of 
value, is that equal amounts of human labour are 
materlallsed In the products which figure in the 
given equation* The classical political economists, 
especially Smith and Ricardo, had moved a considerable 
way because and In so far as they held fast with this 
basic axiomp but It wasn't until Marx appeared on the 
scene that the theory of value was fully worked out. 
For our purposes here, however, we can simply stay 
with Marx and Aristotle. The reason why Aristotle 
gave up on the form of value, Marx tells us, Is that 
equal human labour for him was Inconceivable. The 
reason Aristotle could not penetrate the equivalent 
form of commodities is the same as that which. prevented 
him from considering the possibility that it arose from 
equal amounts of human labour embodied In them: 
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There was, however, an important fact which 
prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to attribute 
value to commodities, is merely a mode of 
expressing all labour as equal human labourp and 
consequently as labour of equal quality. Greek 
society was founded upon slavery, and had, 
therefore, for its natural basis, the inequality 
of men and of their labour-powers. The secret of 
the expression of value, namelyt that all kinds of 
labour are equal and equivalent, because, and 
so far as they are human labour In general, cannot 
be decypheredo until the notion of human equality 
has already acquired the fixity of a popular 
prejudice. This, however, is possible only in a 
society in which the great mass of the produce 
of labour takes the form of commodItiest in which, 
consequently, the dominant relation between man 
and mang Is that of owners of commodities* The 
brilliancy of Aristotle's genius is shown by thI3 
alone, that he discoveredl in the expression of 
the value of commodities, a relation of equality. 
The particular conditions of the society in which 
he livedp alone prevented him from discovering 
what, "In1truth", was at the bottom of this 
equality. 
There are some very Important points condensdd within 
this statement and we must take careful note of them. 
Marx expresses here a condition whereupon his own 
theory Is made possible, namely, that human equality 
has established Itself with the "fixity of a popular 
prejudice". But this Is not all (the words here could 
seem 111-chosen, for popular prejudices are often 
fleeting). This particular notion of human equality 
figures as a condition which arises directly with the 
social form of exchange, a form which appears t1only 
1. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 65. 
in a society In which the great mass of the produce of 
labour takes the form of commodities, in which.. the 
dominant relation between man and man, is that of 
owners of commodities". It is precisely this social 
form of exchange (not its mere logical form), bringing 
with It the equivalent form of "persons" as owners 
of commodities, which develops it as the form of law. 
But we shall come to this later. 
There are two sides to the nature of exchange 
value which are both Illustratedt in different ways, 
by Aristotle: the logical and the historical. 
Aristotle was undoubtedly correct to suppose that 
property In exchangeg expressing itself as a quantum 
(so much money)p could not be a mere quantump but 
had first to be a qualitative relation In order to 
appear as a quantitative one. Aristotle,, the founding 
father of philosophical logic, was, needless to sayp 
logically correct: quality then quantity. Moreovert 
he was Itcorrect" again in his failure to apply hits 
logic to the conditions of exchange of goods In his 
own society, He said that exchange supposes a relation 
of equality. if he had gone further and said that 
exchange supposes a relation of equal amounts of human 
labour In the commodities on either side of the exchange 
equation, this solution would still have been impossible# 
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The reason for this Is that the rational form of 
exchange Is contradicted so long as slavery-forms 
the productive base of society. Slavery, consequentlys 
provides definite limits to the development of the 
exchange economy* 
"The secret of the expression of value" is that 
"all kinds of labour are equal and equivalent, becauset 
and so far as they are human labour in general". The 
phrase ýbecauset and so far as" is an Important 
conjunction here, It expresses the essential unity 
of the logical ("because") and the historical 
("so 
far as") In the nature of exchange value. Slavery 
is a definite barrier against making all kinds of 
labour equalp a clear and unambiguous constraint upon 
the reallsatIon of human labour as human labour in 
general. Aristotle couldntt make the form of exchange 
value rational because the institution of slaveryl which 
was perfectly natural to him,, could not do so either. 
Logically, the equivalent form of property in 
exchange expresses equal amounts of human labour, 
HistorIcallyp corresponding with this, the exchange 
economy and trade generally is only developed so far 
as human. labour has become human labour in general, 
or, to give It a more technical-soundIng termo so far 
as human labour has become homogeneous abstract social 
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labour. The institution of slavery contradicts this 
development. Consequently# slavery can only; develop 
patty commodity production and exchanget It contradicts 
the logic of exchange value* Slavery cannot make the 
form of exchange value rational and as trade and 
commerce become increasingly significants as they 
become developed to their limit under such conditions, 
as in the later Roman Empire, one or the other must 
give waye This contradiction between the forces and 
relations of production and erchange furnishes here 
the material basis of the famous decline and fall 
of Rome. 
In Aristotle's day, petty commodity production 
was a great deal less developed than that realized 
under the later Roman Empire. Thus It Is no surprise 
that the expression of value, as It appeared In the 
development of a money economy amidst the unstable 
anarchy of the city-states, appeared also as "a 
makeshift for practical purposes", for that, by and 
large, Is what it was. The iabour of antiquity$ slave 
labour for the most part, did not meet with the 
contradiction that It was-to be rendered equal with 
other forms of human labour because production for 
exchange only existed in a very rudimentary way* 
H. Arendt, The Human Condition, P-74. 
According to this author, this riCid brute/ 
human dichotomy Is "the reason for tho much 
misunderstood Greek theory of the non-human 
nature of the slave"* She continues: 
"Aristotle, who argued this theory so 
explicitly, and then, on his deathbedp freed 
his slaves, may not be so Inconsistent as 
moderns are inclined to think. Ile denied not 
the slave*s capacity to be human$ but only 
the word Imani for members of the species 
mankind as long as they were totally subject 
to necessity. " - Ibid. The inconsistency,, 
however, Is still with ArIstotleg because If 
the slave has "the capacity to be human". as 
Arendt puts It. then, In Aristotle's own terms, 
he need not be subject to necessity* In I 
other words, "necessity" hero is not absolute# 
but social* Necessity, for Aristotlet howevort 
meant necessIty9 that Is to say, natural 
necessity, and as a result of this he never 
managed to cot out of the circularity involved 
in saying that a slave is a slave because he 
Is a slave* Thuss "Whoever, therefore# are as 
much Inferior to their follows as the body is 
to the soul, or the brutes to men (and this 
Is in reality the case with all whose proper 
use Is In their bodlesq and whose highest 
excellence consists In this part)p thosep I 
sayq are slaves by nature ... He then is by 
nature formed a slaveg who is fitted to become 
the chattel of another person, and on that 
account Is sot and who has just enough reason 
to perceive that there Is such a faculty# 
without being indued with the use of It"* - 
Arlstotleg Worksp po 12-1: 3* The phrase 
Ochattol of another person" Is quite 
contradictoi7 since It accredits the thavo 
with the mutually exclusive qualities of the 
person and the thing, and Ar-Istotlep rocognising 
this, does not Got rid of*1t by qualifying the 
personality here with "Just enough reason to 
perceive etc. $', for to admit this is to admit 
the quality of personality while trying to 
exclude It. 
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Consequently, for Aristotle, the institution of slavery 
as social labour figured not as a contradictory inode 
of expressing value in exchange with other forms of 
labour, but as a imde of excluding necessary labour 
from the activity proper to free men. Arendt makes 
this latter point when she writes: 
The Institution of slavery in anti, quityt though 
not In later times, was'not a devIce for cheap 
labour or an instrument of exploitation for 
profit but rather the attempt to exclude labour 
from the conditions of mants life, What men 
share with all other forms ?f animal life was 
not considered to be human. 
The crucial point which is emphasIsed in all this 
Is that the form of 'Value cannot be considered 
Independently of Its social character. Aristotle 
could not discover "In truth" the equivalent form 
formally embodied in exchange because the society 
of his day did not have this '*truth'19 It had, In 
factt just the opposite, unequal human I: abour. 
Slaveryt generally, is a barrier against the rational 
development of exchange. It is specifically bourgeois 
society which furnishes the historical conditions 
under which the form of value becomes rational. It 
Is specifically bourgeois iioclety which realises 
the principle of equality In all forms of human labour. 
Here petty commodity production becomes generalised 
commodity production and human labour becomes, par 
excellence, human labour in general. 
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From this It follows that to talk about the 
equivalent form of commodities Is really to*talk, 
specifically, about the equivalent form of cormnoditles 
in bourgeois society, because It is only in bourgeois 
society that its principle, equal human labour, is 
fully and properly realised, because It is only in 
bourgeois society that production is, absolutelyp 
production for exchange, where, consequently, human 
labour is realised as human labour in general, or, 
what Is the same thing, as homogeneous social labour. 
It follows, moreover, that it is only when these 
conditions have been established historically, that 
the form of value can be properly comprehended and 
thus yield the novel insights into the contradictory 
character of exchange under previous conditions. 
The anatomy of man, as Marx saId9 is here the key 
to the anatomy of the ape. 
The form of value is thus a social relation of 
bourgeois society. Its Itapplicationt' to previous 
societies therefore yields the correct result that 
it Is not there as such, but only as something 
increasingly irrational depending upon how far exchange 
has become developed under conditions which contradict 
its principle of equal human labour. 
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However, we cannot go much further without saying 
what it is In particular about bourgeois society 
which enables It to realise the principle of equal 
human labour, and thus produce everything, so far 
as It is earthly possible, as articles for exchange 
on the market. The secret lies naturally in the 
relations of production, but to say that these are 
characterised with the aim of reallsing human labour 
as homogeneous social labour, that is to say, by the 
aim of producing exclusively for exchange, although 
trueg is a rather circular process of argumentation. 
We have to say something more about the character of 
the relations of production themselves. Moreovert we 
have yet to bring the form of law into the picture. 
Why Is the form of value so important in this 
connection? In a word, It furnishes the form of 
modern law In as much as it is the material basis 
of an equivalent formo The whole business here 
turns on the social development of this equivalent 
form, which Ist simultaneously, Its legal developmento 
Of course, in pre-capitallst societies, where the 
exchange form is relatively undevelopedg Its implications 
for generating legal categories is correspondingly 
diminishedp although, as we shall see, In Roman law, 
-33- 
because commodity production had been developed to 
a high level of sophistication given the limiting 
conditions of slavery under which this development 
was constrained, an apparently Itmodern" system of 
legal reasoning appeared alongside it. But all 
these questions, production relations, legal relations 
and their connections, we shall come to in a moment. 
Before we do this, however, there Is a little more 
which may be said on behalf of the form which provides 
the basis of these connectionrt namely, the equivalent 
form of commodities. 
Clearly It Is not the use-value performed by 
the individual labourer which, under bourgeois 
conditionsp Is equated with all other forms of labour. 
The welder does not perform the same task as the 
herdsman, and neither of these perform the same task 
as the clerkg and so on and so forth* What renders 
these manifestly different activities equal such 
that their products may relate to each other as values 
Is the productive system under which these tasks are 
in common performed. The productive system which 
develops to perfection human labour as abstract, 
homogeneous social labour is that system which produces 
exclusively for exchange, in a word, the system of 
capitalist production, or, what is the same thing, 
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generalised commodity production. The equivalent 
form of property In exchange, dependina upon Its 
social development# expresses the extent to which 
human labour has become homogeneous social labourg 
and the homogeneity of human labour,, in turn, is a 
. 
condition of the historical development of production 
for exchange. The whole business here turns on the 
extent to which production is production for exchange. 
This depends entirely upon the relations of production. 
The equivalent form of commodities thus expresses In 
Its essentially social character, a relation of 
production. Moreover, without actually looking in 
detail at the form of law (except in so far as we 
need to suppose that It expresses an equivalent form 
with a material basIst that is to say, that It is a 
social development of an equivalent form) and without 
looking at the specific character of the relations 
of production, It Is already apparent, In merely 
considering the equivalent form of commodities, that 
both legal and productive relations are essentially 
bound up with one another. But we shall come to the 
explicit character of these connections in a short 
while. 
As a final Illustration of the charactor of the 
equivalent form of commodities, we may mention once 
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more Its measure (not least because a good deal of 
confusion surrounds this). Measure appears as 
magnitude but Is not synonymous with magnitude as 
such. The measure of value in exchange reallsed 
by a given commodity Is a socially necessary quantum 
of labour-t1me expended throughout the course of Its 
production. The measure here appears as a quantum 
hours social labour), but even In this the quantum 
Is never independent of the qualitative relation 
(social labourv socially necessary labour). This is 
made clear by Marx when he writes: 
Some people might think that if the 'value of a 
commodity is detBrmined by the quantity of labour 
spent on it, the more idle and unskillful the 
labourert the more valuable would his commodity 
be, because more time would be required in Its 
production. The labourg howeverg that forms 
the substance of valuet is homogeneous human 
labour, expenditure of one uniform labour-powere 
The total labour-power of societyg which Is 
embodied In the sum total of the values of all 
commodities produced by that socletyp counts here 
as one homogeneous mass of human labour-powerp 
composed though It be of innumerable Individual 
units. Each of these units Is the same as any 
otherg so far as it has the character of the 
average labour-power of society, and takes effect 
as such; that Isp so far as It Is no more than is 
socially necessary* The labour-time socially 
necessary is that required to produce an article 
under normal conditions of productionp and with 
the average degree of skill and intensity 
prevalent at the time, The introduction of 
power looms Into England probably reduced by 
one-half the labour-time required to weave a 
given/ 
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given quantity of yarn Into cloth* The hand- 
loom weaversp as a matter of fact, continued 
to require the same time as before; but for 
all that, the product of one hour of their 
labour represented after the change only half 
an hour's social labour, and conTequently fell 
to one-half of Its former value. 
The magnitude of valuet labour-time, as a measure, Is 
Inseparable from the social development of commodity 
production. Marxts model here, without being 
explicitly stated, is the capitalist modelv because 
production is supposed to be exclusively production 
of commodities. 
The equivalent form of commodities thus becomes, 
materially, a socially determined quantum of labour- 
time expended over the course of their production. 
This value, which can only appear and be reallsed 
in the act of exchange, concealss without need of 
being explicitly statedo a definite relational 
Integument of specifically capitalist production# 
because, as Is Illustrated In the quote taken from 
Marx, all labour Is supposed as homogeneous social 
labour, which Is a condition of capitalist society 
alone. HereInafterg when we shall have cause to 
speak of the equivalent form of commodities, ort more 
often simply the equivalent form (since Its social 
I- Marxg Capital Vol. 1, p. 46. 
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development by no means stays with commodities), 
It is important that this connection is never 
lost sight of. 
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The Equivalent form of Commodities and the Equivalent 
form of Persons* 
The equivalent form of commoditiesp we have said, 
Is a social relation expressing equal human labouro 
The "truth" of this matter is realised only in 
bourgeois society, for In other kinds of society it 
Is systematically contradicted by inequalities in 
the various forms of labour, where, accordingly, 
production can only ever by petty commodity production* 
Now In laws the equivalent form of commodities becomes 
an equivalent form of persons, and this also Is a 
"truth's which Is only fully appropriate to bourgeois 
conditions of social production. 
How does the equivalent form of commodities become 
an equivalent form of persons? The commodity is 
property In exchange. Property is a relation of 
person to thing* Therefore the commodity as such 
never exists independently of an owner. As Marx 
says: 
Commodities are things, and therefore without 
power of resistance against man... In order that 
these objects may enter into relation with 
each other as commodities, their guardians must 
place themselves In relation to one another# as 
persons whosewIll resides in those objectsp and 
must behave In such a way that each does not 
appropriate the com cUty of the other, and 
part with his owng, except by means of an act done 
by mutual consent. They must, therefore, 
mutually recognIse in each other the rights of 
private/ 
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private proprietors. This juridical relation# 
which thus expresses itself in a contract, 
whether such a contract be part of a developed 
legal system or not, is a relation between two 
wills, and is but a reflex of the real economic 
relation between the two. It is the economic 
relation that determines the subject rpatter 
comprised in each such juridical act* 
Two kinds of relationships may be distinguished here, 
the relation between commodities as equivalents, 
2 
and 
the relation between the participants In the exchange 
act. Each of these relations is a condition of the 
other. The commodity, being inanimate, cannot take 
Itself to mark-ett and the person, without the commodity 
In his possession, has nothing to take. Exchange 
supposes both commodity and person on either side of 
the act. However, what puts the person In the exchange 
act In a relation of equality with his opposite number 
is not his will as such, but his will as a personIfi- 
cation of the commodity. It is the commodity which 
furnishes the equivalent form, not the person. People 
do not automatically relate to one another as equals 
except on condition that they recognise in each other 
something which may be rendered equal without addition 
or subtraction. This condition is provided directly 
with the commodities which each holds in his possession 
1. Marxp Capital Vol. 1, p. 88. 
2. It is to be assumedg for simplicItyts saker that 
the commodity need not be distinguished from 
Its money equivalent. 
upon the Initiation of the business of exchanging 
them. This Is the sense in which the mutual agreement 
between the two wills, Is "a reflex of the real 
economic relation between the two". 
It Is to be pointed out that the reflexive 
character of the "Juridical" moment In the exchange 
act by no means corresponds with some sort of illusory 
quality. It is an absolutely necessary result which 
comes hand In hand with the fact of both person and 
commodity being necessary on either side of the 
exchange relation* On the other hand# we shall see, 
this doesntt prevent the equivalent form of persons 
giving rise to the most fantastic Illusions* 
Let us make quite clear what this equivalent 
form of persons amounts to. It Is the form of the 
individual in the strictly limited sphere of commodity 
exchange. Here the "person" figures essentially as 
the "wIll" of his commodity and It Is only as such 
that he becomes the equal of his opposite number* 
"What chiefly distinguishes a commodity from its 
ownerg, " says Marx, 
is the fact that it looks upon every other 
commodity as but a form of appearance of Its 
own value. A born leveller and cynic, it is 
always ready to exchange not only soult but 
body, with every other commodityl, be the same 
more/ 
more repulsive than Maritornes herself. The 
owner makes up for this lack in the commodity 
of a sense of the concrete, by his own five 
and more senses. His commodity possesses for 
him no Immediate use-value. Otherwise, he would 
not bring It to the ma ket. It has use-value 
for dthers; but for himself Its only direct 
use-value is that of being a depository of 
exchange-valuag andq consequentlyt a means of 
exchange* Therefore, he makes up his mind 
to part with it for commodities whose use- 
value Is of service to him. All commodities 
are non-use-values for their ownerso and use- 
values for their non-owners* Consequently, 
they must all change hands* But this change of 
hands Is what constitutes their exchange, and 
the latter puts them In relation with efch other 
as valuesq and realises them as values. 
For cummoditles to exchange they must have owners who 
recognise In one another their likeness* The basis 
of this inheres in the commodities themselves* 
To recapitulate: Commodities cannot exchange 
themselvest they need an owner to personify them. 
In this way a "Juridical" moment appears in the 
exchange act, which refers to the relation between 
the persons participating In the exchange. Clearly 
It is a necessary relationship. Marx, whom we have 
already quoted In this connectionp says quite 
specifically (and It Is sufficiently Important to bear 
repeating) thatp "In order that these obJects May 
enter into relation with each other as commodities, 
their guardianso., *must ... mutually recognise in each 
. 
other the rights of private proprietors. ft In other 
1. Marx, Cap: Ltal Vol. 1tp. 88. 
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wordst such a recognition is a logical condition upon 
which commodities actually appear as commodities, 
The commodity is the form of property in exchange, 
and for commodities to exchanget for them actually 
to reallse their implicit value in exchanget they 
must change hands between their ownersl whop moreovert 
must recognise each other as owners, and furthermoret 
as "rightful" ownersp at least In the rudimentary 
sense that each does not appropriate, without alienating 
an equivalent In returnp that which belongs to the 
other. 
Now what puts the owners of commodities Into 
relation with each other as equals, recognisine as 
they do the same rights in each otherp Is precisely 
the common substance which they both possess as 
equals, without need of any additIonp namelyv commodities. 
It is the commodity-form Itself which moves them to 
the position of recognising the same rights in each. 
Each party to the exchange does not need to come 
dressed as a lawyer, all he needs to do is to bring 
his commodity to the market and have the will to 
exchange Ito indeed, each'party does not need to 
recognise anything beyond the aim of giving up something 
in exchange for something else. Each sees here only 
the object of his o wn selfish desires, the commodity 
Harxg Grundris3o, p*24-1* The text horo 
from which the quotation is made comprises 
a largo bulk of Harx's rough notes* 
Henco the appearance of the following 
important continuation (the Hegelian terms 
in parentheses are Harx's)s ".. each 
arrives at his end only In no far as he 
servos the other as =oan3; *. each becomes 
moans for the other (boing for another 
only as end In hi=301f (boina for solfý.. (T)he reciprocity In which each in at the 
same time mean3 and endoo is a necessary 
facto presupposed as a natural precondition 
of exchange# butp as auchg it in irrelevant 
to each of the two subjects in exchange*. (T)his reciprocity Interests him only In 
so far as It satisfies his interest to 
the exclusion of, without reference too 
that of the other.. (T)ho common interest 
which appears an the motive of the not 
as a whole Is recognisod as a fact by 
both sides; butt as such, it in not tho 
motive, but rather proceeds, as It wore, 
behind the back of those nolf-rofloctod 
particular Interestson ibid. Harx 
summarlses all thin in a phrase which 
graphically captures the ossonce of tho 
so-called general Interest: 
"The general Interest is precisely 
the generality of self-seeking 
Interests, " - ibid, 
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of the other, and In so doing realises the other's 
means of attaining this end. The hidden basis of 
this mutual self-interest Is the equivalent form 
of commodities. 
In the act of exchange: 
No one seizes hold of another's property by 
force. Each divests himself of his property 
voluntarily. But this is not all: individual 
A serves the need of individual B by means of 
the commodity a only In so far as and becauso 
individual B serves the need of individual A 
by means of the commodity b, and vice versa* 
Each serves the other in order to serve himself; 
each makesiuse of the other, reciprocally, as 
his means. 
The interest of one is here the interest of all. 
It is the material basis of the form of modern law. 
The Individual, in looking only to hImselfp satisfies 
the Interest of the other, and that other, looking 
also only to himself, satisfies the Interest of the 
former. Individual interest In this way becomes at 
the same time a general Interestv and so far as this 
exchange relation Is developed socially it becomes 
Increasingly characteristic of the form of law. 
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CommoditX Production and Legal Relations 
a) Generallsed Commodity Production. 
Where commodity production is generalised the 
equivalent form of commodity ownership corresponds 
with the form of law. As commodity owners, the mass 
of people avail themselves of equal legal personality* 
The condition of the form of modern law is therefore 
the condition under which the mass of people become 
owners and exchangers of commodities* 11istoricallyt 
this condition is provided with the appearance of 
free wage labour. 
Wage labour Is free in a two-fold sensep which, 
according to Marxq means "that as a free man he can 
dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, 
and that on the other hand he has no other commodity 
for sale, Is short of everything necessary for the 
reallsation of his labour-power. ft 
1 
Let us take the 
first sense first. Wage labour is free because and 
so far as the ability to work Is separated from the 
person In whom that capacity inheres, that Is to say, 
because and so far as labour-power has become an 
alienable commodity and figures, therefore, as'a 
relation of property, tee. as a relation of person 
to thing* In order that he may be able to sell, as 
a commodityp his ability to work, the wage-worker must, 
1. Marx, Cap: Ltal Vol. *, p. 166. 
-4.5- 
according to Marx, "be the untrammelled owner of 
his capacity for labour, I. e. of his person. " 
I 
This 
additional fli, e. of his person" looks odd, for the 
subject who owns appears, with this, as the thing 
owned. If the property relation is to stand as 
such, it must be a relation of person to thing, and 
so in this case the thing, the commodity labour-power, 
cannot be the person of the wage-labourer. If this 
were not the case, as soon as the labourer sold his 
commodity he would sell himself. He would revert 
to becoming a slave. But the riddle is explained 
by Marx when he adds. - 
He (the wage-worker) and the owner of money meet 
In the market, and deal with each other on the 
basis of equal rights, with this difference 
alone, that one Is the buyer, the other seller-, 
both, therefore, equal in the eyes of the law. 
The continuance of this relation demands that 
the owner of the labour-power should sell it 
only for a definite period, for if he were to 
sell it rump and stump, once for all, he would 
be selling himself, converting himself from a 
free man into a slave, from an owner of a 
commodity into a commodity. He must constantly 
look upon his labour-power as his own property, 
his own commodity, and this he can do by placing 
It at the disposal of the btrZer temporarily, 
for a definite period of time. By this means 
he can ajoid renouncing his rights of ownership 
over It, 
In this way the person of the labourer is only 
apparently Inalienable, in the sense that, as distinct 
I. Marx,, Capital Vol. 1, p. 165. 
2. ibid. p. 16.5. 
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-1 from the condition of slavery, personality always 
returns to him as the exclusive owner of It. But 
this constant "return" must always be a constant 
return from somewhere, that is to say, the worker's 
personality, so far as we accept that it inheres in 
the form of labour, only returns to him on condition 
that It has been given up by him over and over again. 
Personality, as active human labour, Is alienated as 
a commodity an d consumed by another only to reappear 
again in the hands of its original owner. 
1 
The 
Inalienable right of personality in this way 
expresses a condition of its being constantly 
alienated In the repeated purchase and sale of the 
commodity labour-power. But we must look at this 
peculiar process a little closer. 
As with all other commodities, the purchase and 
sale of the commodity labour-power is an exchange of 
equivalents. The labourer receives, In return for 
his ability to work for a given duration, the value 
of his labour-power, which,, as with the value of all 
The truth of the assumption that personality 
is the same thing as that which is repeatedly 
alienated and appropriated as the commodity 
labour-power, is expressed in the commonly-held 
view that one only "comes alive" at the end of 
the day's work, despite the tremendous effort 
made on the part of the purchaser of labour- 
power to Get his full "poind of flesh"* cfo 
Generally, Braverman,, "Labour and Monopoly 
Capital". 
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commodities, is expressed materially in the socially- 
necessary labour embodied in the value given in 
exchange, in this case the wage-goods that he acquires, 
indirectly, as a result of having sold this labour- 
power. In other words, the exchange-value of labour- 
power, as with all other commodities, Is, on average 
(and here, as throughout, only properly abstract 
average conditions are supposed), the socially 
necessary labour embodied In Its production. 
Concretely, this value Is represented in the wage- 
goods which the labourer receives as a result of 
having alienated his commodity labour-power In 
exchange; goodsp moreover, which he consumes and 
In so doing reproduces this latter commodity afreshp 
ready for re-sale. This then is how the labourer's 
commodity, the only one which he has to sell, always 
comes back to him, namely, by exchanging it for the 
subsistence which reproduces it. Consequentlyp it is 
always his, the ability to work, this life-actIvIty 
inherent in the person of the labourer is his and 
his alone, so long as he continually alienates It. 
Labour-power Is, in fact, all the active and 
creative life-giving potential of man subjugated 
under the commodity-form of property. The labourer's 
commodity thus remains essentially himself, his persong 
says Marx. Yet this seems quite contradictory. The 
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commodity-form Is a form of property, and property 
is a relation of person to thing. The property 
relation as person owns person only comes about when 
the person, as object, as thing owned, is a slavep 
and in this case both subject and object are separate 
entities. To say, therefore, that a person owns 
himself, which is what ownership of the commodity 
labour-power amounts to, Is to say that he is a slave 
to himself. This is really Marxts point; free wage 
labour Is voluntary slavery. Being possessed of his 
capacity to work, the wage labourer is no slave; 
he has the free disposition to do with it as he 
wishes. On the other hand, the condition of this 
right is that he has no productive means of his own 
with which to actuate this labour-power. He must, 
therefore, sell it - "Robson's choice". But In 
order that this process does not take place once 
and once only, in order that this free and equal 
transaction be repeated over and over again, it can 
only apply for a fixed and definite duration; where- 
upon the wage labourer avoids selling himself into 
slavery and the repeated alienation and appropriation 
of labour-power furnishes the inalienable rights of 
the individual over what is his. 
fp 
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The purchase and sale of labour-power, taking 
place as it does In the sphere of circulation or 
exchange of commodities, is an exchange of equivalents. 
This we have already mentioned. Moreover, being an 
act of equal exchange, there Is no question here of 
the seller of labour-power being exploited by the 
purchaser. Howeverl this equivalent exchange 
initiates a peculiar process of consumption. As 
with the consumption of all use-values, the consumption 
of labour-power is a private matter. What is really 
purchased in the exchange of labour-power Is not 
merely something for which the equivalent Is eagerly 
provided, but the labourer's capacity, once purchased, 
to create value way in excess of this outlay. What 
is purchased here Is not just the capacity of the 
worker to re-create in the value of the product the 
value of the materials initially laid out on the 
given productive operation (raw materialsp wear and 
tear of machinery, tools etc. and labour-power itself9 
i*e. wages) but on top of all this, a new value, a 
surplus-valuep which appears in the forms of profit, 
Interest and rent. This mode of appropriation of 
surplus-labour, which begins with an apparently free 
and equal transaction between buyer and seller of 
labour-power, is the Ithidden secret" of capitalist 
production. 
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The. equivalent form of commodities in the 
purchase and sale of labour-power and in the innumerable 
contracts entailed In the purchase and sale of wage- 
goods means that in law the worker is an equal with 
his opposite number, the capitalist, from whom he is 
paid for his capacity to augment the capital-value 
initially invested in the productive processp and to 
whom he pays, coterls paribus, for the wage-goods 
that he, the worker, has produced. The proper meaning 
of bourgeois legal ideology is therefore that the 
law does not without truth consider persons as equals, 
for equals they are so far as they are merely 
exchangers of commodities, but that in fixing its 
gaze here, on the form of exchange alone, It 
systematically prevents itself from considering the 
less conspicuous relations underlying it* This 
systematic blindness, we shall see,, operates throughout 
the entire spectrum of modern legal culture rather 
like the doctrine of original sin In the application 
of Christian dialectics to culture In general. 
To recapitulate: the equivalent-form operates 
in the exchange of labour-power just as it does with 
all other commodities. In the exchange of labour. 
power, the wDrker receives an equivalent via the 
social labour embodied in the wage-goods that accrue 
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to him as a result of this exchange and it is in 
the consumption of these goods that nature restores 
afresh that same labour-power ready to begin the 
process again. Labour-power is thus cheapened, the 
less social labour there Is congealed in the relative 
means of subsistence, a process which appears 
concretely in a general attack upon working-class 
living standards. The point here, however, is simply 
that in the exchange of labour-power, equivalent is 
exchanged for equivalent. It is therefore quite 
erroneous to say that, under capitalist conditions, 
the worker gets paid less than his value. Exploitation 
does not take place, ceteris parlbus, in the realm 
of exchange. The worker does not got paid less than 
his value, for his value Is what he gets; rather, 
he gets paid less than the value which he produces, 
which, under capitalist conditions, includes not 
merely his own value, the value of his labour-power, 
and neither merely this alongside the value of raw 
materials and worn-out equipment re-created in the 
value of the product, but, in addition to this, also 
embodied in the value of the product of the given 
productive process, a surplus-value. It is all for 
sake of this latter that the entire bouregols social 
order clings to the narrow form of equality which 
initiates and terminates over and over again its 
production. At the end of the second part of the 
first volume of Capital, Marx, In a well-known 
passage, comments on the realm of circulation, 
where commodities change handsv thus: 
This sphereo. wIthin whose boundaries the sale 
and purchase of labour-power goes on, is In 
fact a very Eden of the Innate rights of man. 
There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property 
and Bentham* Freedom, because both buyer 
and seller of a commodity, say of labour- 
power, are constrained only by their free 
will* They contract as free agents, and the 
agreement they come to, Is but the form In 
which they give legal expression to their 
common will. Equality, because each enters 
into relation with the other, as with a simple 
owner of commodities, and they exchange 
equivalent for equivalent. Property, because 
each disposes only of what is his own. And 
Bentham, because each looks only to himself. 
The only force that brings them together and 
puts them in relation with each other, Is the 
selfishness, the gain and private interests 
of each. Each looks to himself only, and no 
one troubles himself about the rest, and just 
because they do sov do they allv in accordance 
with the pre-established harmony of things, or 
under the auspices of an all-shrewd providence, 
work together to their mutual advantage, fo: r 
the common weal and in the Interest of all. 
Freedom, Equality and Property (we can forget 
about Bentham) are the hall s of modern legal 
thought* These categories take on their various 
guises In modern legal thought in direct response 
1. Marx, Cap: Ltal Vol. Iv P-172. 
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to the generalised form of commodity production and 
exchange. Their legal appearance sub specie aeterni, 
Is a result which comes about precisely on this 
accountg namely that they are grounded In the specific 
historical form of generallsed (capitalist) commodity 
production and exchange. 
The sphere of exchanget taken along, independently 
of the productive relations which It supposest appears 
as a domain of perfect equality and freedom. But 
the equality here Is really only the equality of 
persons as owners of property in exchange, as exchangers 
of commodities. This "Juridical" moment of the exchange 
act, however, becomes transformed Into a manifold 
of legal equality. For example, the latter has appeared 
historically as Onatural" equality in natural law theory, 
and thiss, in turn has undergone a whole host of 
metamorphoses under the auspices of the category of 
"nature". In unreflective legal dogma, in private 
law doctrine for Instance, where no attempt is made 
to bring anything else to light regarding the riddle 
of equality, the equivalent form is inclined to rest 
in Its raw state, as merely tho "Juridical" moment 
of property In exchange. But all those developments 
of the equivalent form we shall come to In detail later 
on. All that we need to note here is that at the roots 
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of the vast and complex modern legal structure there 
lies a simple abstract '*Juridical" form which becomes 
the legal persona which, as such, becomes fixed as 
the eternal mystery of "one and all". This persona# 
In essence, Is merely the form of the Individual in 
his aspect as an exchanger of commocUtieso In this, 
he becomes a veritable deus ex machina, a living 
Incarnation of property, equality and freedom# 
because the basis of this process is the form of 
property In exchange, the equivalent form of commoditles, 
which freely change hands In the market. In this, 
he becomes, so far as all are commodity owners, the 
equal of everyone else, because every act of exchange 
Is an exchange of equivalents, whether it is a prince, 
a parson or a wbrker who brings his pound of silver to 
ma ket. Here property becomes, In law, personality, 
because here, in the sphere of exchange, property 
Is personality. The commodity actuates Its "will" 
through its owner, who, as Marx saysl, "makes up 
for the lack in the commodity of a sense of the 
concrete by his own five and more senses"* Consequently, 
the norms of individual behaviour are hero the same 
as those of everyone else; each looks only to his own 
selfish requirements and In so doing posits himself 
as a means for the achievement of his (that other's) 
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end. The Individual interest becomes the common 
Interest, and, by the same route, this form of the 
individual as a commodity owner, becomes the form 
of modern law. 
Exchange, however, supposes production for 
exchange, and production for exchange supposes 
definite relations of production. The act of exchange 
Is, In a sense, the most "obvious" of socio-economic 
relationst taking place as It does on the surface 
of society before the eyes of everyone. But the 
very fact of the Individual as an exchanger of 
commodities supposes that he entersq first and 
foremost, into relations of a rather different naturep 
namely, as a producer, for without production there 
would be no commodities at all let alone the mode in 
which they change hands and circulate. 
The conditions of generalised commodity relations 
and thus also the universal-abstract character of law 
which arises therefrom, are the relations of produ6tion. 
These we have considered primarily in connection with 
free wage labour. But the wage labourer, it is not 
to be forgotten, is "free" in the double sense: firstly, 
as a commodity-owner, an owner of labour-power, along 
with all the rightswhich come with the legal 
personality attached thereto, and secondly, "freelf 
1. Thomas More expressed the dawning of BrItIsh 
capitalism when he wrote In hIs "UtOPia"t 
, "These placid creatures 
(sheep), which 
used to require so little food, have now 
apparently developed a raging appetitep and 
turned into man-eaters* Fieldst housesp tournst 
everything goes down their throats. To put 
It more plainly, In those parts of the 
Kingdom where the finest, and so the most 
expensive wool is produced, the nobles and 
gentlemen, not to mention several saintly 
abbots, have grown dissatisfied with the Income 
that their predecessors got out of their estates. 
They're no longer content to lead lazy$ comfort- 
able lives, which do no good to society - they 
must'actIvely do It harmp by enclosing all the 
land they can for pasturo, *. Each greedy indIvIduaLJL, 
preys on his native land like a malignant growth, ' 
absorbing field after field, and enclosing 
thousands of acres with a single fence. 
Result - hundreds of farmers are evicted.. " 
- Bk*19 p. 46-7- 
In Britain, this and similar forms of 
expropriation continued throughout the 16th. 
and 17th- centuries* Legislation on the one 
hand fought vainly against these acts of 
violent expropriationg and on the other band 
fought viciously against the consequences, 
namely$ the masses, of expropriated peasants who 
became beggars, vagabonds, thieves etc.. 
Legislation against these latter Is striking 
, 
for Its brutal and horrific naturet entailing 
such, punishments (for having been robbed) as 
branding, ear-cutting, whipping etc,. Later on, 
as, these expropriated masses began to be 
Increasingly made use of as factory fodder, the 
. resulting new-found sources of wealth, in turn furnished appetites and resources for much 
grander forms of expropriation, and by the end 
of the eighteenth century, parliament becomes 
directly involved in it with Its Acts for the 
enclosure of the Common lands. cf. Marx, 
Capital Vol. 1, p. 676-7- 
In the face of this long historical process 
wherei. n capitalist property relations come into 
the world 11dripping from head to foot, from 
every pore, with blood and-dirt, " Blackstone's 
legal casuistry Is amusing. He writes: ".. there., 
are very few that will give themselve ý'tho, 
trouble to consider the origin and foundation 
of this right (to property). Pleased as we are 
with'the possession, we seem afraid to look back 
to the means by which It was acquiredg as If 
fearful of some defect in our title... " He 
continues boldly, "These inquiries (into the 
means by which the right to property is acquired), 
It must be owned, would be useless and even 
troublesome in common life, It is well if tuo 
I 
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in the sense of being deprived of all the means of 
actuating for himself the use-value of his commodity. 
Wage-labour thus expresses a condition in which the 
means of production are concentrated in the hands of 
a class other than itself, namely, a capitalist class 
of owners. Although Shylock's claim may not be 
exactly true, and certainly few would want to admit 
It in his own case, that "You take my life when you 
do take the means whereby I live*', it is clear that 
tho wage-labourer, with no means of actuating his 
ability to work, is compelled to meet the owner of 
those means in the market and do business with him; 
and it is clear moreover, as a glance at the history 
books shows, that these means have, historically, 
been taken from him. In Britain, for example, this 
latter process of the expropriation of the means 
of production from the mass of direct producerst begins 
in the late 15th century with the enclosures of sheep- 
pastures and continues, in one form and anotherv on an 
increasingly social scale as capital develops* 
I 
This 
(note 1 cont.. ) 
mass of mankind will bbey the laws when made, 
without scrutInising too nicely into the reasons 
for making them. tt - Commentaries etc., Vol. 2,, p. l. 
For those not engaged in t1common life", sufficiently 
intellegent to understand this mystery, Blackstone's 
answer begins: flIn the beginning of the world,, we 
are informed by holy writ, the all-bountiful Creator 
gave to man 'dominion over all the earth; and over 
the fish of the sea.. ' ... 11 etc. etc. And modern 
property rights arise post hoc ergo propter hoe. 
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bloody history of the separation of labour from the 
means of production Is the secret history of the 
development of modern law. 
The historical separation of labour from the 
means of production Is the basis of free wage-labour. 
The result Is that the labourer must sell, as a 
comm dity, his ability to work to his opposite number 
in the market. This latter character also figures 
here as a commodity owner and so both are considered 
as equal personallties so far as the law is considered. 
Butýthe basis of this transaction Is just the opposite 
of a relation of equality; its basis is the fundamental 
inequality regarding ownership of the means of production. 
The basis of this transaction, the condition compelling 
the labourer to do business in the market with his 
opposite number, is that the former has no other means 
of actuating his ability to work and therefore must 
sell this ability to the latter in whose hands these 
means are concentrated. However, it is precisely on 
account of this basic inequality that labour becomes 
subsumed under the commodity-form of property, and 
therefore on this very same account that the mass of 
persons acquire equal legal personality. Property, 
as always, is the basis of legal personality, and Just 
as the "capacity to be human" was never the issue so 
far as Roman legal personality was concerned, neither 
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is it the case with bourgeois law. The greatest and 
most significant modern legal development bearing 
forceful testimony to this is the development of 
corporate personality, for the whole point of a 
corporation as a "person" is that it can thereby 
own property independently of its constituent members. 
It Is only In modern law, that equal 
legal personality applies to the mass of persons, 
and this arises directly as a result of generallsed 
commodity relations. Thus it is only here that the 
equivalent form of commodity relations furnishes 
the basis of legal abstraction and generates the 
general "subject of rights" enabling the development 
of abstract patterns of legal reasoning characteristic 
of specifically modern law. On the other hand, It Is 
nonetheless true that, where we find In earlier times 
legal thought strongly resembling modern legal 
abstraction, we findp also, the development of 
commodity relations in some degree of relative 
sophistication. There are, however, important 
differences and it is Instructive to take note of 
them. 
b) Petty Commodity Production. 
Commodity relations, wherever they have become 
developed on. a relatively elaborate social scale, 
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bring with them as a general rule a corresponding 
development of legal relations rudely approximate 
to their fully developed modern form. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in the case of Roman law, 
which gets Its highly significant "modern" connections 
from the fact of a highly developed system of commodity 
production and exchange politically centered upon 
Rome and spread throughout the great Empire. Much 
earlier still, ancient trading nations like the 
Babylonians or the Phoenicians havet for similar 
reasons, been noted by legal historians for the rude 
"modern" character of their law. But let us stay 
with the classic example of Rome. 
Roman commodity production is developed within 
the fetters of slavery. Consequently, the kinds of 
legal developments which arose alongside the growth 
of production and trade throughout the Empire reflect 
this condition. The slave, even within the "law of 
nations", which is the most important In this -connection, 
cannot have legal personality and therefore the Romans 
knew nothing of a general right-bearing unit. Slavery? 
as a fetter upon the development of commodity production 
and exchange, is correspondingly a fetter upon the 
development of legal abstraction. But lot us look 
at these connections in more detail. 
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One of the highest achievements of Roman civill- 
sation, it is well-known, was its law. This law 
attains its most comprehensive statement in 
Justinian's Corpus Juris CIvilis. What modern 
jurists and legal historians have scarcely paid any 
attention to, however, Is that the woVks of Justinian 
appear at a time when the Roman Empire was on the 
verge of collapse -a coincidence which Is not 
accidental. The rational simplicity of the Corpus 
Juris reflects the material erosion of an Irrational 
system upon which the imperial edifice was grounded. 
The finite limits to Roman legal abstraction are 
reached at a time when commodity production and 
exchange reaches Its limits under the IrratIonal 
fetters of slavery. 
The symptoms of these connections are apparent 
in Justinian's legal writings. Here Is an example. 
In the first title of Us Institutes, we observe a 
'very Important oppositiong an opposition which, 
in its modern connectionsl, we-shall devote some 
time to in the next chapter, namelyq the opposition 
between public and private. law. For Justinian: 
The study of law consists of two branches# law 
publIc, and law private, The former relates to 
the welfare of the Roman State; the latter to 
the advantage of the individual citizen. Of 
private/ 
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private law then we may say that it is of 
three-fold origin, being collected from the 
precepts of nature, from those of the law of 
natlois, or from those of the civil law of 
Rome. 
To properly understand the historical limitations 
operating upon Roman legal abstractiont it is 
important to get a clear sense of the character 
of the opposition which is reflected here. Private 
law and public law figure here as an opposition of 
interests: on the one hand, the "welfare of the 
Roman State"; on the other hand, tithe advantage 
of the individual citizen", As an Emperori, as 
the figurehead representing the interests of the 
Roman statet Justinian shows a keen awareness of 
that which opposes his imperial majesty* This 
"opposition" appears here as private law, and a 
"polltically opportune" mode of dealing with it 
is, first and foremost, to give It a divided origin 
- for unity Is streng. tho Thus, private law has a 
"three-fold" origin, sundered into the "law of 
nations" (jus gentium), the "precepts of naturelt 
and the civil law of Rome. These three are, however, 
all "to the advantage of the Individual citizen". 
More specifically, they are all to the advantage of 
a developing form of individuality. It Is a form of 
individuality which develops alongside the growth of 
1. Justinian p Institutes, Bk. 1 9 title 1. 
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commerce and trade. Thus, "the law of nations ... is 
the source of almost all contracts, " 
1 
and was, in 
reality, fast becoming distinguished from the civil 
law of Rome merely as a genus is distinguished from a 
particular species of It. The "precepts of nature", 
on the other band, is a piece of early-Christian 
rhetoric, or, to be fair, corrupted Christian rhetoric# 
having become transformed from the language of the 
oppressed into the language of the powerful. But 
this does not concern us here. 
The important question which transpires from all 
this Is, why Is this form of individuality, which is 
typified In the persona of the jus gentium, opposed 
to the interests of the Roman state? This form of 
Individuality is in fact the Roman equivalent of the 
modern persona which springs up alongside the develop- 
ment of commodity relations. The question therefore 
is the same as that which asks, why Is the development 
of production and trade a threat to the Roman state? 
And the answer is that such development, by the time of 
Justinian, Is rationally opposed to the slave system 
upon which It is based. Slavery is both the foundation 
of the Roman imperium. and the fetter upon the rational 
1. Ibid., Bk. 1 , title 2. 
Slaves in Roman Society were incapable of 
lawful marriage. They were considered on 
rare occasions, and most contradictorilyt 
as persons for the practical purpose of 
assigning liability In certain criminal 
matters. In the event of delictual 
liability only the slave's owner could 
be legally responsible. 
"In commerce slaves were important. 
In the classical age free hired service 
was not common: most of the work now done 
by clerks and servants (1) was done by 
slaves* Though they could have no property# 
it was customary from early times to on- 
trust them with a fundq called pecullumt 
sometimes large, in connection with which 
slaves appear, in the Empire, almost as 
independent businessmen, contracting w1th 
their owners and others as if free. As 
they could neither sue nor be sued, the 
master intervened if any question of 
enforcement-arosea As a slave's acquisitions 
were his master's., the latter could bring 
any necessary actions, but obligations 
contracted by the slave did not bind the 
owner at civil law, and a man would not 
readily contract with a slavet if he had 
to rely upon his naturalis obligatio, useless 
while he was a slave, and having little 
effect if he was freed. The praetor 
therefore facilitated the employment of 
slaves In trade by giving actions against 
the master Imposing a liab: Ll: Ltyt varying 
with circumstances, of which the actio de 
peculio was the most important. " - Buckland. 3, Roman Law, p. 6.5. 
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development of the exchange economy, which, as we 
mentioned earlier, requires the equalisatIon of all 
forms of human labour. The appearance in the Itlaw 
of nations" of an equivalent form of individuality 
reflects the increasing Instability of the system 
of slavery which stands nakedly opposed to it. The 
dualism which Justinian reflected as law public and 
law private Is therefore In essence the contradiction 
between the Institution of slavery on the one hand, 
and the further development of the exchange economy 
on the other. 
Slavery Is the key to the form of Roman law. 
The slave cannot be included in any category of 
legal personality. 
I 
But for our purposes there is 
only one persona which needs to be borne in mind, 
and it is that which arises jurls gentlum, with 
the law which develops alongside petty commodity 
production and exchange within the Roman empire. It 
is this legal form which ultimately reduces to a mere 
question of pride the distinctions attached to the 
special classes of Roman citizenship and therewith 
the final significance of ilome Itself. But what Is 
especially important is that it is this Roman legal 
form In particular which approximates most nearly to 
the basic form of modern law. With this, therefore, 
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the significance of the different relations 
of production under which the commodIty-form Is 
developed can be most clearly comprehended In their 
connection with law. 
Slavery was juris gentium, and it Is this which 
makes the latter completely and utterly distinct 
from the form of bourgeois law. 
1 Basically, the 
slave is not a person in law because he cannot 
own property, and he cannot own property because 
he is, himself, property. Ownership Is a relation 
of person to thing, whereas, morality apart, the 
-slave is merely a thingg or rather, a contradictory 
person-thing, an Instrumentum vocalee 
Just as property ownership provides the secret 
of legal personality in modern lawl so Is it the 
case In Roman law. The form of property ownership, 
however, is quite different and, consequently, so Is 
the form of law. In a roundabout way, the jurist, 
Savigny, Gets to posing the essential questions in 
the matter of slavery and Roman law. He says, 
1. We shall see later on the kinds of contradictions 
which arise for those historians and others who 
think otherwise,, who think, in other words, 
that the Roman form provides us with the "origins" 
of the modern form. 
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ItIn order to determine what the Romans actually 
admitted in regard to this matter (the rights and 
obligations of the slave in law) it is necessary 
to distinguish two principal questions. Could the 
slave acquire credits? Could he contract debts? 
Or, what Is the same thing, could he become a 
creditor or a debtor? " 
1 
The economic relation, 
Savigny realises, is the secret of the Juridical 
relation. The slave could neither owe nor be owed 
anything because he could not own anything. Whatever 
he advanced was his masterts and whatever he received 
was his master's also. 
Savigny, Jural Relations,, P-302. He arrives 
at these questions in the following way: 
"When a Roman slave undertook such acts, 
from which obligations would have arisen in 
the case of freemen, their effIcacity might 
come into question under wholly different 
circumstances: during the condition of 
slavery and after emancipation. During the 
condition of slaverys a civilis obligatio was 
clearly impossible, since the slave could 
not appear before a court, either as a claimant 
or a defendant, though a naturalis obligatio 
was in this condition certainly conceivable. 
After emancipation, on the other hand, a 
civilis obligatio, Just as well as a naturalis 
obligatio, was conceivable. " - Ibid. 
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The persona juris gentium was, therefore, a 
status category meaning, essentially, "not-slave"j, 
not of the mass. Consequently, it is different in 
both form and content from the modern commodity 
right-bearing unit. The form of the latter is 
general and subsumes the mass of persons and 
therefore becomes the very incarnation of the 
principle of human equality, whereas in the case 
of the former, It is still particular and still 
exists alongside a specifically Roman mode of legal 
regulation. 
Of course, none of this is to say that Roman 
law ignored the slave; he was, after all, property; 
and Savigny makes another most important "economic" 
observation on the Issue of slavery in Roman law 
when he writes: 
But as in consequence of the numerous conquests 
of war the number of slaves increased beyond 
all measure, and people were taught by a bloody 
experience how fraught with danger was a wholly 
cruel treatment of those who, by their numbers, 
had become a powerful class. So It came 
gradually to be held as a firmly established 
rule, that a cruel master could not only be 
compelled to sell his maltreated s+avesp but 
could also be criminally punished. 
1. SavJ-gny, ibido, p*24-. 5. 
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As the slave system matured within the Empire, 
"concessions" to the producers of wealth appear 
just as they did when capital similarly made its 
great moves towards maturity during the 19th century. 
In the latter case, however, it is a class of free 
wage-labourers Obecoming a powerful class", whichq 
for reasons we shall come tog makes the form of 
"legal" intervention here very different. 
The slave was ignored in Roman law as a legal 
subjectp and this imposed very definite limitations 
upon Roman legal abstraction. Hegel had this in 
mind when he wrote in his Philosophy of Right, 
But the science of positive law at least 
cannot be very Intimately concerned with 
definitions since It begins in the first 
place by stating what Is legal, i. e. what 
the particular legal provisions are, and for 
this reason the warning must be given: omnis 
definitlo in jure civIle periculosa. In 
fact, the more disconnected and inherently 
contradictory are the provisions giving 
determinate character to a right, the less 
are any definitions Jm this field possible, 
for definitions should be stated in universal 
terms, while to use these immediately expos? s 
in all its nakedness what contradicts them. 
Hegel had, especially, Roman law in mind here, where 
there could not possibly be a definition of "man", as 
he puts it, since "slave'* could not be brought under 
It. Now Hirst and Hindess in their book, Pre-Capitalist 
1. Ilegel, Philos. ophy of Right, p. 14-1.5. 
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Modes of Production, say of Hegel's view of Roman 
law that It is a function of his "essentially 
humanist philosophy: he takes for a failing what 
is most advanced in this legal form. '* 
1 These notions 
of "failure" and "advance" are conditional upon 
each other, and Hegel certainly did not view them 
as one-sidedly as these authors make out. For 
Hegel, as the above quotation makes clear, the 
"failure" (In this instance the fact of slavery) 
is the limit to the "advance" (the degree of 
unIversa-Uty embodied In Roman legal definition). 
Hegel had grasped the dialectical relation between 
the two; the "failure" here reproduces Itself in 
another form as an "advancelt. True, Hegel only got 
at this relationship in a general and idealistic 
fashion, but Hirst and Hindess display their own 
more complete one-sidedness when they say: 
Roman law provides the basis for an abstract 
concept of legal personality; a personality 
which exists in the sphere of law alone and 
which is attrIbutiV31e to non-human entities, 
corporations etc. 
This is utterly erroneous, for were it the case that 
Roman legal personality could be "attributable to non- 




human entities", there would have been no trouble 
in granting It to the slave. In any case, "Roman 
law provides the basis... of legal personality" is 
nothing more than a variation on the tautology 
"law is the basis of law". Nor is this conceit 
assisted any with the added contradictory assertion 
that, "this development of Roman law Is a function 
of post-Roman analytic jurisprudence. " 
I This Is an 
absolute impossibility. The mistake of making 
Roman law, not-Roman law (I. e. "post-Roman" or, what 
is generally intended, modern bourgeois law) is 
shared, but with generally more subtlety, by most 
writers on the subject. The basis of this error 
rests in a failure to distinguish the forms of petty 
and Generalised commodity production and, consequently, 
the different forms of legal abstraction arising 
therefrom. But we shall elucidate this error later 
on when we come to discuss the Idea of the "reception" 
of Roman law. 
In view of the fact that tautologles abound in this 
area, we may take the liberty of saying here that Roman 
law Is Roman law. And what makes It Roman is the slave 
1. ibid. 
system which it reflects. It reflects the latter, 
for the most part, by being silent; the slave is 
not a legal person and therefore it does not 
address itself to him. But before ever it begins: 
"the first division is into free men and slaveslto 
1 
1. Justinian, Institutes, Bk. 1, title 
part I 
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Equivalent Form and Legal Form 
(1) Private Law and the 'Person' 
It is precisely the appearance In persons of 
the equivalent form of commodities (viz. as owners 
of property In exchange), that gives modern legal 
abstraction Its actual (as distinct from its 
essential) character. Historically, this Is clearly 
ever more the case, the more developed and generalised 
has become commodity production i. e. production for 
exchange. This appearanceg this "Juridical" moment 
arises directly out of the act of exchange itself 
which, as such, is only concerned with individuals 
in their capacity as mere exchangers of commodities. 
However, in the actual juridical view of things 
this slight qualification, that the equivalent form 
merely concerns individuals in their singular 
capacity as exchangers, is overlooked. In this way 
the equivalent form gets transformed, In a fetishIsed 
fashion, I into a form of equivalence between persons 
Fetish, as 11(i)nanimate object worshipped by 
primitive peoples for its supposed inherent 
magical powers or as being inhabited by a spirit" (Concise Oxford Dictionary), is, of course, 
used metaphorically here, but not, as we shall 
see again and againg without justification. 
Compare Marx, Capital Vol. 1, on "The Fetishism 
of Commodities and the secret thereoft1w 
qua persons, quite oblivious to its essential and 
strictly limited basis in the more exchange relation. 
Once this distinction is blurred, all manner of 
difficulties and contradictions arise, and this, 
empirically, becomes the life-blood of modern 
legal thought. 
The clarity of the connection between the 
equivalent form of commodities and legal abstraction 
Is most apparent In private law. The equivalent 
form of commodities posits the equality of persons 
as abstract individuals engaged in the act of 
exchange. The form of the individual as a mere 
exchanger supplies private law (as well as legal 
abstraction generally) with its most fundamental 
category, a category upon which the specifically 
legal edifice is built - the legal person. The 
legal person Is, In essence, the form of the 
Individual as an exchanger of commodities. However, 
the legal form doesntt appear in this way in actual 
legal doctrine. 
The legal person or abstract legal subject, to 
'Which we shall occasionally refer as simply the 
I'lecal form", Is distinct from what we have 
previously referred to as the "juridicalft moment In 
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the exchange of equivalents. It Is distinct from 
the latter on this account: the "Juridical" moment 
implicit in the exchange act has a strictly limited 
nature by way of its implicitness in the exchange 
relation alone, whereas the legal form, in its 
various developments, deliberately repulses this 
connection. The ltjuridical" moment refers, 
specifically, to the form of the individual in his 
capacity as an exchanger of commodities, in his 
essential capacity as an equal with others. The 
legal form, on the cther hand, is this "Juridical" 
form unconscious, so to speak, of its precise 
exchange connection. In other words, the legal form 
becomes the actual or empirical form of the "juridical" 
b 
moment in the sphere of law. The two are closest 
together in private law. Private law displays, as 
a relatively undisguised prototype of the legal form, 
Its essential inner connections with the equivalent 
form of comm dities. Let us now Illustrate this. 
Although the essence of the legal form Is 
contained in the form of the individual as an 
exchanger of commodities (and the productive relations 
therein supposed), it does not appear as such - 
especially when It is stretched and strained, in 
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legal theory, to cover such things as the state and 
law Itself. We shall come to this later. To 
recapitulatet the clarity of the legal form's inner 
connections with commodity exchange appearst first 
and foremost, In private law thinking. Here, the 
legal form appears most clearly as the "Juridical" 
moment implicit in the exchange of equivalents. 
This "Juridical" moment which is contained In the 
abstract legal subject of private law Is nothing 
more than the Individual considered in his aspect 
as an exchanger of commodities, which in turn 
supposest in its abstract generality, a specific 
social development of productive forces under 
definite, historically evolved property relations. 
These particular property relationst moreover, are 
systematically reduced to indifference at the level 
of mere exchange of goods. This much we are already 
familiar with. However, to return to the matter 
under discussion, the legal form, which has to do 
with the actual appearance of law, Is not exactly 
the same as the "Juridical,, form, the form of the 
individual as a more exchanger of coi=odities. Thus, 
In private law the strictly limited form of equivalence 
which is consciously acknowledged In the conception 
of the t1juridicalt, form, appears dislocated from its 
exchange basis and Is posited, in some degree, in 
persons per se. 
1. Pashukanisq Theory of Law etc-,, p. 136. 
(Aligemeine Rechtslehre, p. 54). I will 
take the opportunity here to point out 
that although references are made, here and 
elsewheret to the Babb and Hazard trans- 
lation of Pashukanis' work, I have taken 
the liberty on a number of occasions to 
render the sense more in accord with the 
superior translation into German by Hajos. 
The English translation consistently makes 
a number of jarring literal transpositions 
from the Russian which are utterly inconsist- 
ent with normal usage in the context of the 
subject matter to which they refer, e. g. 
'barter' Instead of exchange, 'worker- 
strength' Instead of labour-powerg and so 
forth* Trivial though this may seem, the 
effect is far from trivial since It makes 
a number of passages quite at odds with 
their intended meaning. Pashukanist work 
In the "Theory of Law and Marxism" Is very 
rigorous (which Is not the case* incidentally, 
In that other essay which appears in the 
Babb and Hazard edition, which has an 
entirely different - indeed, tragic - 
character 'to it) and every term here 
conveys a precise meaning. Thus, when he 
speaks of exchange, he means this In the 
context of a definite stage In the 
development of production for exchange* 
To render this as 'barter' is quite out 
of place, since 'barter' applies to a form 
of exchange where the equivalent form does 
not exist, that is, where exchange in Its 
modern connection with generalised commodity 
production, the form of law etc. has 
absolutely nothing to do with the matter. 
The complexIty of the relations with 
which Pashukanis deals, moreover, makes 
this generally inattentive translation 
doubly unfortunate. 
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The more abstract legal thought becomes, the 
greater this dislocation appears and, consequently, 
the more appropriate becomes the "fetish" metaphor 
noted earlier. Accordingly, private law has always 
appeared relatively sound in its detailed internal 
systematisation - precisely because its categories 
are nearer to their essential basis. In this 
connection, Pashukanis wrote: 
In reality, it is precisely in the field of 
private law relationships that the most solid 
kernel of juristic hazinesso if the expression 
Is admissible, Is to be found. It Is in the 
concrete personality of the egoistic managing 
subject - the property owner, tha bearer of 
private interests - that a legal subject such 
as the "personal' finds complete and adequate 
embodiment. It is specifically In private law 
that legal thinking moves with the greatest 
freedom and confidence, where conceptions take 
on the most complete and symmetrical form... 
It is specifically in private law that the 
a priori premises of legal thinking are clothed 
with the flesh and blood of two contending 
partiesq defending "their right" - vindicta 
In hand ... The dogma of private law is neither 
more nor less than an endless chain of 
considerations for and against Imaginary claims 
and potential suits. Unseen behind every 
paragraph of systematic advice stands the 
abstract client ready to use the coryesponding 
propositions as professional advice. 
In private law the equivalent form appears as 
something arising in connection with persons per so. 
In abstract legal theoryg which we shall come to 
later on, these "persons per sell become abstracted 
into "pure" categories of will. But it is private 
law thinking which sustains the greater sense of the 
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concrete, precisely because, as Pashukanis remarks, 
the legal form is here t1clothed with the flesh and 
blood of two contending parties". 
Stripped of all its specific determinations, 
the legal. form merges with the "juridical" moment 
of the exchange act - the "personification" of the 
commodity. In reality, however, this latter is 
automatically mediated because this deus ex machina 
necessarily appears as a real person. This 
mediation posits the substantive character of private 
law. The legal historian, Maitland, expresses a 
similar view when he says: 
"Sometimes its neighbours vill have cause to 
complain of Its legal Impersonal-Ity. They 
v-111 have been thinking of it as a responsible 
rIght-and-duty-bearing unit, vhile at the 
tough of law it becomes a mere many, and a 
practlially, If not theoretically, irresponsible 
many" . 
In the actual act of exchange, the Individual 
doesn't merely appear as an exchanger of commoditiesp 
but in the concrete form of an indivIdual per so, 
Maitland, F. W. "Moral Personality and Legal 
PersonalityO, In Selected Essays p. 232. 
Maitland, however, skirts elegantly round the 
Inelegant compound adjective, vIz the right- 
and-duty-bearing unit, recognising merely 
that on this phenomenon, Ittheorising, of course, 
there has been. " p. 234 ibid. 
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even though it is just in the former capacity that 
he is the equal of his opposite number and hencop 
the bearer of the legal form. Personalityt outside 
its aspect as the "will" of the commodi., ty within the 
boundaries of the sphere of exchange, Is the essence 
of human differences - t1no two people are alikollp 
runs the common phrase. So it is that "human" 
differences constantly seek reconciliation with the 
equivalent form which grows up behind their backsp 
as it were, which arises independently and between 
them as possessors of commodities in exchange. 
Individuality, in the actual business of exchanget 
appearing here necessarily as concrete Individuality 
along with all the many-sided connections thus 
impliedp inevItably brings with It differences which 
seek reconciliation with the abstract sameness 
Implicit In exchange and supposed by the legal form* 
We may sayp following Hegelt that the unity of 
identity and difference here provides the ground 
of private law* 
1 
The legal form - here, the abstract legal 
subject of private law - only arises because and In 
so far as It can reflect a real equivalence between 
1. Compare Hegel, Logic, pps. 183-198- 
This is the true sense in which the legal 
world turns on money. Talk about commerc- 
ially oriented lawyers, phrases of the kinds 
"money buys justice" and so forth, are all 
very well, but none of this distinguishes 
law in relation to money from that of any 
other occupation which must compete to make 
a living. Needless to add, "criticism" of 
law from this sort of standpoint Is quite 
commonplace. Of ten self-styled as "critical", 
"Marxist" , "Radical" etc., much of this 
popular debunking of the legal profession and 
law must be considered as little more than 
invective against something which is little 
understood. Legal theorists and judges 
themselvesq of course, have fared little 
better with the hidden connections between 
money, and the form of law. Savigny has the 
distinction of being a legal theorist who 
displayed at the same time a penetrating 
insight into the nature of money; for, he 
says: "In the first place money appears 
in the function of a mere instrument for 
measuring the value of individual parts of 
wealth. As regards this function, money 
stands on the same basis as other instruments 
of measurement... But money also appears In a 
second and higher function, viz. it embraces 
the value Itself which is measured by It, and 
thus represents the value of all other Items 
of wealth ... 
(M)oney thus appears to be an 
abstract means to dissolve all property into 
mere quantities-" Obligationenrecht, cited, 
Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money, p. 24. 
Such conclusions as these mark Savigny as 
one of the most distinguished jurists of 
modern times. The treatment of money by 
other, less notable legal figures, Is 
often quite comical. Here, for instance, is 
a view of the English legal mind in this 
connection: "I take it that if a tort had 
been commited in England before England went 
off the gold standard, th7e plaintiffs could 
not say: 'We insist,... on being paid the 
value of the gold standard pound at the time 
of the commission of the tort. t A pound 
in England Is a pound whatever Its inter- 
national value., ' Scrutton L. J., cited in 
Mann's book, PPs- 77-8 ! bid. Rule BrItannial 
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persons* And that real equivalence Is certainly 
not a matter for the exclusive attention of meta- 
physics; it inheres neither In a "natural" scheme 
of things nor in an ether of "pure reason", but in 
the commensurable form of commodities and money, the 
things reciprocally alienated and appropriated by 
their possessors in the relation of exchange. The 
legal form embodies the equivalence of persons only 
because and In so far as they are equated with one 
another specifically as possessors of commodities 
and the money which circulates them. 
1 This, moreover, 
is the indiclum of modern law. Hence, the legal 
form as abstract personality, unlike# for instance, 
the legal form of feudal society where every right 
is dependent upon a particular "status", is common 
to the mass of people - and it has this distinction 
precisely because it arises alongside the generallsation 
throughout society of commodity production, which Is, 
absolutely, production for exchange. 
To return to the matter of private law, we have 
said that the actual personality of the individual 
is not merely that he is an exchanger of commodities, 
a "juridical" moment in the exchange act - he Is a 
real person with an occupation, intelligence, character 
etc. Wo have said, furthermore, that it Is in the 
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reconciliation which is sought between such factors 
and the abstract legal form (in its naked connection, 
its absolutely essential connection, with the 
"Juridical" form of the individual as an exchanger) 
that the substantive side of private law attains 
its detailed classificatory content. On the whole, 
however, the essential strength of the legal form, 
that is, its inner connection with the "Juridical" 
form, is quite sufficient for the mass of daily 
contractual exchanges. In this, the legal form 
subsists In its essential connection as the 
"Juridical" form of the subject in the exchange 
act. It is precisely this phenomenon which has 
given rise to the modern stress upon the "customary" 
basis of law (pioneered by Savigny) and, what is 
but an inverted reflection of this, notions about 
the "gapless" quality of modern legal thought 
(Stammler, Ireber). The whole point is that the 
equivalent form already subsists in the exchange 
of commodities, the "Juridical" form is here implicit, 
before the legal form articulates itself upon it, 
before it acknowledges It In its characteristically 
dislocated modes. 
The characteristic dislocation. of the legal form 
In private law, that is, Its movement away from its 
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essential "Juridical" connection, come3 when this 
normally adequate basis of formal legal acknowledee- 
ment (i. e. where the legal form and the "Juridical" 
form are practically one), is observed in the breach. 
Such a moment corresponds with the reconciliation 
which Is sought between "con. cretell individuality 
(difference) and the abstract equivalence of 
Individuals (identity) in the exchange relation, 
whence the form of the legal persona initially 
springs. The vital point to be grasped here Is 
that the legal form can never eradicate the limits 
provided by the form of the individual In the 
exchange relation. The private'law development of 
the legal persona, its most fundamental category 
which is essentially though not actually the latter 
(i. e. the form of the individual in the excbange 
relation, the 10juridIcal" form) can never get beyond 
It, It Is always presupposed. Thus, "concrete" 
Individuality may only be reconciled with the 
abstract form because and in so far as It Is a 
bearer of it. In other words, if there Is no legal 
persona, there can be no further development of 
legal relations. In the legal view of things, of 




This is the sense in which 
Pashukanis, quoted earlier, remarks, "Unseen behind 
every paragraph of systematic advice stands the 
abstract client... ete. It Ifithout the "abstract client#', 
The law doesn't always recognIse this by taking 
it for granted. Following the practice of legal 
scholarship, we may give the following example 
of explicit recognition: In Newborne v. Sensolid 
Ltd. (1954) 1 Q. B. 4.5; (1953) 1 All E. R., a 
contract was made by "Leopold Newborne Ltd. tl 
with the defendants for the supply of certain 
Goods. Subsequent to the sale, the defendants 
refused to accept delivery of the goods. An 
action was commenced for damages arising from 
breach of contract, upon which the plaintiff's 
solicitors discovered that the company had not 
been registered at the time of the contract. 
They therefore took steps to substitute 
Newborne himself (the promoter of the company) 
as the plaintiff. He had, however, signed the 
original contractual letter with the company's 
name, merely adding his own signature to 
authenticate it. The defendants argued that 
they had made the agreement with the company, 
not with Mr. Newborne, and that since the 
company had no legal existence at that time* 
there was no contract; hence, no breach of 
contract. The action was, accordingly, 
dismissed. Judges, of course, are not immune 
from giving contradictory judgements - which 
makes examples of this kind of dubious 
scientific merit. Generally, however, the 
rule, "no legal persona, no legal relations"s, 
Is essentially implicit in law; Its explicit- 
ness not being beyond the reflective capacity 
of legal thought itself - as the example shows. 
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however, there could be no "systematic advice",, 
even though from the legal standpoint it is this 
latter, the detailed classification and so forth 
which seems all-important. Yet it is clear that 
it is the abstract persona and the historical 
connections In which it arises and assumes its 
social significance are all-important for a full 
and proper comprehension of the nature of law. 
Norms about the "reasonable" behaviour of 
parties in typically recurrent "fact situations"j, 
as Weber would put it, are already put forward for 
the substantive working-out of private law by virtue 
of the fact that the form of the Individual in the 
exchange relation necessarily appears as a real 
person. The potential for intellectual classifIc- 
ation and articulation of private law dogma is thus 
set by-the general state of development of commodity 
production and exchange, since it is this latter 
which develops socially this form of the individual. 
"In the development of legal categories", 
Pashukanis wrote, 
the capacity to perfect exchange arrangements 
appears merely as one of the concrete 
manifestations of the general attribute of 
legal capacity and capacity to act. 
Historically, howeverg it is specifically 
the/ 
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the exchange arrangement which furnished the 
idea of a subject as the abstract bearer of 
all possible legal claims. It is only under 
conditions of developed commodity production 
and exchange that the abstract legal form is 
generated - that is to say, it is only there 
that the capacity to have a right in general 
Is distinguished from specific legal claims. 
It is only the constant transfer of rights 
taking pLace in the market which creates the 
idea of an immobile bearer of those rights. 
In the market the obligee Is himself obligated 
at the same time: he is ceasing every moment 
to be In the position of the party demandant, 
and is becoming a party obligated. The 
possibility of beine abstracted from the 
specific differences between subjects of 
rights and of bringing them with+n a single 
generic concept is thus created. 
Private law doctrine is really a proto-tYPO Of 
the entire modern legal edifice, as Pashukanis says. 
Private law thinking, and especially that major 
branch of It which Is known as contract, displays 
in a relatively clear fashion Its inner connections 
with the equivalent form of persons in their aspect 
as exchangers of commodities, since here the legal 
form is considered directly in relation to the 
sphere of exchange, out of which it first arises. 
It is, for this very reason, no accident that private 
law has developed Its various ideas and patterns of 
systematic advice In the most coherent or, rather, 
Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc. " p. 167. (A-Ugemaine Rechtslehreq p. 96). 
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least contradictory fashion as compared with other 
branches of modern legal thinking; and for this 
reasong as Pashukanis puts it, "it Is precisely in 
the field of private law relationships that the most 
solid kernel of juristic haziness.. is to be found". 
However, the equivalent form provides not merely 
the legal form as private law, but, of course, the 
legal form as such I. e* in all its guises. 
In the varieties of "public" legal thought, In 
abstract legal theory, the self-same subject of the 
exchange act who appeared as the persona of private 
law now appears as an abstract Ego accentuated In 
a "publicU aspect. By the same token In which the 
private figure becomes public In private law (I. e. 
as law), the public figure, the state, becomes private 
in legal theorising thereupon. In abstract legal 
theory. the Upublic" sphere is conceived under the 
form of a subject just as in private law, the 
"Privatet' sphere was conceived under a "publict's 
that is, shared or common form. Not surprisingly 
then, in abstract legal theory, we find again and 
again the "public" sphere. considered as a matter 
of will, precisely because it is considered under a 
form which Is equally *private". 
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Before we move on, it is useful to recapitulate 
the following three points: 
Firstly, the legal form has been takong first 
and foremost, in its least mystified connection; 
namolyg as it arinos directly from the form of the 
individual in the exchange of commodities, as the 
most immediate and formal aclmowledgement of the 
"Juridical" moment implicit in the exchange of 
equivalents, We may, with guarded qualificationt 
conceive of this simple legal form as appearing 
at the moment when the "Juridical" form in the 
exchange of equivalents is acknowledged by a 
competent authority outside the direct process 
of exchange. 
Socondlyt and heroin lies the important 
qualificationg this legal form immediately appears 
to be something present in all societies where 
production for exchange has been developed with 
some degree of sophistication. Consequently, as we 
shall aeot some of the most historically conscientious 
observers are led to the belief that the form of 
bourgeois law is historically universal. But this 
belief arises merely from the commodity-connection, 
that is, the fact that older societies also had 
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production for exchange* This commodity-connoction 
we shall have a chance to discuss further in part 3. 
11oro we may just note that the commodIty-foinn cannot 
be torn from its ground, cannot be divorced from 
the productive relations which produce it in its 
full social significance. Just as the generalised 
form of right in not to be considered as right in 
general; nor are coneral-ised commodity relations 
to be conflicted with commodity relations in general. 
The ancient Phoenicians wore a great trading people, 
they had developed production for exchange and, 
indeed, certain local forms appropriate to this 
ancient development of productive forces under 
slavery. But that is all; in ancient Phoenician 
law the modern local form is not even "there" in 
a rudimentary and stunted capacity since the modern 
form allpposes a society based on capital and free 
wage labour. Honcog oven the ancient forms appropriate 
to commodity oxcliango. can, by no stretch of the 
imagination, be connected with bourgeois law. In 
earlier societies comm dity-local forms in any case 
only existed alongside and-in combination with 
other more dominant modos of legal regulation. Only 
in modern bourgeois society Is the equivalent form 
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embodied in commodity oxchanae the dominant indicium 
of laws because only hero is society completely 
dominated by a mode of production gearod towards 
production for exchange on an ever increasing scale. 
It in only with reference to specifically modern 
aocioty, therefore, that we may speak alone of the 
equivalent form of commodities in connection with 
the 1brm of law, 
Thirdly,, as the form of law, the form of the 
individual an an exchanaor of commodities Is the 
dominant relation behind all modern legal discourses 
notwithstanding its abstract and scholarly Guises. 
The principal connection between the naked legal form 
and the dispersion which it achieves over a massive 
empirical terrain, we have said, is one of "dislocation", 
that in, a process in which the essential form of 
equivalence in more or loss shifted from view 
depending upon the subject mater through which it Is 
modiatodo Some of the "classical" highways and 
bywayn upon which this process of mediation has 
travelled (and attained hundreds of years of mileaGe) 
WO shall come to In part 11. 
But firsts there are some rather Important 
questions, which have so far been left begging, to 
be dealt with now. 
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(2) The Rrivate/public dualism within the 
leGal form 
The principal source of the confusion in modern 
legal thinking which accentuates one-sidedly first 
the "Private" aspect of the legal form and theno in 
another breath, Its "public" aspect, is that the 
legal form is, at the same time, both "private" and 
"public". in private law, we have seen, the isolated 
private Individual appears as the bearer of the legal 
form, which, however, as law, must be also "public". 
In this process it is possible to conceive: a 
private bearer of a public right, a private bearer 
of a private rightv a public bearer of a private 
right and a public bearer of a public right. With 
Its characteristic lack of dialectic, modern legal 
thinking has inevitably failed to disentangle itself 
from this mess. Each one of these statements Is 
true, yet at the same time false, or rather, if It 
Is permissable to speak In this way, each one Is a 
quarter trueg throe-quarters false. For, the whole 
truth, if the turn of phrase may ag .,, ain 
be forgiven 
is that in this process we*must observe a public/ 
private bearer of a public/private right. The 
public/private description here cancels itself out, 
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and we are back to the original question of simply 
the "subject of a right". And what we have here is 
none other than the form of "abstract individuality" 
regarding the inner character of which legal thought 
always draws a blank. For the same reason, thens the 
public/private dualism remains a riddle which is 
never solved. The problem of the "public" and the 
"private" becomes here a development of the basic 
problem of the "subject of a right" - in bourgeois 
society. 
1 
However, there is a great deal more to the 
problem of the "publiC and the "private" than we 
have so far been prepared to admit. The private 
aspect of law, for instance, is so-called because 
its aim is the reconciliation of private interests. 
But, of course, as law, this form of reconciliation 
is something over and above the ordered anarchy of 
exchange, something more than the mere "Juridical" 
moment of the exchange act. In a word, it inhabits a 
domain of power. And here its "public" character 
becomes something quite different from its equivalent 
form. 
1. Chs. 1,2, ante. 
The foundation-stone of private law is the 
pure right-bearing unit, the persona, in which the 
"private" and the 11public" are entirely merged 
into one and the same thing. The legal form here 
stands (almost) und: tfferentiated from the "juridical" 
moment of the exchange act. What is "publict' here 
is the shared equivalent form and what is "private" 
is the isolated individual, %, rho is subsumed, as such, 
under this form. In this, the public/private duality 
returns, just like the riddle of the general "subject 
of a rightfl, to the inner nature of the exchange 
act and the various relations supposed therein* The 
"public" here transpires Jm the social production 
relations congealed In the commodities which those 
apparently isolated and independent private individuals, 
requiring solely the will to exchange them, bring 
to ma ket. These are the suppositions we have made 
so far. Now, however, there are new avenues to be 
opened upg and the reason comes im this: the legal 
form would have no raison dtetre were it to be simply 
considered as the "Juridical" moment of exchange. 
The important distinction, which we have so far 
merely supposed here is that the legal form, as 
distinct fron. its subsistence level in the exchange 
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structure, occupies the domain of power. Even in 
its closest exchange connection, In private law, 
the legal form aquires the power to regulate exchange 
relations when their normally adequate "Juridical" 
basis breaks down. The legal form and power: an 
equivalent form and Its opposite, a relation of 
domination and subordination. It is here that the 
public/private dualism of the legal form becomes 
transformed into the dualism of state and law. The 
first dualism, of equality and individuality, we 
have already considered. The latter is a dualism 
of an altogether different order, for it contains 
the former dualism (which is united in the legal 
form as such) juxtaposed with something elsel namelyl 
state power. 
Before we begin to explain this, the following 
maY be helpful: 
First Antithesis: 
This concerns the legal form as such, I. e. as a 
generallsed equivalent form. As an equivalent form 
it is "in common'19 shared by "individuals". In this 
way It figures as a unity of opposites, as "abstract 
"Law as a form... exists only in antithesest', 
Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., p. 119 (A. Rep, 
P-30). 
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individuality": "abstract" because "In common" 
(public) as against individuality as such (private). 
It is the same riddle as the "subject of a right" 
- of bourgeois society. 
Second Antithesis: 
This concerns legal form juxtaposed with the 
relation of power. An equivalent form ("abstract 
individuality") here appears united with yet another 
opposite: power, a relation of one will over that 
of another. Equality and inequality. This dualism 
appears as the antithesis of private law (the archetype 
of the legal form as such, as an equivalent form) and 
"public law". 
It is the second antithesis which we must now 
consider. In order to first clear the way a little 
it Is appropriate to exemplify some of the confusions 
of modern legal thinking upon the matter, I. e. upon U. 
the subject of the dualism between "public law" and 
private law. In this, we may draw upon the assistance 
of the legal theorist, Mans Kelsen. Kelsen has a 
clear Grasp of the confusion of others In this connection, 
but is, himself, incapable_of furnishing a solution 
to the problem. Ile shall allude to the erroneous 
character of Kolsen's solution, but for a thorough 
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criticism of the basis of his views we must wait 
until we deal with Kant in the next chapter (Kelsen 
is a "Kantian"). Here is an example of Kelsen's 
clear grasp of the problem as it appears in 
"traditional legal theorylt: 
The contrast assumed by traditional legal 
theory between public and private law clearly 
displays the fundamental dualism that dominates 
modern legal science and thereby our entire 
social thinking: the dualism between state 
and law. if traditional theory of law and 
state opposes the state to the law as an entity 
different from the law, and at the same time 
asserts that the state is a legal being, they 
accomplish this by comprehending the state as 
a subject of obligations and rights, that is, 
as a legal persont and at the same time 
attributing to it an existence independent of 
the legal order. 
Private-law theory originally assumed 
that the legal personality of the individual 
logically and temporally precedes the legal 
order; In the same way the public-law theory 
assumes that the state, as a collective unit 
and subject of willing and acting, exists 
independent of, and even preceding, the law. 
According to this theory the state fulfills 
its historic mission by creating the law, "its" 
law, the legal order, and submits itself to It 
afterward, which means the state imposes 
obligations and confers rights upon Itself by 
means of its own law. Thus, the stater as a 
meta-legal being, as a kind of macro-anthropos 
or social organism, is presupposed by the law 
- and at the same time, as a subject of the 
law, i. e., as subjected to it, obligated and 
authorised by It, presupposes the law. This 
is the doctrine of the two sides and self- 
obligation of the state 'which manages to 
maIntaln Itself with unequalled tenacity desplte 
the manifest contradictions which it implies. 
Kelsenj #*The Pure Theory of Law", p. 284-. 5. We 
shall consider "traditional legal theory" in its 
more profound modern-classical connections in 
part 11. Kelsen never says who ho, means In this respect. 
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Kelsen, however, never discloses the source of this 
tenacious dualism; In fact, he denies that It exists 
- after having spoken with such authority upon the 
matter. It follows, then, that Kelsen doesn't 
really OcritIcise" here at all, but rather "ignores". 
In a similar kind of way, the French legal theoristt 
Duguit, 11crIticlsed" the doctrines of Jher: Lng and 
Jellinek, which subjected the state to its "own" 
law (in the sense which Kelsen makes clear above), 
and ended up with theoretically the same results 
as Kelsen, namely, that the "true" theory Is based 
upon Hwill",, 
' 
But lot us consider Kelsen's position 
a little further. 
Kelsen is quite correct to summarise the position 
of "traditional legal theory" in the following manner: 
According to the majority view we are confronted 
here with a classification of legal relation- 
ships: private law represents a relationship 
between coordinated, legally equal-rankIng 
subjects; public law, a relationship between 
a super- and a subordinated subject, that is, 
between subjects of whom one has a higher legal 
value as compared with that of the other. 
The typical publIc-law relationship is that 
between state (or government) and subject (in 
German, characteristically, Untertan)o Private- 
law relationships are called simply Olegal 
relationships" in the narrower sense of the term, 
to/ 
cf. L. Duguit, "Theory of Law Anterior to the 
State", Modern Legal Philosophy Series, Vol. VII. 
Kelsen is not as naive as Duguit and does not 
draw this conclusion in so many words. 
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to juxtapose to them the public-law relation- 
ships as "power relationships" or relationships 
of "domination". In generalt the differentiation 
between private and public law tends to assume 
the meaning of a difference between law and a 
non-legal, or at least a half-legal, poweit 
and, particularly, between law and state. 
Instead of being so alarmed at the implications of 
the ')majority view" here, Helsen would have done 
better to have probed it a little further, sincer 
for once, the majority view is, superficially at 
any rate, correct. In other words, this traditional 
view concerning the private/public law dualism has 
the sense of the legal form as a form of equality 
which, as such, stands in an antithetical relation 
v1s a vis state power, the latter, supposing as It 
does, the form of inequality, of hierarchy, domination 
and subjection. Kelsen's Psolution" to the problem 
here is essentially the "solution" of all positivists 
to all difficult questions; he ignores it, declaring 
In the process its metaphysical connections. Anything 
a positivist cannot solve Is "metaphysical". 
According to Kelsen, "A closer analysis... 
discloses that we are confronted here with a different- 
iation between law-creating facts. " 2 What appeared as 
11 Kelsen, "'Pure Theory of Law", p. 281 . 
2. ibid. 
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an absolute dichotomy now appears as a more 
"differentiation between law-creating facts. " 
in other words, the antithesis in the "majority 
view" is ignored and the problem supposedly resolved 
by simply contradicting it, by uncritically supposing 
that the term "law" must equally apply to the business 
of the state. Thus, "the legal plus-value assigned 
to t1lie state"91 Kelsen's phrase, is a sleight-of- 
hand which ignores, with that use of the little 
word, 111-egal", the whole issue which is at stake, 
namely, the "majority view" doubts as to a legal 
value at all in connection with the state, lot 
alone a "Plus-value". 
Kelsen's way of saying that he prefers to 
ignore the problem of the absolute public/private 
dualism, rather than furnish a "closer analysis" 
Is as follows: "the Pure Theory of Law Irelativises' 
the contrast between private and public law, changes 
It from an extra-systematic difference, that is, a 
difference between law and non-law or between law 
and state, to an intra-systematic one. 1t And, not 
satisfied with just this, he adds: "The Pura Theory. 
proves to be a true science (s1c) by dissolving the 
ideology (classical liberalism - S. M. ) connected 
1. ibld. 
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with the absolutising of the difference In question. " 
To "relativIsell the dichotomy is tantamount to 
ignoring it, denying Its existence. For ordinary 
common sense, let alone a "true science", mere 
existence Is rarely the question, but rather, the 
connection in which a given thing has existence. 
In so far as "traditional legal theory" has been 
constantly thwarted with the apparently insurmountable 
publIc/private duallsm of law, it is certainly not 
something of its own choosing. Accordingly the 
most unscientific appearch imaginable is one which 
calmly declares that the problem is a red herring, 
that the dichotomy does not exist. Of course it 
exists, and if IttradItional legal theory" has 
ceaselessly wrestled with the problem and Inevitably 
become entangled in a net of typical contradictionst 
then the overbearing character of this "existence" 
is patently obvious and, clearly, there is some 
objective connection concealed behind It. The 
denial of "existence" is tantamount to foreclosing 
analysis beforo it can even begin. 
"Traditional legal theory" has not erred In Its 
recognitIon of the public/private dualism In law. In 
so far as It has noted that the legal form Is a 
1. ibid., p. 282. 
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relation of equality, it has also noted correctly 
that, as such, it is irreconcilable with state 
power, which entails in its barest essentials the 
relation of domination and subordination. Where 
it has erred, however, is in Its mode of reconciling 
these opposites, something which it has been compelled 
to do in order to accomodate what Is "obvious" in 
realityl that law is power. As we have already 
noted, we shall come to "traditional legal theory" 
proper in part 11; but before we do this we must 
make an attempt to got at the roots of this dualism 
of law and state, or, what is the same essential 
thing, of private law and "public law". 
In the purely empirical sense it Is "obvious" 
that the state's demands, appearing in the form of 
statutory rules and so forth, are law. Still, 
contrary to the positivist view of things, the 
, word "obvious" here has Its right to inverted commas, 
just as the apples observed by Newton "obviously" 
fell to the around. For, it is not on account of 
their issuing from the "political" sphere that the 
various "public" demands attain the form of legality. 
On the contrary, such demands, In so far as they do 
not bear the stamp of private interests, are utterly 
antithetical to the legal form. The real basis upon 
which these "public" demands appear as law is their 
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laboured and cumbersome translation into a vocabulary 
which is furnished both logically and historically 
by private law doctrine. This is precisely what 
"traditional legal theory" has reflected in the 
dualism of "public law" and private law. Conceptually 
and historically the legal form (private law) is 
the prius into which the demands of the "political" 
sphere find their way. 
On the other hand, without supposing a "political" 
structure in and through which the demands of society 
as a whole may (well or ill) be expressed, the legal 
formt as a language of equality which arises on the 
basis of generalised commodity ownership, cannot be 
spoken with any authority; it cannot serve any 
purpose unless It becomes compromised as part and 
parcel of that structure, unless the logic of private 
Interest is prepared to subsume also (contradictorily) 
the social interest. Without the "political" sphere 
the legal form falls back to its subsistence level 
as a powerless articulation of the equivalent form 
implicit in the system of generalised commodity 
ownership. With the "political" sphere, on the other 
hand, it is compromised and can no longer remain true 
to form. 
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It is a matter for detailed empirical investi- 
gation to see how a given subject-matter of "public 
policy", or rather, a demand having no direct 
private interest behind it, becomes accomodated 
under the legal form which is basically antithetical 
to any interest which cannot be construed as a 
private interest: for instance, the area of state 
contracts with the private sector of industry, where 
the state has to be contradictorily subsumed under 
the private law form of contract. It Is the same 
contradiction in principle here manifest as a 
specific technical legal attempt to reconcile the 
power of the state with the form of legality which 
figured more abstractly and in purer form in the 
classical attempts to devise a social contract 
theory of the state. So far as this present work 
is concerned we shall only be concerned with the 
general conditions of this contradictory process 
and therefore the historically pure manifestations 
of It, namely, in the classical formulations of the 
social contract. The presence of the same essential 
contradictory elements in such things as the modern- 
day legal working out of state contracts with the 
private sector is something which will not be 
considered within the confines of this present work* 
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But whatever the specific character of the 
state's demands at any given time and In any given 
"policy area" may be, this much, in general, Is 
always true: so long as such demands have their 
origIn in bourgeois society, they will never dissolve 
the legal form, the language of private Interests In 
and through which they appear as law# This is 
because the legal form is essentially a commodity 
relation, I. e. a relation of private property. 
On the other hand, this does not mean that the 
legal form cannot be hideously compromised in the 
most blatantly obvious manner in the light of the 
specific character of the state-Is demands. Indeed,, 
the contradiction between the legal form and the 
state's demands, the opposition of a language of 
equality and a relation of power seeking accomodatIon 
therein; this is precisely what becomes Increasingly 
apparent and what is naturally to be expected in the 
very process of modern legal development. The 
material basis of this Is the increasingly antithetical 
relation of socially organised production (the root 
of the increasing mass of state regulations etc. ) 
and private ownership of the means of production 
(whence the form of legality, mediated, of course, 
through the form of generalised private ownership 
of commodities which arises upon this basis. ). 
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The legal form and state power appear as 
opposites which need one another: the latter so 
that demands in which It is dressed might be given 
the form of legality, and the former so that It 
doesn't dissolve and revert back to Its primordial 
existence in the anarchy of generalised commodity 
relations. But this opposition is a process, or 
rather, this opposition describes what is materially 
a deeper underlying antithetical processs, which, 
with the development of bourgeois society comes 
increasingly to the forefront. The material 
substratum of the opposition of law and state, 
of private law and "public law", of the form of 
legality and the "social" demands which are mediated 
through the "political" sphere, is the antithesis 
of private property (the ground of the legal form) 
and the general development of the productive forces 
of society (reflected in the increasingly preponderant 
"interference's of the state). Itis this which belies 
the "socialism" of the modern states, the "mixed 
economy", and the Increasingly mountainous growth 
of "public law" to the extent that it appears to 
dwarf the relatively simple and uncomplicated body 
of private law doctrine into insignificance. 
The antithesis of "public law" and private law 
does not go aw-ay with the increased significance of 
the former. It becomes, in fact, more acute. This 
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is so because the ground of this antithesis Is that 
between social production and private property, which 
becomes more acute as capitalism develops the 
concentration of the means of production into fewer 
and fewer hands. As the means of production become 
concentrated into fewer and fewer private hands - 
as In the modern multi-national corporation, for 
example - the contradiction of social production 
and private property becomes more and more acute. 
As the large-scale modern enterprise becomes more 
grandiose, as it becomes "responsible" for tens of 
thousands of jobs, for the production and distribution 
of products upon which sometimes the effective 
material stability of the entire social edifice 
depends, when production in this way becomes 
effectively social production, then its ownership 
and control on the basis and in the interests of 
private proprietorship becomes increasingly obvious 
as an irrational integument which no longer corresponds 
with the social responsibilities which It has brought 
upon itself. The parallel of this in the legal sphere 
Is that the form of legality embodied in private law 
(which has Its roots In private ownership) becomes 
an increasingly irrational shell in which the growing 
manifold of the state's activities seek legal 
expression. Let us just clarify this process a little 
further. 
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Social production, i. e. production for the 
needs of society as a whole cannot be guaranteed 
on the basis of private ownership of the means of 
production. One man with the means of production 
as his private property will use that property as 
such, as his own and in his own best interests. 
His interests are private, not social. Once these 
means of production no longer serve his own purposes, 
he will discard them regardless of their necessity 
for social production as a whole. The tale of the 
nationalisation of Industries in modern bourgeois 
societies corresponds with precisely this principle: 
the private proprietors lose interest in their 
railways, their mines etc. as soon as they become 
unprofitable and they do this quite regardless of 
fact that such things are absolutely essential for 
social production as a whole (which here means, for 
capitalist production as a whole). When essential 
Industries and sex-vices become unworkable in private 
hands (notwithstandinG the fact that what Is "essential" 
in this connection appears as a result of "political" 
manoevering) the state moves in and thereby guarantees 
the continuation of capitalist social production as 
a whole. In practice this has meant the state not 
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only taking over for example such thing ., s as 
railways, 
roads, minesp education and health services and 
so forth, but has meant the development alongside 
this of an enormous state bureaucracy responsible 
for the financial and administrative organIsation 
of such things. 
It Is not our aim here to go into any detail 
In regard of these developments of the modern state. 
Our aim is rather to point out that, with the growth 
of state regulation in an Increasingly large number 
of areas of social life, law appears to become 
predominantly "public la-w". Yet, at the same time 
the form of legality is still perfectly embodied in 
private law. The modern legal form is essentially 
a commodIty-relation, that Is, a relation of private 
property in Its form as property in exchange. The 
legal form, as we have already made clear previouslyl 
makes no distinction between private ownership of 
commodities and private ownership of productive means 
(the basis of the generalised character of the former 
and hence the legal form itself). Legally, the modern 
corporative gianto as a private owner of productive 
means capable of producing the most astonibhing 
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quantities of value, is of the same essential 
character as one of the hundreds of thousands who 
work within it. Consequently, so far as the state 
is compelled to "Interfere" with this giant, to 
remind this essentially private character of his 
public responsibilities e. go, to those whom It 
employs, or to the environment etc., so far as 
the state does these things in specific regard 
of taming this egoistic giant, it points explicitly 
to the narrowness of a legal form which implicitly 
stands on a principle of equality (of giants and 
dwarfs) on such matters. Just as. private ownership 
of productive means becomes a constraint upon the 
social development of production (egoistic disregard 
of Jobs, environment etc. ), so the legal form 
becomes a constraint upon the state's attempts to 
rectify this imbalance. For, the legal form Is 
basically only "generally" concerned In so far as 
it reflects the generality of private interests. 
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(3) "Public la-w": the legal form and state 
power 
(a) So long as there exist, historically, the 
elements of generalised commodity production and 
exchange, automatically a system of private-law 
relations, legal relations as such, become 
articulated hand in hand with Its development. 
The aim, however, in developing these relations As 
legal relations, of articulating the already 
implicit norms of equivalent exchange, supposes an 
authority "independent" of this process capable 
of applying those norms to cases In which they 
appear to have broken down for one reason or 
another. In other words, the legal form only 
develops as such i. e. beyond its existence as merely 
the "Juridical" moment of the exchange relation, 
when, at the same time, there is in existence a 
form of power that it can join forces with - other- 
wise there would be no point in developing the legal 
form as such. For without any power to Guarantee 
the norms of equivalent exchange, that system of 
exchange might just as well be left to Its own 
devices. The legal form in this latter instance 
would exist as nothing more than the "juridical" 
moment of the exchange relation. In this way the 
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legal forra supposes the existence of an authority 
independent of itself. We can designate this 
authority with the term, 11statelt. 
On the other hand, this 11state", under the 
conditions of generalised commodity production, finds 
at hand, so to speak, a definite legal form ready 
and waiting to give in return for accomodatIon, the 
blessing of its categories to its (the statels) various 
orders. The character of the modern state cannot be 
Guaged from these general conditions as regards its 
specific coloration, but whatever orders It might 
come up with, the legal form, in return for its 
shelter under the auspices of power, will readily 
ornament them with its language of equality. Thus 
the demands of state attain their legal character. 
It Is precisely in this way that the commonly- 
held belief that, it is specifically its existence 
as law which commands obedience to a Given rule, 
attains its force of conviction. In fact nothing 
could be more wrong, for the legal form In essence 
has no "power of command" whatsoever. As an 
equivalent form, the legal-form becomes compromised 
as soon as It appears (as it must) in conjunction with 
the organised system of state power. This is the 
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case even when the legal form is "truest" to its 
real inner nature as the "juridical" moment of the 
commodity exchange relation, i. e. in private law, 
whereupon the legal form acquires the backing of 
state power in the regulation of exchange relations 
through private actions. Still, the "power of 
command" subsists not in law itself but in the 
given manifold of political conditions that are 
spoken through the law. 
When Austin formulated a la Hobbes (but with 
none of Hobbes scientific instinct) all law as 
command by a sovereign, he was really talking about 
anything but law as such. Austin's theory is 
specifically a theory of "notO law: the "province" 
which he "determined" was an official summary of 
the political conditions which the state stands 
for "public law", the demands of the state 
ornamented in legal style. 
1 
The legal form as such, private law, which 
reflects the Interests of the individual in the 
relation of commodity exchange, guarantoes in effect 
1- 11 ... juristIsche .5 tilisierungtl - is Pashukan: Ls I 
phrase, Allgemeine Rechtslehre, p. 14.5(a). 
We shall consider his position in this 
connection later on. Austin's t1aeory is 
contained in his book, "The Province of 
Jurisprudance Determi-ned", a book despised by 
contom-porary Scottish writers, like Ikistie, 
for its "Commonplace hedonism". 
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no more than that which is guaranteed in the 
"normal" business of exchange. And this amounts 
to very little Indeed when it is considered that 
the "normal" business of exchange, especially in 
the modern era, has meant the most tremendous of 
social upheavals: colonialism, competition for 
ma kets, trade wars, unemployment, armed conflict 
on a world-scale ... In all this the legal form 
is a paper tiger without an "independentO authority 
behind It. This, moveover, Is why jurists, in so 
far as they speak properly as jurists, can never 
really talk about "order", as it is called, even 
though the terms f1law" and "order" are commonly 
associated. The legal form has nothing to do with 
order. Order/disorder are outside the scope of 
the legal form, which Is strictly a descendent of 
the commodity-exchange relation. 
The legal form Is basically a form of equivalence 
and, as such, Is the antithesis of the most elementary 
facet of power: the domination of one will over 
that of another. Thus, strange to relate, the 
differentia specifica which makes a thing legal 
Is that of a form which knows nothing of power. 
Power requires that the will of one predominates 
over that of another - inequality. 
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However, the legal form's raison dletre as 
firstly (logically and historically) the systematic 
working-out of the norms implicit in generalised 
commodity exchange must be something beyond this 
alone. That is to say, it supposes a "power" 
capable of ensuring those norms which, generally 
speaking, already ensure themselves in the majority 
of cases. Independently of the legal development 
of the exchange relation, of the "abstract individual", 
the "subject of a right" and so forth, ire Imow 
that the material equivalent form of commodities 
of itself enables the "do ut des"I "do ut facias"t 
"facio ut des" etc., in a wordt'the "Juridical" 
moment of the exchange act. The point here is 
that the purpose of making these conditions 
legally explicit must suppose something else if 
such a project is not to be an exercise merely for 
its own sake: in other words, a "power" Is supposed 
which is both "independent" of it and at the same 
time necessary to it in so far as it Is to reallse 
Itself (contradictorily) as such i. e. as law. 
To express the point here in a sentence: the 
legal form is not a power in itself, but necessarily 
makes its way to a centre of power in order to survive. 
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Materially it is the movement of private property 
(the commodity-form) under the protection of the 
state. 
Historically, the modern legal form found in 
the ancient regime, or rather, in the decaying 
ancient regime, a power structure appropriate to 
its minimal life-demands. In this way the legal 
form, essentially a language of equality, an 
articulation of the social equivalent form of 
generalised commodity relations, moves under the 
auspices of a sphere which It is not, a sphere which 
bears a form antithetical to Its own (the legal 
form's) nature, a sphere which bears the form of 
inequality: the f1power of commandt'. In this 
historical movement, the legal form became merged 
Into the modern state apparatus as part and parcel 
of it, as part of the very process of stripping the 
institutions of the ancient regime of their feudal 
integument. So established, the new state acquires 
in the same breath the new language of law and the 
"power of command" now speaks contradictorily through 
the language of equality. If men are equal, how can 
some command others? An absolutely impossible 
question for previous societies is here turned into 
a live issue Jai the so-called "rule of law". 
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The "rule of law", a veritable contradictio 
in adjectog is really rule expressed in the language 
of law. Law as such i. e. the legal form, cannot 
"rule" for it Is basically an equivalent form. If 
equality rulest then no one will preponderates over 
that of another, in other words, nobody rules; but 
if a power Is required to enforce such a maxim, by 
that very design the maxim is destroyed, for one 
will at least must then predominate. And if one Is 
reminded here of the "possibility" of a "will of 
equality", as causa sui, then the reader must also 
be reminded of how far Kant got with it and the 
reasons for his demise. 
1 
The riddle of the "rule of law'19 that is, rule 
through the language of equality is to be decyphered 
thus: the legal form and "powerfl are opposed to one 
another, they are antithetical; but, for its very 
existence, the legal form must move into the domain 
of "power"., It must inhabit the latter otherwise It 
would perish, or rather, It would revert back to Its 
level of subsistence as the "juridlcal" moment within 
the structure of generalised commodity exchange. 
1. cf. part ii. 
111i. 
Unlike the snail, the legal form Is not born 
with its roof on Its back; in its pure unadulterated 
state it is an equivalent form estranged from the 
trappings of power. Its natural course, however, Is 
to move towards the latter. We may picture the 
process here as a struggle for survival. The legal 
form and "powertt, being antithetical, must never- 
theless go historically hand in hand. Thuso in the 
course of its development, the bourgeois state emerges 
hand in hand with the legal form. The legal form 
becomes in this respect snail-like, it appears 
Inseparable from the shelter of power which it comes 
to inhabit. 
Were the legal form to move from its shell of 
power, it would dissolve or, what is the same thing, 
it would revert back to its essences its level of 
subsistence as the "Juridical'# moment of the commodity 
exchange relation. On the other hand, as the demands 
of the state move progressively against the language 
of equality - it is a question of degree heret depending 
upon specific historical circumstances - the legal 
veneer correspondingly peels away. 
(b) The state therefore never dissolves the 
legal forms because and so far as It never dissolves 
the private ownership of the means of production 
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upon which basis the antithesis of law'and the state 
is premised. On the other hand, history has shown 
that the bourgeois state apparatus, under certain 
conditions, can make this legal form along with 
its developments of equal right and so forthq 
look a terrible joke. The example of ONazi law", 
which students of jurisprudence are well enjoined 
to consider is a case in point! To make the position 
quite clear regarding the antithesis and unity of 
state power and the legal form, this example may 
appropriately be developed here. It may be developed 
with the following question: "Is Nazi law really 
law? " 
A, negative answer to this question must be 
qualified with something to the effect: ".. in the 
same way that prescriptions originating in the 
bourgeois state apparatus generally, regardless 
of its political coloration, are not law. 0 But the 
qualifications cannot stop here. This qualified 
negative answer is still not a full answer, for, in 
Itself, it does not distinguish from the dichotomy 
of "traditional legal theoryt', merely that law Is 
private law and that which issues from the organs 
of state, in so far as It cannot be subsumed under 
Puller in his "", "O-rality of Law" raises the issue 
of "Nazi law", but gets nowhere near to grasping 
it. According to him it is purely a teciniical- 
legal question having to do with the absence 
of certain "rules". 
the strict categories of private law, is something 
else, nothing to do with law. What "traditional 
legal theory", essentially the classic liberal view, 
cannot grasp Is the unity of the antithesis. All 
which is seen here is the antithesis alone and the 
state as a flnecessary evil". 
Nazi law is not law, in the same way that the 
prescriptions of the bourgeois state apparatus, 
regardless of its specific political coloration, 
in goneral are not law. This answer Is fine - but 
only as a beginning. Nazi law takes on the form of 
law because the latter, if it Is to survive, must 
be parasitic upon the power structure which it 
finds available. It is a matter of survival that 
the legal form inhabits the domain of power, that 
it unites with It. It is inherently a contradictory 
process, and overtly so in the case of Germany under 
the third Reich. it is still nevertheless a 
contradictory process under "normal" parliamentary 
democratic conditions (under liberal democracy - 
the legal form's ideal, as It were) where the antithesis 
between state power and the legal principle of 
equality which its bears upon its breast doesn't 
seem so glaringly obvious. The specific political 
conditions upon which the legal form is always 
parasitic - notwithstanding the "bravery" of judges 
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and the legal profession, a quality wi-ach, for this 
very reason, they are not noted for - are not 
something which the language of equality can decide, 
for, try as it may, the legal form cannot go against 
the grain of its own inherent struggle for survival, 
a struggle which automatically seeks shelter under 
the umberella of power, independently of the latter's 
specific form. Contrary, then, to the traditional 
legal view of the antithesisg the Nuremberg laws 
appear as law not as some awful anomaly, but as part 
and parcel of the very process which the legal form 
itself depends upon: power, regardless of its formp 
to speak its language of equality. Quite apart 
from the criminal law, this is the real process 
of the "protection of private property". 
"Traditional legal theory" (we shall come to 
a proper development of this phrase in pa-rt II) 
found in the private law form of contract its ideal, 
a form in which independent and equal individual 
wills could be brought together without any apparent 
coercion on either side. And with this it proceeded 
to subsume the state itself under this very form, 
it tried to reconcile the antithesis by reducing 
public law to private law, by considering power 
-118- 
under a form of equality. The legal theorist, 
Radbruch, expressed the posItion here thus: 
To liberalism, private law is the heart of 
all law, with public law as a narrow protective 
frame laid around private law... This relative 
rank, as between private and public lawp which 
is assumed by liberalism is expressed in the 
ideas of the social contract doctrine. It 
involves "a compromise between private law 
and public law, " (von Ranke) the attempt to 
trace super- and subordination In the state 
to an agreement between originally coequal 
individuals, i. e., to dissolve public law 
fictitiously in private law. Liberalism 
carried to the extreme, namely, -anardh: Lsmp 
seeks to dissolve public law in private law 
not only fictitiously but really. By refusing 
to recognise any obligation that is not self- 
obligation, it makes the social contract 
doctrine not only the political theory but 
also the principle of organisation of social 
living together. 
In the next chapter we shall consider in detail some 
of the historically more important formulations of 
this kind of doctrine. Here attention may be drawn 
to certain of Radbruchts words: "Liberalism carried 
to the extreme, namely, anarchism.. -refusing to 
recognise any obligation that Is not self-obligationlIg 
i. e. refusing to come to terms with power, Indeedt 
Incapable of reconciling the antithesis it holds in 
relation to the legal form. Lot us reiterate what Is 
wrong with this view. It is not grasped by Radbruch, 
G. Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, P-153-, 20th century 
legal philosophy series, Vol. IV. 
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who says: "Contractual obligation is not suitable 
to serve as the basis of the obligation of the law; 
quite the contrary, it presupposes the obligation 
of the law. " 
1 
This merely looks at the reverse 
side of the coin and stresses the other end of the 
antithesis. Bacon's dictum, "Jus prIvatum sub tutela. 
juris publici latet" 
2; 
an article of the Weimar 
constitution, ItIn economic intercourse, freedom of 
contract shall prevail in accordance with the lawsO 
- this is the sort of evidence Radbruch brings in 
support of his view that private law cannot be 
the basis of law, I. e. the form of law. In other 
wordsp his proof is by assertion. Law Oobvlously" 
requires power, therefore it cannot be an equivalent 
form. Thus, the basis of law is power. Again, 
recalling the brief points we made in connection 
with legal theorists Kelsen and Duguit, this Is not 
a criticism of the liberal view, or, what Is the 
same thing, the view of "traditional legal theory". 
1. Radbruch,, ibid. p. 168. 
2. "Private law latently subsists under the tutelage 
of public law". ibid. 'p. 152. 
3. ibid. p. 172. It is Article 152 of the Reich 
constitution of 1919. 
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Regarding the liberal view: the legal formg par 
excellence private law, is not alien to the power 
structure of the bourgeois state in the subjective 
sense, that it "despises" it. In the classical 
liberal view of the state as a "necessary evil", 
the "evil" here is the rhetoric of the "free trader 
vulgaris". The Important thing is the "necessary", 
namely, the fact that the power of the bourgeois 
state, whatever its "political" character, is necessary 
to the legal form as such, as an equivalent form. 
Thus, to return to our example, if "Nazi law" is 
not law, the latter Is parasitic upon the living 
conditions provided by the Fascist state in so far 
as it is to retain the platform upon which to speak 
Its language of equality, i. e. its "commodity" 
language - the language of private property. 
Thus, it is very important to distinguish from 
the view of the law/state dualism which is really 
a glorification of trade and money-making via 
"contract" as law properly so-called, via the 
"harmony" ("anarchyff, in Radbruch's terms - It is 
the same thing) of equivalent commodity-exchange 
relations, to distinguish from this the real operation 
of dualism. If the legal form as a relation of 
equality is antithetical to "power", that is, to 
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the relation of domination and subordination, then 
In reality, In bourgeois society, where these forms 
come alive as it were, they become united in opposition. 
Each needs the other: the bourgeois state needs Its 
language of equality and the legal form needs power. 
In the nineteenth century and the early part of the 
twentieth, the liberal free traders, both In England 
and on the continent, spoke directly the sentiments 
of the legal form. They were all for equality and 
free trade and against state intervention. They 
sought to realise practically what the legal form 
stood for theoretically. In their various performances 
they demonstrated precisely the opposite of their 
case: to speak the language of freedom and equality, 
they stalked the corridors of power. As spokesmen 
for the legal form, i. e. private propertyt they showed 
exactly how it must subsist in reality: as a language 
of equality spoken within the bourgeois state apparatus. 
If these spokesmen had been theoretically correct, 
then there would have been no need for them to jockey 
for parliamentary seats, to move Into Influential 
committees and so forth; they would have just as 
well given their exclusive attention to their various 
business interests. 1 
cf. Finer S. E., in "Studies in the Growth of 
11 19th century Govern: mentll. Nora aenerally, 
cf. Halavy, f'Tlxo Growtll of PlAilosophic 
Radicalism". 
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Private law is, to use the words of Pashukanis, 
'#the prototype of the legal form in general. " But 
even here, where the legal form appears relatively 
undisguised in its essential connections with the 
"Juridical" form of the commodity relation, it Is 
no longer true to this latter form. That is to 
say, as private law it Is already "touched" with 
an alien spirit of super- and subordination In the 
"power" which It supposes in its business of rectifying 
private (primarily contractual) relations. Accordinglyl 
the antithesis of law and state is classically 
formulated very early on In bourgeois society, i. e. 
before the state even begins to "interfere" with 
things hitherto operated under exclusively private 
hands. As we have said, we shall look at "traditional 
legal theory" proper in this connection In part II* 
Here we may just remark that legal thought subsequent 
to the turn of the eighteenth centuryt whether 
"traditionalist" or Opositivist",, has not got beyond 
these classical formulations, of the antithesis of 
law and state power. Basicallys the persistent error 
here is of the following nature: the antithesis of 
law and state power (which we have called the second 
antithesis of law) becomes a mere sublimation of 
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the abstract subject (the first antithesis of law, 
i. e. the equalisation of individuals as Itabstract 
Individualitytl)o The state, in other words, becomes 
subsumed under the legal form as such, whereupon 
this style of thinking becomes an expression (as 
distinct from an understanding) of the antithesis 
of law and state power. For, this is precisely the 
contradictory process, namely, that of shunting 
the state's demandsl or more formally, the relation 
of domination and subordination, into a form which 
intrinsically opposes such a relation, which the 
second antithesis consists Ine 
1 
Legal thinking, since Kant, has done none other 
than express this antithesis of law and state. 
Disregarding the legal positivists, who simply 
declare that a problem doesntt really exist here, 
this is true of even the most historically 
conscious juristic writers, e. g. Savigny, Puchta, 
Ahrens, Friedlander (cf. post, part 3). The 
English writers who fall into this latter category, 
e. g. Maine, Pollock, Maitland, Dicey express the 
law/state dualism with great naivety: Dicey, for 
instance, believed that the growth of "public law" 
was identical with the growth of socialism (which 
could not possible be legal) and denounced almost 
every act of state intervention over and above Mill's 
principle that, "the sole end for which mankind 
are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of 
their number, is self:.. protection. " Dicey rages 
against the "collectivist" developments of his 
day: the Old Age Pensions Act, the Trade Disputes 
Act, the Education (provision of meals)Act, 
the Mines Regulation Act. This "rapid growth of 
collectlvism.. (demonstrates how) the main current 
of legislative opinion.. has run vehemently towards 
collectivism.,, - Dicey, Law and Public Opinion etc., 
Introduction (2nd. ed. ). 
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(c) We have a duty to acknowledge the work of 
the legal theorist, or rather, theorist of law, 
E. B. Pashukanis, in connection with the things 
we have just considered. At the same time there are 
some points which may be further clarified. 
Firstly: the two antitheses in the process of 
modern law. In the presentation of these antIthesesp 
the first comes first, and the second develops out 
of it. They are not logically separate; on the 
contrary, each logically supposes the other. To 
clarify: the first antithesis is the legal form as 
an equivalent form - concretely, as private law, the 
persona and so forth. Here it is developed first 
and foremost as an opposition of equality and 
individuality. Thus the process as described in the 
introductory remarks in chapter 1, not forgetting its 
material elements as laid out in the whole of 
chapter two. However, this process so-describeds 
although It temporarily leaves out of view the 
question of power, on no account precludes it 
logically. On the contrary, the legal form here 
supposes that as such, i. e. as an equivalent form 
primarily, It stands in an antithetical position 
vis-a-vis the relation of power. The second 
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antithesis Is therefore a development which springs 
directly from the first, with the difference that 
the question of power and the legal form is now 
directly posed: How is the antithetical power 
relation which is supposed both logically and 
historically by the very nature of the legal form 
to be reconciled with it? All the difficulties 
here turn on the word, "reconcile". For, the 
antithesis Is realp a historical product, and not 
simply an Invention of legal theory. Thus, thinking 
the thing out does not Involve a "reconciliation" 
so much as a grasping of the thing as an antithesis, 
as a contradictory unity in reality. We shall come 
back to this. Let us bring Pashukanis into the 
picture. 
Pashukanis does not talk about the t1two antitheses" 
in so many words. They are nevertheless both present 
in the way he grasps the process of modern law - 
indeed, they have to be, for, as we have just remarked, 
to consider the first, the legal form as such, as 
fundamentally an equivalent form, automatically 
posits the second, Its antithetical relation with 
power as it appears in reality. Pashuk-anis' essay 
embodies this dialectic: 
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It is perfectly manifest that the logic of 
juristic concepts corresponds with the social 
relations of a commodity-producing society, 
and that it is specifically In these relations, 
and not In the permission of the authorities, 
that the root of the system of private law 
("the prototype of the legal form in general") 
must be sought. On the other hand, It is only 
in part that the logic of the relationships of 
authority and subordination fits into the 
system of juristic concepts - wherefore the 
Juristic understanding of the state can never 
become a theory, but will always appTar as an 
ideological perversion of the facts. 
Problems concerning the 11two antitheses" are quite 
naturally brought together in this statement. In 
the first sentence, the commodity-connection of the 
legal form Is recalled: the riddle of the equivalent 
form and its material basis. Essentially, the first 
antithesis, But, at the same time, the second 
antithesis is expressly supposed in this first 
sentence, with the words, "not In the permission 
of the authorities". These words mean; not as a 
concession on the part of the state; the basis of 
law, as fundamentally an equivalent form, Is opposed 
to the relationships of state power. This latter is 
certainly not unimportant, quite the reverse, but 
the basis of the legal form must first be sought 
elsewhere. The second sentence then passes directly 
to a range of problems posed by the second antithesis. 
Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., p. 149. (A. R., P-72). 
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Just as the first antithesis supposes the second, 
so the second embodies the first. Juxtaposed with 
the problem of the state, In its most elementary 
facet as a relationship of domination, the legal 
form does not become something else; it remains, 
as it was comprehended in the first antithesis, as 
an equivalent form, only here it undergoes a further 
development. Here, in Pashukanis second sentence, 
the legal form remains in reality an equivalent form, 
a verity proved by the fact that when the attempt 
is made to shunt the relationships of domination and 
subordination into Itq real contradictions arise: 
"wherefore the juristic understanding of the state 
can never become a theory. " 
The proof of the immoveable reality of the law/ 
power antithesis (so long as bourgeois society 
remains) is the confusion of legal thought on the 
matter. The point Is reiterated by Pashukan1s, quite 
simply, when he says, after giving a few examples 
(e. g. ".. a community of Jesuits, where all members 
blindly and unprotestingly fulfill the will of the 
leader" - notwithstanding ýhat "blindly" might not 
express the subjective view of the Jesuit): 
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One need only ponder such examples thoughtfully 
to conclude that the more systematic the development 
of the principle of authoritarian regulation 
(which excludes the notion of separate autonomous 
wills) the less ground there is for the category 
law. This is felt with particular keenness in 
the sphere of so-called public law. Here legal 
theory comes up with the most serious difficulties. 
And again, illustrating the "field for endless 
controversies and of the most impossible confusion": 
Law is at the same time a form of external 
authoritarian rogulation in one aspect, while 
in the other it is a form of subjective private 
autonomy. In the one case, that which Is basic 
and essential is the index of unconditional 
obligation and coercion from without; in the 
other the index of freedom, guaranteed and 
acknowledged within certain boundaries. Law 
comes forth at one time as a principle of 
social organisation, and at another time as 
a means for individuals "to be disunited, being 
in society". In the one case law, it seems, 
completely merges with external authority. 
In the other case, law sets itself in opposition 
to every sort of external authoriýy which 
likewise does not recognise it ... 
There is no escaping the dualism Of law and 
power; it is a real historical condition arising 
directly from the fact that law subsists basically 
as an equivalent form. The only theoretical "escape" 
from this dualism is to grasp it as a dualism in 
reality. Pashukanis never loses sight of this. 
As this dualism inevitably manifests itself as the 
1. Pashukanis, ibid., p. 1.54. (A. R., P-78). 
2., ibid., p. 150. (A. R., P-73). 
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dichotomy of private law (law as such) and "public 
law", Pashukanis takes the example of Goichbarg, 
who, like certain other legal theorists whom we 
mentioned earlier in this same connection, pretends 
that the dualism does not exist, or, what Is the 
same thing, that It can be thou. -ht away. Pashukanis 
says: 
Goichbarg's objections rest on the idea that 
the abstractions aforesaid (public law and 
private law) are not the fruit of historical 
development but have simply been excoGitated 
by jurists. In the meantime, it is this very 
antithesis which most typically and specially 
charactorises the legal form as such. The 
division of law into public law and private law 
typifies this form both from the loalcal and 
from the historical standpoint. Having declared 
that this antithesis simply does not exist, 
we are in no way lifted above the "backward" 
(Goichbare's term - S. M. ) practical Jurists 
- on the contrary, we shall be constrained to 
use the very same formal and scholastic 
definitions as those with which they operate. 
The antithesis between "public law" and private law 
is an antithesis In reality which Is not shifted 
one inch by declaring that it does not exist. What 
Pashukanis states here Is perfectly correct: such 
declarations, in so far as they are "reasoned", can 
only covertly return to the definition of law as an 
equivalent form. They thui3 move in a circle and end 
up with essentially the self-same antithesis which 
- 
ibid., P-1.57-8. (A. R., p. 82). GoIchbarg says: 
"The division of law into public law and private 
law, which has never turned out happily for the 
jurists, enjoys recognition at the present time 
only among the most backward jurists.. ", cited, 
ibid. 
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they initially sought to remove. Pashukanis adds: 
The very concept of public law may thus be 
developed only in this, its movement, in which 
It is constantly pushing away from private 
law as it were, seekine to define itself as the 
antithesis of private law, and then returning 
once mor? to private law as to its centre of 
gravity. 
In this way the most articulate of leg'al formalistst 
par excellence those who hark back to Kanto end up on 
the doorstep of tile very antithesis which they try to 
e. scape from. The truth of the matter is that the 
antithesis is fundamentally immoveable, so lone as 
the conditions behind It, in a word, bourgeois 
commodity production and exchange, remain. Bourgeois 
society is the condition of the antithesis between 
private and social interests. As Pashukanis says: 
"the real premise for this overcoming of the leGal 
form and legal ideology is a condition of society 
wherein an end has been put to the very contradiction 
between the individual interest and the social 
interest. to 2 
Secondly, attention must be drawn towards some 
of the problems which arise while comprehending the 
antithesis between public and private law as something 
rooted in the real conditions of capitalist production 
1. ibid. 
2. ibid., p. 156. (A. R., p. 81)- 
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and exchange. These particular problems arise from 
the tendency to infer the actual conditions of the 
antithesis from the general logic of these conditions. 
This tendency is a result of the fact that it is 
specifically the form of law which is under consider- 
ation, and the state, even when It becomes directly 
involved (in the second antithesis), is still only 
considered formally, as an official summary of 
"social" or "Public" demands entailing the formal 
relation of domination and subordination. Pashukanis 
illustrates this tendency himself. on one occasion 
he notes, for example, that "'LeGall demands issuing 
out of the organs of public authority, demands having 
no private interest of any sort behind them, are no 
more than the facts of political life formulated in 
legal diction. " 
1 
AGain, this recalls the antithesis 
between Opublic law" and private law. Those demands 
issuing from the organs of public authority are 
t1legal" - in inverted commas. Not really law as 
such, because they are "power" demands, demands 
merely ornamented In legal style ("Juristische 
Stillsierung"). The surprising thing about this 
statement, however, Is not this, but certain of the 
words which Go in expressing It, namely the "no more 
1. ibid., p. 203 fn. (A. R., p. 14.5). 
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than" In connection with "the facts of political life". 
These "facts of political life", in their connection 
here, can constitute no less than the difference 
between a Fascist dictatorship and a tolerant liberal 
democracy. Such conditions are not to be under- 
estimated - In any event. Moreover, in the context 
of the antithesis between power relationships and the 
legal form, such things are certainly not to be left 
out of the reckoning. As we remarked earlier, the 
legal form can only thrive within the "facts of 
political life". Outside this sphere It perishes 
and reverts to subsistence level-in the commodity- 
exchange structure; within thi s sphere, it becomes 
a "contradiction In reality". 
A, word about this term, "contradiction in reallty"s 
is appropriate here. The antithesis in bourgeois 
society between power relationships, whatever their 
particular coloration, and the legal form Is always 
a unity In (actual) reality - even though it is a 
contradictory one. The 4--ontradictlon In reality" Is 
really an expression of the mode in which the thing 
in question Is to be apprehended In thought, whereas 
reality as such, as it Is experienced by the senses, 
does notq of course, come labelled with nice neat 
categories telling us about itself. It needs hardly 
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be said thatt were this the casev there would be 
absolutely no need to think. 
So, the law/power antithesis is brought together 
in reality, but In the only way that an antithesis 
can be brought together; contradictorily In reality, 
therefore, the form of legality is always compromised, 
sometimes more, sometimes less, depending precisely 
upon those "facts of political life. " 
Pashukanis again furnishes us with a rather 
uneasy expression when he writes, "State authority 
introduces into the legal structure precision and 
stability, but does not create the premises of that 
superstructure; these are rooted in the materialg 
that is to say, in production relationships. " 
1 
There 
is something not quite right about the expression of 
the law/state dualism here. Firstly, there is the 
suggestion that state authority, being distinguished 
from the legal structure, Is somehow independent of 
production relationships. And secondlyt and what Is 
In fact the cause of this suggestion, the whole 
business of exchange, I. e. the Immediate source of 
the legal form as an equivalent form I and hence the 
very ground of the dualism, is cut out of the reckoning. 
Thus, the odd thing about Pashukanis' statement here 
1o. ibid., p. 147. (A. R., p. 69). 
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is that it seeks to express the law/state dualism 
while at the same time cutting the basis away from 
under Its namely, the dualism of exchange (the 
sphere of generallsed private Interest) and production 
(the sphere of particular private interests where 
the social interest becomes problematic). It is 
In this latter spheres In the sphere of production 
relationships, that the state's activity is directly 
rooted, whereas the legal form has Its roots here 
indirectly, i. e. mediated through the form of exchange. 
By missing this very important distinctiont Pashukanis 
is led into turning "state authority" Into something 
apparently independent of the relations of production, 
whereas just the reverse Is true. For, as we saw 
earlier, It is directly production and the conditions 
of production under private hands which posits the 
state's "interfering" activity, the form of its 
authority, as guarantor of social production as a 
whole. 
It hardly needs be said, given what we have 
already acknowledged in connection with Pashukanis' 
work, that the above over-sights which we have made 
use of are not charactorlstic of the whole* Indeed, 
Pashukanis rarely loses sight of the law/state 
The truth of this statement Is nowadays 
brought home daily In the incessant "political" 
talk about trade, prices, employment, 
productivity, wages, profitst balance of 
payments, inflation etc., in a word, the 
conditions of material production. 
"The specific economic form# in which 
unpaid surplus-labour Is pumped out of 
the direct producersq determines the 
relationship of rulers and ruled, as It 
grows directly out of production itself'v 
and, in turn, reacts upon It as a determining 
element... It is always the direct relation. 
ship of the owners of the conditions of 
production to the direct producers -a 
relation always naturally corresponding 
to a definite stage in the development 
of the methods of labour and thereby Its 
social productivity - which reveals the 
innermost secret, the hidden basis of the 
entire social structureq and with It the 
political form of the relation-of sovereignty 
and dependence, In short, the corresponding 
specific form of state. This does not 
prevent the same economic basis - the same 
from the standpoint of its main conditions 
- due to innumerable different empirical 
circumstances, natural env: Lronmentl, racial 
relations, external historical influences 
etc., from showing infinite variations 
and gradations in appearance, which can 
be ascertained only by analysis if the 
empirically given circumstances. " - Marx, 
CapItalt Vol- IIIP P-791-2. 
Recent scientific discussion on the 
nature of the state rightly takes this 
as a point of departure and views the 
state as an essentially unmediated 
relation of the concrete conditions of 
material production. cf. 
' 
Hirsch, Elements 
of a Theory of the Bourgeois State. 
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antithesis In its essential connections. On the 
other hand, It is a tendency with the nature of his 
enterprise, which Is a criticism of the theory of 
law, that the "facts of political life"# "state 
authorItyllp or rather, the theoretical locus of 
such conceptions, is disturbingly left out of the 
reckoning. 
Finally, we are now in a position to present the 
schematic outlines of the law/state antithesis. It 
is to the sphere of production relations, of the 
direct conditions of material production, which 
specifically "state" activity corresponds. 
1 It Is 
to the sphere of exchange relationst of generalised 
private interests, to which the form of legality 
corresponds. The dualism of law and state is 
therefore fundamentally a dualism of exchange and 
production. It develops, as we pointed out earlier, 
as a dualism of private and social interests, the 
former being generalised in the form of legalityp 
. 
the latter being particularised as a result of their 
falling within the conditions of private ownership 
of the means of production. As we saw, it Is under 
these latter circumstances that the state finds It 
increasingly necessary to compromise the free exercise 
of private right over property in this particular 
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connection, a connection in which, moreover, the 
legal form is Intrinsically opposed to distinguishing 
from private ownership in general, i. e. mere owner- 
ship of commodities. 
Still, it might be objected that the mediation 
of the form of legality through the sphere of exchange 
is, at all events only a mediation; in other words, 
that the legal form does, ultimately, depend upon 
material production relationships. The objection 
Is well-made in so far as it draws attention to the 
fact that the legal form is not just a commodity- 
relation, but a commodity-relation which is grounded 
in a productive system of capital and wage-labour. 
All this is very true: but It doesn't dissolve the 
antithesis of law and state. It is true that exchange 
depends upon production. Production Is the basis bf 
exchange, not the other way around. And in this way 
the form of legality ultimately depends upon the 
same conditions governing the activity of the state. 
But this does not make the law/state dualism much 
ado about nothing. On the contrary, when this common 
ground comes to the surface, when the conditions of 
material production become revealed as the veritable 
basis of all things - In times of economic crisis 
the dualism of law and state becomes Increasingly 
apparent. This Is evident from the example which we 
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mentioned earlier, the case of legality under the 
conditions of the third German Reich. Here the 
acuteness of the economic crisis bursts the 
antithesis of legality and the state wide open. 
All notion of equal standards here goes to the wind. 
The crisis in production calls for "emergency 
measures", which in this case throws up the ugly form 
of Nazism. The complacently "bourg'eols" form of 
Weimar legality Is essentially smashed to piecesp 
but remains gibbering its language of equality under 
the auspices of the Fascist state. 
The economic roots of Fascism are generally 
seen by liberal historians as merely one of 
many "factors" alongside such things as the 
"uniqueness" of Hitler's personality etc. - But although Hitler was "uniquellp there was 
nevertheless a little bit of Hitler in every 
down-trodden petty bourgeoisl every unemployed 
worker, who could envisage no alternative 
rescue from the complete and utter ruin brought 
about by Germany's unfulfilled need for "normal" 
capital accumulation, for marketst for economic 
expansion, for "Lebensraum"o The secret to the 
phenomenon which has both appalled and puzzled 
liberal historians with their eclectic tools of 
analysis, that the Nazis came to power by 
parliamentary democratic means, rests in 
precisely this, namely the conditions of 
capital accumulation, the conditions of 
material production zýppertaining to Germany 
In particular and the West In general from 
1919 onwards. cf. Vajda, X., On Fascism; 
and Mandel, E., (ed. ), lUse of Fascism In 
Germany. 
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The reason why the "common ground" of the state's 
activity an the one side and the form of legality 
on the other doesntt dissolve their antithesis, Is 
that this "common ground", i. e. production relation- 
ships, is in its own very nature the seedbed of 
antitheses. Production as production Is already 
at odds with exchange before its products ever come 
to market, because these products bear the hidden 
markings of labour for whIch-an equivalent has not 
been given in return. Exchange, on the other hand, 
as we made clear in chapter two, contains just the 
opposite thesis. 
It is now time to conclude - although the reason 
is far from being that enough has been said. But 
In this first part we have at least got at the 
material elements behind the form of modern legality. 
Firstly (In chapter 2). the material elements behind 
the (first) antithesis of Individuality as sucht as 
concrete Individuality, and equality; that Is to 
say, the material elements of the generallsed"boEiinddity 
structure which lie behind the notion of the abstract 
subject. And secondly (here in chapter 3). the 
material elements behind the (second) antithesis of 
this legal equivalent form and state power, namely,, 
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the opposition of private and social Interests 
premised in the opposition of private property in 
general, I. e. as generallsed commodIty-ownership, 
and private property In particular, i. e. in regard 
of private ownership of the means of production, 
whereupon the state becomes increasingly compelled 
(In the interest of capitalist production as a 
whole) to compromise the narrow shell of egotistical 
private Interest upon which the form of legality Is 
based. 
As a foreword In regard of part 2: the antith6ses 
In the process of modern legality are now to be 
considered in connection with certain of their modern- 
classical expressions. Now this terrain is, indeed, 
a considerable distance away from the irmnediate 
conjuncture of events (although perhaps not so far 
away as might be Imagined), that is to say, the 
present social conditions under whIch the form of 
legality makes Its typically contradictory appearance. 
On the other hand (and this Is the only "excuse" 
which is offered In the face of this apparently 
"escapist" subject-matter-) the day when an aspiring 
new generation of Illegal" thinkers take it upon 
themselves to re-think the language of equality may 
not be too far away In the distant future, in which 
ovent the kinds of criticIsms which we are about to 
make will not be entirely in vain. 
Part II 





Modern-Classical Connections of the Equivalent 
Form - 
It was explained in the last section how the 
subjoct-matter of private law hides from view the 
abstract form of equivalence upon which it Is based. 
However, the abstract form, although shifted from 
view, Is not so far removed since the subject-matter 
of private law is largely a matter of contractual 
relations anyway. Moreover, It was seen that on 
this account, following Pashukanis, private law 
thinking achieves its characteristic internal 
coherence relative to other branches of upositiven 
legal thought. in the same kind of way it was 
Pashulcanist view that the classical modern Itnatural- 
law" theories achieved their distinguishing marksý 
of clarity and coherence In the form of discursive 
argument. But the way in-which he skirts round the 
points involved here Is interestingly one-sided. 
If we leave un-named certain "contractarlan" 
theorists, we can still say a good deal about them. 
It was perfectly sensible that these theorists-should 
conceive public authorIty. in terms of a contract, for 
hidden beneath this notion lay the workings of a new 
mechanism committed to reproducing commodity-exchange 
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relations on an unprecedented social scale, a 
mechanism at work before their very eyes - for the 
first time. It is the era of the'ascendancy of 
capital, the withering of the ancien regime. These 
theorists were acutely sensitive to the connection 
between exchange relations and jublIc authority 
(and no mean feat given the then historical 
character of the latter), but nevertheless beheld 
this connection In a state of mystery - they 
returned to the "state of natureft for the basis 
of right. 
But how far can-these theorists go un-named? 
Rousseau, for instance, dIdn't-see the Itstate of 
nature" the same way as Hobbes or Locket and Kant 
is different again. Pashukanis merely talks about 
"natural law doctrineft, "the natrual-law prejudice" 
etc. and so appears to make some rather crude brush- 
strokes over a richly complex history of ideas. He 
Gives the latter its due simply by pointing out its 
merits vis a Vis the vulgarity of modern legal culture. 
Our procedure now will be to see how far this kind 
of view takes us. 
The "contract" which the social contract theorists 
arrived at, whatever the variations of form it took 
from one thinker to the next, has this negative quality: 
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it -was never "properly" connected with the real 
equivalent form, the material equivalent form of 
generalised commodity-relations already becoming 
increasingly apparent In the societies of their 
day. It was an idealised formt something which 
couldn't be cleansed of the mysteries of historical 
"origins". Despite this Croy side to their thinking, 
however, the remarkable quality of their scientific 
spirit can only glitter next to the developments of 
more recent legal culture, in which connection, 
Pa shukanis remarks unceremoniously: "The difference 
between the natural law doctrine and the most recent 
legal positivism is merely that-the former. has. felt 
much more clearly the logical association between 
abstract state authority and the abstract subject" 
by which latter he means the equivalent form of 
persons as commodity owners. He goes on: "It (natural 
law doctrine) took these relationships of a commodity- 
producing society, wrapped up in mystery as they were, 
In their necessary connections and so provided a 
pattern of argumentation of classical clarity, whereas 
the so-called legal positivism, on the contrary, has 
no realisatlon even of its onw logical premises. " 
2 
1. Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., p. 190. 
(Allgemeizie Rechtslehre, P. 126). 
2. Paslxukanis, ibid. 
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There are two points to be noted from PashukanIs' 
position as it appears here. The first concerns the 
general criticism of more recent legal culture and 
the fact that it "has no realisation even of its 
own logical premises"; and the second concerns the 
"mer& difference of this in comparison with so-called 
"natural-law doctrine". Let us take the first point 
first; It may be dealt with hero very briefly. 
It may appear odd that Pashukanis should talk 
of "recent legal positivismt' being unaware "of its 
own logical premises" when such positivism has been 
concerned, . more than anything else, with the logical 
systematisation of legal norms, -with "pure" concepts, 
notions and designations of normative structures, 
legal rules and so forth. Pashukanis' sense, however. p 
is to be brought out rather differently. The 
premises of which modern legal positivism is unaware 
are of a historical character. Hence the logical 
categories of which It shows no knowledge are those 
which are embodied in historical movement - and to 
this extent Pashukanis is perfectly correct. The 
positivist war-cry against "metaphysics" is symptomatic 
of just this deficiency, because "metaphysics" in 
earlier legal thinking (i. e. in so-called "natural law 
doctrinet') Is precisely the expression of a serious 
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attempt to come to terms with it. The sheer artlesness 
of the "Durkheimlan" legal positivist, Duguit, is 
illustrative In this connection. Duguit boldly 
declares that, "we have to-day (! ) eliminated from 
politics the theories of metaphysics, " and that, 
accordingly, "a statute can no longer be the formulated 
command of sovereign powerl't (by which latter he 
presumably means metaphysical constructions thereof). 
He then continues in "hard-fact" manner: "A statute 
Is simply the expression of the individual will of 
the men (sic) %, rho make It. " "Men"t a plurality, 
'With (it is all very simple) an "individual will". 
All we have here in fact is a mere reassertion of 
the problem, abstract individuality, from which the 
mt4eorles of metaphysics" departed. But Duguit only 
sees fit to add, t'Beyond that we are in the realm 
of fiction", as if the "individual will" of "men" 
bore no such resemblance. 
1 
Duguit, L, Law In the Modern State, p. 69 et. seq. 
For an illustration of his "theory", Duguit tells 
us: "In France, for example, statute (which 
for Duguit embodies the concept of law) is the 
expression of the wil4L of 350 deputies and 
200 senators who usually form the majority in 
the Chamber and in the Senate. " - ibid. If only 
Locko, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel etc. had had 
M. Dugult to open up their eyes to this powerful 
theory of law. This is typical of the school-boy 
manner in which positivism "eliminates" 
metaphysics. As for Duguit being a follower of 
Durldioita, the latter's "conscience collective? ' 
bears little resei-, iblance to the formor's 
re-statement of It in legal style. cf. Durkhoira, 
Division of Labour in Society. 
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The second point, which is connected with this, 
concerns the comparative status of so-called "natural 
law doctrine" with these more recent developments 
characteristic of modern legal culture. N "Latural 
law doctrine" apprehends the relationships of a 
commodity-producing society (Pashukanis means a 
capitalist commodity-producing society) "in their 
necessary connections. " But what does "natural 
law doctrinelf'really mean? It might appear that 
Pashukanis could have Plato and the ancients in 
mind, or the Thomists and other Christian scholastics 
of the middle-ages. In fact, he has in mind the 
bourgeois theorists since the time of Grotius - 
which is an important point not to miss: 
The natural-law school was not only the most 
brilliant exponent of bourgeois Ideology 
during the epoch when the bourgeoisie, coming 
forward as a revolutionary class, was formulating 
its demands openly and systematically: it was 
also the school which furnished the model of 
the most profou3ýd and distinct understanding of 
the legal form. 
The context in which he speaks of 11natural law 
doctrine", he further clarifies with the following 
statement: 
Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., p. 127 
(A. R., p. 42). 
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For bourgeois thinking the framework of commodity 
production is the eternal and natural frainework 
of every sort of society and it therefore 
declares that abstract state authority Is an 
appurtenance of society of every sort. The 
most naive expression of this was by t: ie 
natural law thorists, who, basing their 
doctrines concerning authority on the Idea of 
the communion of independent and equal 
personalities, supposed that they were starting 
from the principles of human intercourse as 
such. They were in reality developing in 
different modes the idea of an authority which 
binds Independent commodity owners as between 
themselves. This explains the fundamental 
features of this doctrine which come out 
perfectly distinctly as , early as 
Grotlus. 
The primary factors In the market are the 
commodity possessors who partake In exchange; 
the form of authority appears as something 
derivative, something secondary and added from 
without to the commodity possessors already at 
hand. Accordingly, the natural law theorists 
regard authority abstractly and rationalistically 
- and not as a phaenomenon. emerging historically 
and therefore associated with the forces in a 
given society. In the intercourse of comm dIty 
owners, the necessity of authoritative constraint 
arises where peace has broken downt or where 
a contract is not voluntarily fulfilled, wherefore 
the natural law doctrine reduces the functions 
of authority to merely preserving peace, and 
declares the sole destiny of the state to be 
an instrumentality of the law. Finally, one 
commodity oxvner finds himself in the market 
by the will of another, and all are such by 
their common will. For this reason. the natural 
law doctrine produces a state out of a contract 
of separate and isolated individuals. 
We must see how adequate this type-construction of 
"natural law doctrine" is. Pashukanis at least is 
convinced that "Here we have the skeleton of the 
doctrine, and it permits the most diverse specific 
variants depending on the historical setting, the 
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political sympathies, and the dialectic powers of 
the particular author. " 
1 
The independent variables, 
however, (political sympathies, dialectic powers 
etc. ) are not so easily simplified. 
On the one hand we have all the differences 
which separate Grotius and Hobbes from Rousseau, 
or those which distinguish Rousseau from Kant or 
Fichte, not to mention a host of other possible 
names, and on the other we have the simplification 
that they all harboured "natural law doctrine" and 
the specific relations and functions attached thereto. 
HOW this simplification and this manifold of 
subtlety, Genius and rare stupidity may be united 
in the productions of these modern classical figures, 
we. shall begin to consider in detail shortly. But 
first a few more words on this "simplification" 
aspect of the problem. 
It seems a rather Stoic picture of the modern 
history of the analysis of "Political Right" if 
the "Robinsonades Great and small", as Marx might 
put It, are thus made to drown - even the Giants 
being just submerged under_the water along with the 
1. Pashukanis, Ibid., p. 188-9 (A. R. p. 124-. 5). 
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dirarfs riGht at the bottom. 
1 
On the other hand, if 
we may simply mention for the MOment tile names of 
Locke and Rousseau, tile "contractarlant' theorists 
had indeed only sensed the connection of law with an 
"exchange relation". They sought the basis of right 
in a contractual equivalent form - and they rightly 
deviated from the ancients here in specifying this 
particular form of equivalence, sensing it in its 
bourgeois "exclianget' character. 
2 
Yet, giants that 
1. "The Stoics lay down that all who are not at the 
highest degree of wisdom are equally frivolous and 
vicious, as those who are two inches under water ... It 
- Pascal, "Thoughts", p. 114. 
2. The equivalent form at the'basis of ancient 
Political Right is thought out altogether differently. 
"Is there or is there not some one thing in which 
all citizens must share, if a state is to exist at 
all? " asked Protagoras. Here, for instance, he 
gives his more mythical answer: "Zeus therefore, 
fearing the total destruction of our race, sent 
Hermes to impart to men the qualities of respect 
for others and a sense of justice, so as to bring 
order Into our cities and create a bond of friend- 
ship and union. Hermes asked Zeus in what manner 
he was to bestow these gifts on men. 'Shall I 
distribute them as the arts were distributed - that is',. on the principle that one trained doctor 
suffices for many laymen, and so with other experts? 
Shall I distribute justice and respect for their 
fellows in this way, or to all alike? t 'To all', 
said Zeus. 'Let all have their share. There could 
never be cities if only a few shared in these 
virtues, as in the arts. Moreover, you must lay it 
down as my law that if anyone Is incapable of 
acquiring his share of these two virtues he shall be put to death as a plague to the city'. " - Plato, "Protagoras", p. 54. lie shall have cause to consider t1le distinction between the "natural equality" of the ancients and that of the bourgeois theorists 
a little later on. 
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they were, they nevertheless beheld the contractual 
character of right in connection with the mysteries 
of the "state of nature" and society in general 
(instead of society in particular) and so forth; 
thus, they remain submerged under water. 
The exchange relation of the "contractarian" 
theorists was haunted with "original" spirits, the 
contract they arrived at was not grasped as a 
historical result but as history's point of departure. 
1 
Subsequent developments after Rousseau, in German 
idealism, only mystified matters further (while 
clarifying others). Kantks development of the "state 
of nature", where the exchange equivalent found its 
ideal resting place, into an flidea of Pure Reason" 
only served to obscure the real connections more 
thoroughly. 2 Previous developments, before Locke, 
on the other hand, appear more naive. The Important 
facts of the exchange equivalentt as an authority 
bringing together independent owners of commodities, 
are brought out "clearly and dist: Lnctly as early as 
Grotius. 11 And, indeed, Grotius reflects i-rith perfect 
".. not arising historically, but posited by 
nature. " - Marx, see infra on Rousseau etc.. 
2. The Kantian emphasis has in this way achieved an 
enormous significance as a pillar and final 
bastion of modern European legal culture. It 
is thus sufficiently important to warrant separate 
consideration later on. 
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precision the new jurisprudence appropriate to 
bourgeois society - in his case a Holland in commercial 
ascendency upon the high seas ofworld trade. In 
this connection, It may be added, we find the true 
origins of modern jurisprudence - not in Babylon, 
or Greece or even Rome and later medieval times, 
but in Holland over the turn of the sixteenth century. 
But In any of these developments, before Locke 
or after Rousseaug in the "freedom of the seast' 
on in the ethar of t1pure reason", the equivalent 
form had not been engaged. There is, however, a 
strange circularity in the conclusion that every 
last one of them thus adhered to "natural lamr"doctrinelt. 
Pashukanis does them swift justice, which shows itself 
in the parallel conclusion that none of them had 
discovered what Marx was ordained to reveal, namely, 
the class mechanism underlying the bourgeois social 
equivalent form. 
It transpires that It is all rather too obvious 
that the classical bourgeois theorists badn't 
properly engaged the social equivalent form over 
which they showed such admirable enthusiasm. But 
although it is trivially true that none of them could 
find out what Marx could, it is never all-too-obvIous 
why. The result of this is that we are led into 
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believing the classicals to be on a par with the 
developinonts in recent legal culture. Let us 
explain this. On reflection it is obviously the 
case, for example, that the "contractual" sentiments 
of Locke or Rousseau were not quite placed In their 
appropriate social conditions - less so in Rousseau 
than in Locke-. (but leaving aside their "dialectic 
powers" for the moment). The reason for this, 
however, is not that they were in some strange 
way "lesser" men than Marx (which allows any number 
of vague and base distinctions to hold sway), but 
that they couldn't have been expected (except by 
someone rather foolish) to have perceived in full 
scientific detail the social changes they were 
immediately caught up with. And what are these 
social changes? They comprise the quickly eroding 
ancien regime, a hitherto unroalised expansion of 
productive forces and, therewith, markets, the 
growing power of the bourgeoisie, their class 
alliances alongside threats of civil war and so 
forth. They are conditions which reflect the 
nascent character of bour(;; o: Ls society; and so, 
the new social order of equality, of private property 
and 10freedom of the individual" is naturally somewhat 
difficult to see in its fuller developed character: 
for such a thing did not then exist. This cannot 
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be said of recent mod. ern legal culture, which merely 
echoes the old tales of Its classical mentors with 
a complacency they could never have shared. 
The classical theorists are not to be treated 
unjustly just because their epigones (and epigones 
of these epigones) have been prepared to let almost 
two hundred years of history escape their attention. 
These classical theorists, from Grotlus through 
to Kant, attacked the problem of right and the 
mysteries of equality with all the scientific 
spirit they could muster. Their business was 
genuinely with a science of right, and that they 
got so far as the "contract", ; Eý relation of apparently 
isolated individuals somehow brought together by 
their mutual interest, that they made, in other 
'Words, a fundamental connection of right with 
"exchange", shows just how far they had developed 
this science. 
I 
Hence the fact that recent legal 
The legal historian, Maine, had this to say of 
the "contract" theorists. - "They had observed the 
fact, already striking in their day, that of the 
positive rules obeyed by man, the greater part 
were created by Contract, the lesser by Imperative 
Law". - Ancient Law, -P-324. But for some strange 
reason Maine does not see fit to enlighten the 
reader as to the meaning of this distinction. 
Thus what is not "imperative" ahout "contract" 
he does not say. Regardless of this, however, he 
felt the pompous need to point out that, "they (the Contract theorists) were ignorant (sic) or 
careless (sic) of the historical relation of 
these two constituents of jurisprudence. " - ibid. 
-153- 
thought has not really got any further than those 
classical luminaries, and has continued to merely 
parrot in the dullest of ways the same difficulties 
with which they were faced, is inclined to lead 
us to over hasty conclusions about the scientific 
ach-ievements embodied in the classical formulations 
of right, or "natural" equality and so forth. 
Pashukanis is nevertheless perfectly within 
his rights to ,. say of natural equality and 
the 
classical modern thinkers who re-thought the 
matter, that they hadn't got it right. He says: 
In all other relationships, human Inequality 
Inequality of sex, inequality of class, and 
so on - is so glaringly conspicuous as history 
-stretches before us that we can only max-vel, not 
at the, %, realth of arguments that its various 
opponents could advance against the doctrine 
of natural equality of human be: Lngs, * but at the 
fact that down to Marx, and independently of 
Marx, no one concerned himself with the problem 
of the historical causes which contributed to 
the rise of this natural-law prejudice. Per 
If over the ages human thought has so stubbornly 
returned to the thesis that -people are equal 
and has worked it out in a thousand and one 
modes, it is clear that there must be some 1 
objective relationsfiip concealed behind It. 
On the other hand, those who harboured "this natural- 
law prejudice" were, to the extent they sheltered it, 
keeping out at sea precisely to the same extent the 
1. Pashukanis, Theory of Law and Marxism, p. 19.5 
(Allgemeine Rechtslelire, P-134). 
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objective causes behind it. And, for this reason, 
just the converse of Pashukanis' position might be 
asserted, namely, that down to Marx and independently 
of Marx, every single one of those modern classical 
thinkers of "natural-la, %, r prejudice" had been concerned 
with, and had contributed towards the revealing of, 
the latter's "objective" basis. It is not just a 
question, for instance, of Locke having seen less 
than Rousseau in regard of "natural right" etc., but, 
on this admission, a question of Rousseau having 
revealed more than Locke. Whatever the case may be 
(and we shall come to such details shortly - for 
they are important), it is clear that in Pashukanis' 
own terms he is more than overexaggerating when he 
declares: ".. down to Marx, and independently of Marx, 
no one concerned himself with the historical causes 
which contributed to the rise of this natural-law 
prejudice". For this is precisely what the classical 
thinkers of "natural-law prejudice" were concerned 
to derive as best they possibly could. 
Part II 
Cli. 2. The "Contract" and the "State of 
Naturell 
a*. Summary: "Natural" SympatlAes. 
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The "Contract" and the "State of 1,. Taturell . 
The "contract" is really the private-law 
contract of a capitalist commodity-producing society. 
But it is more than this. It Is the specifically 
legal form enmeshed within a configuration of problems 
about its "origins"; the problem of the "state of 
nature" and the further questions which this poses, 
man's position therein and, conversely, his 
development through society, the role of culture, 
industry and so forth. The solution is the "social 
cuntract". It appears in the classical writers not 
as a historical result of their own particular 
society, but as something which-terminates the "state 
of naturelt and begins the dawn of civillsation. 
I Thus the specifically legal form Is displaced and 
articulated within a strange system of philosophic 
reasoning at the centre of which lie this "contract" 
and the "state of nature". Thus also, the Itnatural- 
law prejudice". But we have a duty to see how this 
sort of thing came about If we arenot: to forget the 
names of Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau - not to 
mention Kant, Hegel, St. Simon (Mar-x? ). 
How great was Rousseau's "natural-law prejudice"? 
This Is a question around wlAch the issues at stake 
may be developed. Let us see why. 
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Professor Habermas informs us that Hegel must 
have possessed a deep fear of the French Revolution, 
a fear which outwardly manifested itself in the 
gloving enthusiasm with which he was inclined 
depict it from time to time. 
1 
Be that as it may, 
Hegel was certainly scronful of the ideas which, 
he believed, announced it: 
The distinction... between what is merely in 
common, and what is truly universal, Is 
strikingly expressed by Rousseau in his 
famous ItContrat Social", when he says that 
the laws of a state must spring from a 
universal will (volonte general), but need 
not on that account be the will of all 
(volonte do tous). Rousseau would have done 
better service towards a theory of the state, 2 if he had always kept this distinction in sight. 
Rousseau hadn't always managed to stop that which 
is "merely in common" from becoming the object of 
his enquiries. For Hegel it was unthinkable that 
the state should be connected with such a base 
foundation. The terror, according to Hegel, was 
just such a perversion. 
But what Is this thing 'tin common't? In reality, 
it is the force which mysteriously brings together 
those isolated and independent commodity oivrners (11men") 
in their mutual interest dfid benefit - an equivalent. 
c. f. Habermas' discussion of Hegel's Jena lectures, 
in "Theory and Practice". 
2. Ifegel, Logic, p. 253. 
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form, which expresses itself historically in the 
juridical form of a contract. However, this 
contract is, In Rousseau, transposed to the question 
of the foundation of political right, the Itstate 
of natureft, the "origins" of society and so forth. 
Therefore Rousseau doesn't exactly let his thoughts 
lapse to an object "In common" (the "conscience" 
of the "allft: the equivalent form), but, rather, 
lets them drift far too far away from it, to the 
da-%, m: Lng of civil society. In other words, it was 
in. a way to Rousseau's merit that he did not do 
what Hegel reprimanded him for not doing: for not 
making the "concept" of the general will the 
substantial element, for not making it a primaevalp 
universal will unfolding and realising Itself in 
its historical and many such moments. 
Something so important as a "will" shared by 
individuals in common could hardly be "merely" 
something in common If it had found Its way-to the 
"origins" of civil society. The lofty arrogance 
which denies this finds its place in classical 
German Philosophy, where, admittedly, the "Irrational" 
elements of Rousseau's social contract had been 
perceived, but only because "their" reason (Kant's 
158- 
"Pure Reason", Hegel's "Idea" etc. ) could not err 
in such a way; that is to say, only because Rousseauts 
problems had not really been taken up. For Hegel 
it was a base exercise to reduce "the union of 
individuals in the state to a contract and therefore 
to something based on their arbitrary wills, their 
opinion, and their capriciously given express consent". 
1 
The point, however, is that the "union of individuals" 
under the form of a contract is a riddle to be solved 
before it can be scorned, and Hegel had not solved 
it, for the contract was anything but a matter of 
"arbitrary wills" in this connection. 
The irrational character of Rousseau's social 
contract really comes to this: It is the juridical 
form of contract (a definite historical result) 
appearing out of place; the rude t1abstract indiv: Ldual"v 
a product of the crumbling ancien regime and the rise 
of industrial capital, appears as the thIng-in-common, 
the condition of an "original" contract at the 
foundation of society in general - not Rousseau's 
particular society (Geneva), but all societies. But 
there is more to Rousseau's contract than meets the 
eye . 
1. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, P-137- 
1. Rousseau, The Social Contract, p*12. 
2. Might could not create right for Rousseau, 
"The strongest Is never strong enouj-h*, 
to bo always the master, unless he 
transforms strength into right"t - he 
s'ays In the "Social Contract", ibid., p. 6. 
"Right", therefore, is always the master. 
If strength were to be the foundation of 
right, Rousseau goes on, "As soon as It 
is possible to disobey with impunity, 
disobedience is legitimate; and the 
strongest being always in the right, the 
only thing that matters Is to act so as 
to become the strongest. " - ibid. This 
distinction of Rousseau's between might 
and right v: Ls'a' vis Hobbes, Grotius etc. 
is well known. What is not so well- 
recognised is the fact that Rousseau, 
who then of course moves to the idea that 
"conventions" create right, -forgot that 
Hobbes had also applied the Itconvention't of the 
"covenant" to his state of bellum omnium 
contra or-nes. In other word'S, 
_the distinction force/convention is hot air, 
like everything else in the "state of 
nature". 
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The equivalent form supposed in the juridical 
notion of the contract appears in Rousseau's social 
contract as a natural endowment giving each and all 
the capacity to enter into a contractual arrangement 
with themselves (for there is no "other") for the 
Purpose of establishing nothing less that the state, 
law# society Itself. It Is a strange agreement# 
But lot us leave this for the moment. The "clauses" 
of the social contract may be reduced to one, says 
Rousseau: 'I- the total alienation of each associate, 
together with all his rights, to the whole community; 
for, ; in the first place, as each gives himself 
absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; 
and, this being so, no one has any interest in 
=akinj; them burdensome to others. " 
1 
Each associate 
"naturally" does this. The grounds for associatlýn, 
however, are not "force" - that, to Rousseau, entailed 
a Grotian or a Ilobbesian view of man 
2_ but the force 
of "reason". ItReason", which distinguishes for 
Rousseau social man, is pursued back to "natural" 
man, man in the Itstate of natureft. 
The general point to be made here, howeverv is 
that the equivalent form carmot be decyphered or 
further distinguished on account of this or that 
contending view of man's dispositions in the "state- 
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of naturo". Whether or not it was by force of the 
Divine, Rationalt brutal or otherwise, the "original 
compact" could not help but repulse and turn away 
its inner socio-historical character. Even though, 
as we shall see, Rousseau made great advances, the 
equivalent form of the "abstract Individual" was 
hardly given a concrete character when It had still 
to be thought out (as with Hobbes and Locke) in 
a pre-social-connection. 
Rousseau's social contract is something 
conceivable only under conditions of a hitherto 
untmown level of commodity production, production of 
and for exchange and all the relations embodied 
therein. The contract, a reciprocal relation, an 
exchange relation bearing an implicit form of 
equivalence: this in fact turns on the commodity- 
form of property, property as it is immediately 
appropriated and alienated, "freely and equally", 
in the mutual business of exchange. This is not a 
pre-social question; It is essentially bound up 
with a specific historical stage in the social 
development of commodity p:! ýoduction, a state in which 
is realised the production and reproduction of 
commodity-exchange relations on an increasingly 
public scale - and, not least within the sphere of 
-i6i-. 
"Political Right", the subject-matter of Rousseau's 
inquiry. Rousseau had got this far: there is an 
equivalent forra at the basis of right which may be 
conceived under the form of a contract. Dut he 
could never say why this should be so, for he 
develops this observation in regard of the 
individual in his "natural" state precisely the 
theoretical domain in which the "individual" is 
stripped of all his social relations, his 
contractual abilities and the like. 
The actual ability of a general "all't (the 
classical writers were not always so inexact, and 
often spoke, more concretely, of the t1many" in 
the same connection) to enter into a contractual 
arrangement is a socio-legal question. Once It is 
perceived as such, the forcefulness of the notion 
that a "people" may be subsumed under a "natural" 
forra as equals can also be developed and connected 
in with this definite social basis. A uniform 
contractual facility shared by the "all" is the 
historical result of specifically capitalist social 
development. The equivalent form which Rousseau 
Thus, "The Social Contract# or Principles of 
Political Right". Rousseau's title is greeted 
by Vergil: "Poederis aequas, Dicamus loges. 11 
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put in the dress of the social contract cannot be 
anything other than a social relation and, as such, 
peculiar to a definite social form of equality. 
It arises, we have said (Part 1) from the character 
of property in exchange, a form reproduced on an 
ever increasing social scale only under capitalist 
conditions of production. The equivalent form of 
commodities or property in exchange brings with it 
the "abstract,.: Lndividual", a form which the real 
individual shares in co=on with all others because 
and so far as they are bearers of property in 
exchange. Thus the actual nature of the contractual 
facility at the hands of each in common lies hidden 
within the mechanism of generalised commodity 
production and exchange. The real equivalent form 
at the bottom of modern "Political RigAht", far 
from being an original and natural one, subsists 
in generalised commodity exchange, which in turn 
passes down into the mechanism of social production 
and reproduction of exchange relations. 
Rousseau had misplaced his lead on the trail 
of the social equivalent form. Instead of taking 
him to the depths of bourgeois society, the form of 
the contract took; him elsewherep to a pre-social 
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state of affairs. Dut we must now look at all this 
more closely. Few scholars of any note have failed 
to notice that Rousseau put the preconditions of 
the social contract outside society, that theso 
conditions have to be oddly construed as subsisting 
already in the 4'reasont' of individuals all similarly 
ýhus compelled so far as they are to relinquish 
their pre-social condition. On the other hand, few 
again of these. 
-(philosophers, 
historians etc., great 
and small) have grasped the source of this disturbing 
theoretical procedure. Consequently, most have 
failed to fully appreciate the problem (and the 
"solution") of Jean-Jaques Rousseau. 
Rousseau's social contract was a theoretical 
"failure". But this t1failure" has a right to its 
inverted commas. Rousseau's social contract was, 
concludes Louis Althusser, an "admirable Ifailuret 
of an unprecedented theory". The impossibility of 
the social contract in the way that Rousseau expressed 
it namely, as something proscribed in a pre-social 
state b-.,,., a distinctly modern legal form - leads 
Althusser to conclude, most sympathetically, that 
beyond this and the furthrr contradictions which this 
leads to, there was only one recourse available to 
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Rousseau's genius; ".. there is still one recourse, 
but one of a different kind, this time, the transfer 
of the impossible theoretical solution (the social 
contract) into the alternative to theory, literature. 
The admirable 'fictional triumph' of an unprecedented 
literature: La Nouvelle Ifeloise, Emile, the Confessions. 
That they are unprecedented may not be unconnected 
with the admirable 'failure' of an unprecedented 
theory: the So'cial Contract. " 
1 
We shall return to 
Althusser shortly. But amongst certa-in authorities 
on Rousseau whom we shall find cause to name, we 
must bear in mind primarily the finest authority 
- Rousseau himself. 
L. Althusser, "Rousseau: The Social Contract, 19 
In "Politics and History", p. 1 60. 
In this essay on Rousseau's Social Contract 
Althusser, as the text will make clear, gives 
a clear picture of the important issues in 
this area. But I take the opportunity here 
to point out that this cannot be said of 
Althusser's work in general. it Is my 
opinion that Althusser has earned for himself 
the title of the "Kantlt of Marxism, and when 
we come to discuss Kant later on in this work 
(albeit in rather different connection) the 
full meaning of this will perhaps be clearer. 
But I mean this only in the sense of Kant-the- 
defender-of-the-faith, the stepistomelogical" 
champion, who made what was "rightful" 
Identical with Pure Reason: "Rightful" Reason. 
Is Althusser's "political" reason (speaking 
flepistomologically" of course) anything other 
than a surreptitious "back to Kantlf? It can 
be no other. 
cf. Althusser ot al., Readin, -,. Capital. 
In the second Discourse (on the origin of 
Inequality-etc. ), Rousseau shows us what he thinks 
of his predecessors (Grotius, Hobbes, Locke) 
and their regard of the "state of nature": 
The philosophers, who have inquired into the 
foundations of society, have all felt the-. * 
necessity of going back to a state of nature;. 
but not one of them has got there. Some of 
them have not hesitated to ascribe to man, in 
such a state, the idea of just and unjust, 
without troubling themselves to show that he 
must be possessed of such an idea, or that It 
could be of any use to him. Others have 
spoken of the natural right of every man to 
keep what belongs to him, without explaining 
what they meant by "belongs". Others again, 
beginning by giving the strong authority over 
the weak, proceed directly to the birth of 
goverrmient, without regzrd to the time that 
must have elapsed before the meaning of the 
words "authoritY" ind "government" could have 
excisted among men. 
"Authori. tyfl, "government", the "idea of justice" 
- these things are entirely bound up with the 
conditions of man's social development. And this, 
Rousseau recognised, meant the development of human 
thought and industry (agriculture and metallurgy). 
How far is this an improvement on the theories of 
Hobbes and Locke? Hobbes and Locke, it seems, had 
been less acute on these matters than Rousseau. 
Rousseaus UA Discourse on the subject prepared 
by the Academy of Dijon: What is the Origin 
of Inequality among Men, and is it Authorised 
by Natural Law? 'I, P-171. 
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In Hobbes, the covenant of total alienation 
appears as a most peculiar application of the 
contract-form to a state of war; it Is a strange 
contract of insurance which the people somehow 
take out amongst themselves - against a "nasty, 
brutish and shortt' life. where and bow this comes 
about, Hobbes never really says, and to this extent 
we may conclude that there is little historical 
imagination In his "covenantit. jPerhaps more clearly 
in Locke we find the dawning of a more historically 
conscious outlook on the "origins" of right. Here, 
human labour is brought on to the scene. The fear 
of death, which was all very well, becomes coupled 
with the need to protect private property. Man 
must have not just his person protected, but that 
which is also his, his property In which his labour 
has been incorporated as means to life. In this 
way, Locke turned up connections nearer to the heart 
of modern right - property, labour. Yet this 
I'labour" of Locke's still doesn't approach anything 
like the concreteness of Rousseau. Instead of the 
metallurgy and agriculture. which Rousseau talked 
of in the Social Contract and the second Discourse, 
Locke merely talked of the "mixing of labour" with. 
the fruits of the earth in a mysterious connection 
i. e. in the "state of nature", whence the Holy 
Trinity of life, liberty and estate. 
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The point is that Rousseau's predecessors had 
not attended to the distinction between natural and 
social nian very thoroughly. They had moved all-ton- 
quickly to the "state of nature" and back again 
for the foundations of society, and ".. in speaking 
of the savage, they described social man. " 
1 
Yet 
precisely the same criticism is to be made of 
Rousseau that he levels against Hobbes, Locke etc. 
The difference is one of degree, for although 
Rousseau's attention Is drawn to the futility of 
10 oking back to an "original" state of affairs in 
whIch I'modern't categories (of right, authority, 
justice etc. ) might be found, his own distinction 
between the floriginal" and the I'modern't bears the 
same uneasiness. That is to say, although Rousseau 
is aware of the t1natural-law prejudice" as it 
manifests itself in Hobbes, Locke and others, he is 
nevertheless himself caught within its clutches. 
In Rousseau, that which Is a specifically bourgeois 
development, the legal form of contract, still finds 
its way back to the terminus-of the "state of nature" 
and the point of departure of civilisatIon. 
1. Rousseau, ib: Ld., P-171 - 
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Accordingly, there is the same problem of the 
contract and the Itstate of nature" in Hobbes, Locke 
and Rousseau, even though in all three It is manifest 
In differing ways. However, their differing 
"dialectic powers" (especially Rousseauts, the most 
advanced) must be revealed fully if the scope cf 
the Onatural-law prejudice" (if we way continue with 
that expression of Pashukanis') and its inner 
historical and theoretical determinations are to 
be guaged. 
In the nature of the modern-classical problem, 
there is first the divislonj "state of nature"/society. 
With this appears the questlon of the relation between 
the two. "Man't passes from a "state cf nature" into 
civil society. He and his fellows mediate this 
passage. This mediation Is thought out In Hobbes, 
Locke and Rousseau under the form of a contract. 
So much for the bare elements. 
In Hobbes, it is well-known, men In the "state 
of nature", which Is a state of war, suddenlyp 
despairingly, find themselves In agreement: they 
"covenant, every one with every one". In this they 
Give up all their freedom, not to a sovereign "in 
exchange" for security etc., but to a sovereign, 
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period. That is to say, the sovereign is the 
result of the covenant, not a party to It. Hence, 
the people have no right to expect anything in 
exchange from the sovereign - they have not 
contracted with a sovereign - and, with this, we 
find the I'llobbesian problem" of absolute power, 
the question of lJmitations etc. Again, we may 
mention in passing, no one fails to notice Hobbes' 
problem here, yet few have appreciated its precise 
causes (the historical causes are generally at best 
put merely in the following sort of way: Hobbes 
was living during a time of civil war, he was a 
'ItimId" man etc. ). The source of the contract or 
covenant in Hobbes is pure mystery: How are 
independent, belligerent individuals suddenly 
brought together, what force is at work producing 
this strange form, this uniform contract of equal 
donation of life and liberty? The answer for Hobbes 
is the same one given by Locke and Rousseau (it is 
only the clauses of their "contracts" which differ): 
the "reason" of "nature". This, of course, turns 
on the nature of their reasoning. 
We have seen that, according to Rousseau, the 
state of nature in Hobbes is ill-observed. So also 
in Locke. "Others have spoken of the natural right 
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of every man to keep what belongs to him, without 
explaining what they meant by 'belongs'. Others 
again, beginning by giving the strong authority over 
the weak, proceed directly to the birth of government.. " 
Hobbes and Locke denied the state of nature its 
non-socIal character in supposing there the conventions 
of civil society, and they denied the social character 
of their objects of Inquiry (Right, Aut hority, 
Government, Law etc. ) their non-natural character 
in supposing here that they are founded upon a 
natural basis. Denlal* "Denegation", says Althusser, 
who, moreover, is speaking specifically in connection 
with Rousseau. A similar "denegatIont' eats at the 
root of Rousseau's theoretical t'discrepanciest'l 
to use another of Althusser's tenns. 
I We may take 
note of Althusser's points here. 
"Discrepancylo, is the rendering given by 
Brewster, Althusser's translator, of the 
French, llde'claggelt. According to this 
translator: "Its literal meaning is something 
like the state of being 'stagggeredl or $out 
of step'. " note in Althusser, "Rousseau: 
The Social Contract", P-113. The translator 
also holds the view that "dislocation" would 
be a 11morG mechanical" as distinct from the 
"more mental metaphorh in this connection. 
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In the categories of tile legal form of contract 
there are two parties. They exist independently 
of the act of exchanae which brings t1lem together, 
quite mysteriously, as isolated Individuals with 
mutual Interests. But in Rousseau's social contract 
there are no two Independent existences coming 
to, gother. Here is what Althusser says: t> 
(I)n every contract tile two recipient parties 
exist prior to and externally to the act of 
the contract. In Rousseau's Social Contract, 
only tile first recipient party conforms to 
these conditions. The second recipient partyq 
escapes them. It does not exist before the 
contract. Hence the paradox of the Social 
Contract is to bring together two recipient 
parties, one of which exists prior to and 
externally to the contract, while the other 
does not, since it is the product of the 
contTact itself, or better: its object, its 
end. 
Rousseau does not escape the theoretical difficulties 
which lie perceives in his predecessors; he reproduces 
them in another form, -a form which betrays a deeper 
awareness of these difficulties and, with this, a 
more sophisticated sense of their source. Here 
aGain is how Althusser describes Rousseau's 
difficulties: 
The 'peculiarity' of the Social Contract is that 
it is an exchanae a4grdemcnt concluded between 
two recipient parties (like any other contract), 
but one in which the second recipient party 
does not pre-exist the contract since it is its 
product/ 
I, 
1. Althusser, "Rousseau: The Social Contractft, p. 129. 
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product. The 'solution' represented by the 
contract Is thus pro-inscribed in one of tlao 
very conditions of the contract, the second 
recipient party, since this is not pre- 
existent to the contract. Thus we can observe 
in Rousseau's own discourse a discrepancy 
within the elements of the contract: between 
the theoretical statuses 7f the first and 
second recipient parties. 
All this is true of Locke and Hobbes, but in Rousseau 
this "discrepancy" yields up the most revealing 
limitations. Althusser goes on: 
ý0 Rousseau, aware of this discrepancy, cannot 
ut mask it with the very terms he uses when 
he has to note it: in fact he negates this 
discrepancy, either by designating the first 
recipient party by the name of the second (the 
people), or the second by the name of the 
first (the individual). Rousseau is lucid, 
but he can do no other. lie cannot renounce 
this discrepancy ... That is why when Rousseau 
directly encounteres this discrepancy, he 
deals with It by denegation: by calling the 
first recipient party by the name of the 
second one, and the second by the nam2 of 
the first. Denegation is repression. 
This "discrepancy", which In Althusser's 
"readingO develops into different stages of 
"discrepancies" (Discrepancy 1, Discrepancy II etc. ) 
and, finally, to the sheer Impossibility of a solution, 
Is a form of repression. It. is symptomatic of the 
repression of the social equivalent form underlying 
1. Althusser, ibid., P-130- 
2. ibid., P-131- 
3- For the kind of emphasis which Althusser gives 
to the activity of "reading", see his and 
B. Dalibarls "Reading Capitallt, introduction. 
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bourgeois right, the "abstract individual", the 
riaht-bearing unit embodied in the legal forin of 
contract; that is to say, a repression of their 
concrete inner-connections, with the commodity-form, 
the mode of production, social classes etc. 
The basic fault with Rousseau's social contract 
is that it is cast in the most inappropriate of 
moulds, the legal form of contract. The result 
Is that he is led into "designating the first 
recipient party by the name of the second (the 
people), or the second by the name of the first 
(the individual). " T his observation of Althusser's 
is very important. But first a-few facts. The 
"people" is the name of the second party, i. e. the 
result of a prior convention in which it does not 
exist as such. Thus, In speaking against Grotius, 
Rousseau says: 
A people, says Grotius, can give itself to a 
king. Then, according to Grotius, a people is 
a people before It gives itself. The gift Is 
itself a civil act, and implies public 
deliberation. It would be better, before 
examining the act by which a people gives 
itself to a king, to examine that by which it 
has become a people; for this act, being 
necessarily prior to týe other, is the true 
foundation of society. 
1. Rousseau, "The Social Contract", p*11. 
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Grotius naively presupposes a "people" before it 
gives itself to a king. But, with equal naivety, 
Rousseau does the same, except for the difference 
that with him the "people" is presupposed before 
it gives itself to Itself. In Rousseau, "a people" 
must "become a people". The result of the act by 
which "a people.. has become a people" Is "a people", 
and the cause thereof, "a people". Tautology. 
On the other hand, the "people" (as result) is 
also conditional upon each ttindividualtl: "each 
gives himself to all". But that same "Individual't 
then appears in the result of the act, nay more than 
this, as "the" result, where the individual "may 
still obey himself alone, and remain as free as 
beforeft. 1 
In Rousseau, the dual result, people/individual, 
may arise from a contract between individual and 
individual, people and people, individual and people, 
people and individual. I-rhat a mess! A people is 
ibid., p. 12.. From tile famous passage where 
Rousseau presents the "difficulty": ItIThe 
problem is to find aform of association which 
will defend and protect with the whole common 
force the person and goods of each associate, 
and in which each, while uniting himself with 
all, may still obey himself alone, and remain 
as free as before. ' This is the fundamental 
problem of which tile Social Contract provides 
the solution. " - Rousseau, ibid. 
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realised through individuals coming together; 
individuals are brought together in so far as they 
are a people, unanirnous etc. This is how silly 
the legal form of the exchange agreement looks 
when it is forced into contending with the 
"principles of political right". 
Only in bourgeois society does the "individual" 
appear at the same time as a "public" figure and, 
conversely, the "public" s3, -mbol as the embodiment 
ofthe "individual". Therefore, the people/individual 
debacle in Rousseau is a definite sublimation of the 
legal form of contract. For, in the legal form of 
contract we find tile ttabstract indivIdualt'r the 
public/private figure merged into one as the 
singular juridical right-bearing unit. It is this, 
which in Rousseau is displaced and pondered under 
the quaint candle-light of eighteenth century Reason. 
We cannot modify the theoretical status of the 
"natural-law prejudicet'; it is the same whether we 
Pass it over as the mysterious commodity-form hidden 
in one uray and another by an outmoded impression 
of "nature", or whether %, re. look at its more intricate 
movements e. g. in Rousseau. In Other-words, the 
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"natural-law prejudice" is a most finely determined 
object, and is to be understood as having nothing 
to do with crude historico-theoretical generalisation 
despite the fact that on occasion one might find it 
convenient to talk simply of modern "natural-law 
dogma" as a more or less naieve expression of the 
new social order of markets, contracts and money. 
Rousseau, of all the modern classical natural- 
law writers, elucidates-most symptomatically the 
theoretical depths to which the contract-form is 
in capable of reaching. However, It is surely best 
not to get hogged down in questions about Rousseau's 
"oriaInality" here. It is important not to get 
lost in a strange and increasingly irreconcilable 
"history of Ideas" (which all-too greedily turns 
itself into a scholastic exercise of no consequenc e. 
Into an object reminiscent of Benda's "TrahIson Des 
Clercs") . Why, indeed, compare Rousseau with Hobbes 
and Locke - Instead of, say, Hobbes with Descartes 
and Spinoza? Thus, for instance, Spinoza had 
perceived the theoretical dualism of Hobbes in a 
way certainly no more reprehensible than-Rousseau. 
On the other hand, It might be added, Rousseau 
wasn't exactly the spiritual recluse "fearlessly" 
Spinoza and Rousseau are both compared 
with Hobbes In the following passage of 
Leo Strauss' "Natural Right and History" (p. 272): "His (Hobbes I) notion of the 
whole required, however, as Spinoza had 
indicated, that the dualism of the natural 
world and the world of mans be reduced 
to the monism of the natural world or that 
the transition from the state of nature 
to civil society, or man's revolt against 
nature, be understood as a natural process. 
Hobbes had concealed from himself this 
necessity, partly because he erroneously 
assumed that presocial man is already a 
rational being, a being capable of making 
contracts (instead of f1partly", Strauss 
would have done better to say, "precisely" 
- but any sound notion of the tyranny of 
the-legal form is understandably allen 
to this recent natural-lawyer). The 
transition from the state of nature to 
civil society therefore coincided for 
him with the conclusion of the social 
contract. But Rousseau was forced by 
his reallsation of the necessary implications 
of Hobbes' premises to conceive of that 
transition as consisting : Ln,. or at least 
decisively prepared by, a natural process: 
mants leaving the state of nature, his 
embarking on the venture of civillsation, 
is due not to a good or bad use of his 
freedom or to essential necessity but to 
mechanical causation or to a series of 
natural accidents. " "Essential necessity". 
I'mechancial causation". #, use of freedom". 
"natural accidents" - Strauss, in other 
wordst finds it difficult to express the 
way in which Rousseau overcame the discrepancy 
that he (Rousseau) had noted in Hobbes. 
Appropriate references regarding Spinoza's 
criticism of Hobbes are given by Strauss, 
ibid. But see Generally B. 
, 
de Spinoza, 
"Ethics, Proved in Geometrical Order" 
(Everyman). Regarding the Geometry of 
Hobbes: In 1629, according to Plamenatz, 
'Hobbes, on a visit to the Continent, 
"discovered and 'fell in love' with Geometry, 
and came to believe that true knowledge in 
every sphere is to be gained. by the method 
of geometer". - Hobbes, "Leviathan". 
Introduced by J. Plamenatz, P-3. It is 
said/ 
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putting geometrically forth his moral objections to 
Hobbes If earful geometi-jrl .. 0. and so f orth. To got 
to tile point: "comparison", "originality" must not 
be encouraged entry into the issues at stake here, 
they cannot in t1lemselves have any theoretical 
importance. They cannot, because tlicy thrive on the 
fact that "there is no comparison". As soon as 
"comparison" begins to take over, everything begins 
to get mysterious, for the opposing thesis going 
I 
hand in hand with such a project is that ltdistinetness", 
Itbriainality", "genius" etc. are incomparable. Faced 
with tae infinite barrenness of this same/difference 
opposition (for-in itself the distinction brincs 
literally anything into play), it is no accident 
that the "history of ideas" at its best develops the 
symptoms of blind obsession for biographic detail 
spiced with vulear journalistic intimacy. 
Accordingly our purpose rests neither with the 
"difference" nor the "sameness" of Rousseau's work 
("compared" with Hobbes, Locke etc. ), but rather with 
"sameness and differencelt taken together, whenever 
and in so far as there is cquse to speak of one or 
the other. Thus it is to be hoped that within the 
(note 1 cont. ) 
that Hobbes, at one time believed he had managed 
to "square tUe circle'O, much to his subsequent 
embarrasment. Theoretically, the impossible 
squaring of the circle, resembles the equally 
impossible I'squarinall of the legal form of 
contract with the foundations of society. 
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foregoing comments neither "sameness" or I'differencet' 
is unduly accentuated in connection with the ideas 
of Rousseau, and that what is "different" in Rousseau 
expresses at the same time something which is to be 
found in Hobbes, Locke etc. also, and conversely, 
what is the "same" is, at the same time, expressed 
differently - in other words, that the distinction 
same/different is reduced to indifference and 
appropriately. left behind to cover the void space 
it is forever doomed to peer into. 
Let us illustrate what is meant by this same/ 
difference business another way. If one is stressed, 
the other': Ls understressed - they must, consequently, 
be held in mind together. If we make too much of 
Rousseau's dialectic powers, we forget that they 
were contained by the "natural-law prejudicelt; if 
we fail to give due regard to his acute powers of 
observation, we run the risk of overstating the 
"sameness" within the manifold of natural-law doctrine. 
Let us, in lieu of a summary, consider ±n this 
connection Lucio Collettils essay: "Rousseau as 
1 Critic of 'Civil Society"'. 
In L. Collettl, flFrom Rousseau to Lenin" 
p. 143 et. seq. 
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It is not such a novelty as Collettl makes out 
that Rousseau had dialectics embedded in his criticisms 
of civil society. However, the distinctness and 
acuteness of some of Rousseau's points leads 
Colletti, into wanting to distinguish him "from" the 
tradition of natural-law thinking. A good deal 
hanas on this word "from". Rousseau can certainly 
be distinguished from Hobbes, from Locke, from Grotius; 
but he can only be distinguished llwithint? the natural- 
law tradition. Here we have a case of "difference" 
Compare EnCols, "Anti -Duhring" , p. 159-61. A text which Colletti sees fit not to mention in 
this connection. "Outside. philosophy in 
the restricted sense, the Prench nevertheless 
prodocod masterpieces of dialectic. We need 
only call to mind Diderot's 'Le Noveu de Rameaul 
and Rousseau's 'Discourse sur Vorigine, et les 
fandements do 11inegalite parmi les hommes'. 11 
writes Engels in the Introduction to this work. 
Apart from the fact that this shows that at 
least one of the founding-fathers of Marxism 
(we shall come to the other in the text) was 
aware of Rousseau's fine critical faculties, 
there are other reasons why Colletti is displeased 
with this work of Enggels. In this connection 
compare Collettils remarks on the development 
of Marxist philosophy in his Introduction to 
the Pelican ed1tion of Marx's "Early Writings". 
The issues are too involved to deal with here. 
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ignoring "sameness", or, rather, seem to Liave. We 
seem to have a case of disproportion. The distinctness 
and often astonishing penetration of Rousseau's 
thirking leads Colletti-into occasionally putting 
Rousseau far too far outside the context of the 
natural-law tradition. In so far as Colletti does 
this, he taust overexaggerate Rousseau's connections 
elsewhere. 
Accordingly, "(o)ne point tliat is embarrasing 
and hard to explain in this whole affair", Collettils 
affair with Rousseau, "is that in spite of the fact 
of his deUt to Rousseau, Marx never gave any 
inclination of being remotely aware of it. " 
1 
Without 
documentInff the context of Collettils statement, 
there immediately appears a yawning gulf to be 
bridged over a typically uncertain "history of ideas" 
here - namely, where a "debt" is unacknowledged by 
Marx to a thinker who came before Hegel, St. Simon, 
Fourier (not to mention Feuerbach, Proudhon etc. ), 
and before classical Political Economy (we shall come 
to this), Smith, Ricardo etc. 
1. Colletti, "Rousseau as Critic. -etc. ", P-187- 
j 
Marx, Grundrisse, p. 83- My friend, Neil, 
MacCormick, to whom I owe a great deal 
In connection with much of this work, 
takes exception, In particular, to Marx's 
view of Smith as It is expressed here, 
namely, that the latter "begins" with 
the "Individual and isolated hunter and 
fisherman". The basis of the objection 
is that Smith does not postulate the 
individual or isolated hunter and 
fisherman, but rather, "nations of 
hunters", having their own character3-stic 
social structure. The point is well- 
made only in so far as one is prepared 
to ignore the extent to which Smith 
actually managed to distinguish the 
characteristic social structure of 
"nations of hunters?, from that of 
bourgeois nations. Narx's point, of 
course, Is that he didn't manage to do 
this, that is, not scientifically at 
any rate, and. that, consequently, many 
of Smith's economic categories-have the 
quality of being applicable to all forms 
of society, with nothing theoretically 
preventing this "naturalistic" error. 
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Here is a quote from 'Ilarx's Grundrlsse -which 
Collettl makes use of In 'nis argument: 
The individual and isolated hunter and 
fisherman, with whom Smith and-ýRicardG 
begin, belongs among the unimaginative 
conceits of the eighteenth-contury 
Robinsonades, which in no way expresses 
merely a reaction against over-sopUst±cat±on 
and a return to a misunderstood natural life, 
as cultural historians imagine. (Just) as 
little (does) Rousseau's contrat social, 
which brings naturally Independent autonomous 
subjects into relation and connection by 
contract, rest on such naturalism. This 
is a semblance, the merely aesthetic semblance, 
of the Robinsonades great and small. It is, 
rather, the anticipation of "civil society", 
in preparation since the sixteenth century 
and making giant strides forward towards 
maturity In the eighteenth. In this society 
of free competition, the individual appears 
detached from the natural bonds etc. which 
in earlier historical periods makehim the 
accessory of a definite and limited human 
conglomerate. Smith and Ricardo still stand 
with both feet on the shoulders of these 
eighteenth-century prophets, in whose 
imaginations this eighteenth-century Individual 
- the product on the one side of the dissolution 
of the feudal forms of society, on the other 
side of the new forces of production developed 
since the sixteenth century - appears as an 
ideal, whose existence they project into the 
past. Not as a historic result but as history's 
point of departure. As the Natural Individual 
appropriate to their notion of human nature, 
not arising historically, but posited by nature. 
The thing which Colletti takes exception to here is 
the assimilation of Rousseau within this natural-law 
tradition i. e. that mode of thinking which places 
thelUbstract individual", tha historical product of 
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the social development of commodity production and 
exchange, in a pre-social connectiont in a "natural" 
state of affairs. According to Colletti, this 
"rather remarkable passagelt of Marx's, which, he 
rightly observes, "recalls the real historical 
roots (the development of commodity production and 
the resulting configuration of all social relations 
as 'contractual' or $exchange relations) of the 
'independent'. individual of eighteenth-century 
natural-law theory", 
1 this passage does Rousseau 
an injustice. However, what precisely this injustice 
amounts to Collettl finds difficult to say. For 
some reason Harx's view of Rousseau is so clearly 
"conditioned" that "it is a fact that it acted as 
a retarding factor until Marxists reached the point 
of being able to re-examine Rousseau's thought-" 
2 
In the passage quoted, Marx refers to Rousseau 
once, merely in passing. lie writes (it is so roughly 
Venned down that we need parentheses): "(Just) as 
little (does) Rousseau's contrat social, which 
brings naturally independent autonomous subjects 
into relation and connection by contract, rest on 
such naturalism. ft What on earth is urong with this? 




Marx was not writing an essay on Rousseau (he begins 
with Smith and Ricardo -a point we shall come to 
in a moment). Moreover, just in this tiny sentence 
I-farx does more justice to Rousseau than those who, 
following Voltaire, believed Rousseau to represent 
"a reaction against over-sophistication'? and a desire 
to ". return to a misunderstood natural life". This 
naturalism is a "semblance", a peculiar domain in 
'which the contract (the individual in "thistf 
society of free competition etc. ) is systematically 
displaced. Something so displaced is simultaneously 
something repressed, namely, the significance of 
exchange, contract, the market, -money, commodities 
etc. in 'ItUs" society. Rousseau is not unaware 
- the bourgeois character of Geneva, politicians 
who spoke of "notUnG but trade and money" (2nd 
Discourse) but this is exactly what makes this 
naturalism more than for anybody else t*h: Ls" problem. 
In that one small sentence, Marx's brief mention of 
Rousseau could not be more supremely appropriate. 
Collettils point is therefore quite hollow. 
Dut what are Collettils reasons for Marx's 
"conditioned" view of Rousseau, a view which has 
"acted as a retarding factor"? The "retarding factor's 
is presumably cne which acts to restrict a fuller 
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appreciation of Rousseau's work. Colletti can 
only be vaCuo in his essay: 
One possible explanation (of Marx's I'misinter- 
pretationt' of Rousseau - Collett! Is following 
on not from the instance in the Grundrisse, but 
an equally inappropriate one In 1-farxts much 
earlier "On the Jewish Question". See below. ) 
.. could perliaps be found in the interpretation 
of Rousseau current in Germany at the time 
when Marx's thought was formed. Ilogel, for 
example, gave the Contract an essentially 
natural-law interpretation. Rousseau, to him, 
is a theorist ?f "atomistic" liberal 
individualism. 
1. ibid., p. 188. cf. Marx, "On the Jewish Question", 
in Early Writings, p. 234. Here Marx merely 
quotes a passage from Rousseau's Social Contract 
and declares that "Rousseau's description of 
the abstraction of the political man is a Good 
oneft. According to Collet. ti Marx "misrepresents" 
here "a fundamental passage from the Contract 
on the Ide-naturalisationt that society must 
carry out on man to transform him from a mere 
'natural' man into a truly 'social' being". ibid. 
The Rousseau passage is as follows: "Whoever 
dares to undertake the founding of a people's 
institutions must feel himself capable of 
changing, so to speak, human nature, of 
transforming each individual, who In himself 
is a complete and solitary whole, into a part 
of a greater whole from which he somehow receives 
his life and his being, of substituting a 
partial and moral existence for physical and 
independent existence. He must take mants 
own powers away from him and substitute for 
them alien ones which he can only use with the 
assistance of others. " Marx doesn't "misrepresent" 
Rousseau at all by saying that this "description 
of the abstraction of-political man Is a Good 
one"# nor when he adds after he has quoted it 
certain vague Feuerbachian conclusions about 
emancipation of the human world, man becoming 
a 11specles-being" in real social life etc. All 
Marx can "misrepresent" here is his own later, 
more rigorous views over these latter questions. 
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With this, Marxts I'mi sropresenta t ion" of Rousseau 
is turned into that of Hegel, who saw Rousseau as 
"a theorist of latomistic' liberal individualism" 
and viewed the Contract as "an essentially natural- 
law interpretation". Back to Hegel! The terms 
used here to describe Hegel's view are worth scrutiny: 
Rousseau is "a theorist of latomistic' liberal 
indivisualism"; his Contract is "an essentially 
natural-law inperpretation". This is interesting 
because firstly, it Is a true statement of Hegel's 4ý1 
view and secondly, it is also a true statement of 
Marx's view. But it is true of them both for very 
different reasons. lie have just considered Marx's 
view of Rousseau and the Contract, perfectly contained 
in the quotation from his Grundrisse. And, we 
mentioned at the very beGinning Hegelts view. So, 
the point at issue here can be made briefly. Marx 
connected Rousseauts "latomistIc' liberal individualism", 
his "essentially natural-law interpretation" or, 
to return to our previous phrase which we retained 
from Pashukanis, his "natural-law prejudice", in 
with the commodity structure of bourgeois socIOtYP 
which furnishos the real answer to his (Rousseauls) 
problem. HeGol, on the other hand, merely scorned 
those things in Rousseau because they did not live 
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up to the logical demands of the speculative Idea. 
The furthest which Ifegel got with the "natural-law 
prejudice$' is finely expressed in his "Philosophy 
of Right" when he says of those theories of law 
and of the stnto that Give these a basis In terms 
of "positive divine right, or contract, custom etc. ": 
"So far as the auttiority of any existing state has 
anything to do with (such) reasons (i. e. 'positive 
divine riGhtf, * 'contract' etc. ), these reasons are 
culled from the forms of law authoritative within 
itil. 1 But Hegel never actually got beneath those 
"f Orms of lawle and, in particular, the modern legal 
form whence tho "reasons" he attacks derive. For 
him this "Cottina benoath" is not a question of 
looking at the mechanisms of "this" society, but 
instoad a matter of the "truly universal" surpassing 
its finitudo in o. g. Rousseau's Ifeeneral will". 
2 
1109elo Philosophy of Riclat, p. 156. This is 
one of the many instances w1aere Hegel ', overreaches" 
himself in thought, as Marx used to say; 
where, in othor words, Hegel gets the subject- 
matter critically laid bare in spite of himself 
1-0. In spito of his idealist deduction of It. 
2. "--if you say 'the will is universal; the will 
determines itself', the words you use to 
describe the will presuppose it to be a subject 
or substratum from tho start. " Hegel, ibid., 
p24. Unfortunately, however, not a "subject 
or substratuin't of the Idea. 
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We nood not pursue this particular line of 
argument any further. On no account does Colletti 
enhance our approciation of Rousseau's Itoriginalitylt 
by talking on the one hand of Marx's "debt" to 
Rousseau and on the other, Marx's "misrepresentation" 
of him (supposedly symptomatic of an unacknowledged 
"debt"). Rousseau's "oricinality"I if it is to mean 
anything can never consist in him having surmounted 
natural-law doctrine, it can only refer to the way 
in whicU he uuqdo use of it. Not Rousseau as "Marx". 
but Roussoau as Rousseau. Rousseau as ItHarx1t, is 
COllottils way of saying, "Rousseau outside natural- 
law doctrine". Since the latter is impossible, 
COllottils roundabout gestures in the direction of 
the formor are all doomed. Let us take one final 
example. 
In tUo Marx passage in the GrundrIsse, cited 
earlier, Smith and lUcardo are mentioned in connection 
'with tU0 eighteenth century "Individualt' - the product 
Of the disintegration of the feudal order and the 
corresponding social dovolopment of commodity 
production and exchange relations, wherein the 
individual appoars isolated, independent etc. - an 
"individual" as yet clothed in mystery. However, 
Smith and Ricardo "still stand with both feet on 
-188- 
the shoulders of the eightoenth-century prophetsit. 
1 
The important words here, for our present purposes, 
are "on the shoulders". They see further than those 
upon whose philosophical shoulders they stand. 
Their vision is directed towards the economic basis 
of society and Its inner workings. In this way 
Rousseau is theoretically "backivardlt compared i&th 
Smith, Cbllotti doesn't sot about assimilating 
Rousseau to Marx by rejecting this, but, In a 
roundabout way, be acceptinig, this fact. 
So far as PolicItal Economy is concerned, 
Rousseau was behind Smith and the Physlocrats. The 
"backi, rard and backward-lookIng character of Rousseau's 
economic views is beyond question", says CollettI. 
He continuess "In a fragment relating to the Social 
Contract he (Rousseau) oven went so far as to state 
that 'in everything dopondInG upon human industry, 
it is essential to be able to proscribe every machine 
and every Invention which might sUorten labour, 
reduce the number of workers and produce the same 
result with loss troubles. " 
2 
Wherever this "fragment" 
1. Marx, op. cit. p. 83. 
2. C0110tti, "Rousseau as Critic.. etc. ", p. 162. 
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comes from (Collotti doesn't give a reference), 
it is not unassociated with the following . A, which 
appears in the second Discourse: "If he had had 
an axe, would he have been able with his naked 
arm to break so large a branch from a tree? If 
he had had a aline would he have been able to 
throw a stone with so Great velocity? If he had 
had a ladder, would he have been so nimble in 
cli=bing a tree? if he had had a horse, would he 
have been himself so swift of foot? ft 
1 In any case, 
the "fraGmant", even if it doesn't quite come forward 
so naively as this, is certainly Obackward-looking". 
In this "fraGment" ]Rousseau is far and away from 
being a critic of the bourgeois social order, 
unless, of course, It harbours in some way a 
discuisod sense of the fundamental contradiction 
of capitalist social development, namely, that the 
increased productivity of labour which coos hand in 
hand with the increased application of machinery and 
equipment does not Go to the full benefit of the 
workers, that in fact, any benefit which does accrue 
to the latter under such circumstances is only 
relative to an always proportionally Greater benefit 
1. Iloussoau, Second DIscourso, p-164. 
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constantly acciunulating in the hands of their 
employers. But nothinC of the kind is in Rousseau's 
mind. And Colletti is quito correct to emphasise 
that Rousseau is well behind SmitU and the Physiocrats 
on this scoro, the latter, approciatinf; as they did 
the proCrossivo side of capitalist social development, 
the missive devolopment of productive forces which 
it ushers forth. 
1 But Colletti is quite mistaken 
if ho thinks that this can bo turned into a little 
"t'VILIO" colinactinCr Rousseau up with Marx, if he 
thin-'-s that Roussoauts more "naturalistic" approach 
can bo assimilatod to the kind of crIticisizi which 
1. S-21ith's observations on the progressive aspects 
of the division of labour which accompanies 
on an over Lneroasing scale capitalist social 
dovolopinant, wore cSton tompered when he came 
to consider the lot falling to the labourer 
in all this. On the other hand, his guileless 
co". 110arisons with the noble savagge, neither 
factually nor theoretically appropriate, 
sustained his enthusiasm. Thus: "Compared, 
indeed, with the more extravagant luxury of 
the aroat, his (the labourer's) accomodatlon 
must no doubt appoar simple and easy; and yet 
it may be true, perhaps, that the accoraodation 
of a Duropean prince does not always so much 
exceed that of an industrious and frugal 
Peasant as the accomodation of the latter exceeds 
that of many an African king, the absolute 
master of the lives and liberties of ten 
thousand naked savages. " - Wealth of Nations, 
P-117- 
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Marx brought to bear on Smith, the Physiocrats, 
Ricardo etc. Ho puts it this way: "Rousseau's 
insensitivity to the phenomenon of 'development' 
(chez Smith, for oxample - S.: 1. ) sharpens his 
dramatic porception of the new 'social inequality' 
which is emoraing and prevents him from seeing the 
progressive sianificance of the rise of industrial 
capitalism and the concomitant rise of bouraeois 
, civil society'". What is Colletti leading to? 
The "procrossive gianificance of the rise of 
industrial capitalism. -etc-" means the same as 
the'word "development" (which appears in quotes); 
so it is a superfluous addition. The sentence can 
be reduced to: "Rousseau's insensitivity to the 
phenomenon of 'development' sharpens his dramatic 
perception of the now 'social inequality' which is 
emerginC;. 11 It is this "sharpened dramatic perception" 
whicU Marx borrows from Rousseau. 'What a vague result! 
1411Y not borrowed from St. Simon, or Fourier or even 
Proudhon? Collotti concludes: "Marx, who inherited 
the analysis of teconomic dovelopmentt worked out 
by Smith, and that of 'social Inqqualityl developed 
1. Collotti, "Roussoau as Crltic. -otc-11, p. 162. 
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above all in Franco, unified and combined those 
two arcunants. 11 
1 The important words here are, 
"developed above all in France", for it is no 
longor Rousseau, it is post-rovolutionary French 
Socialism - another matter altogether. 
1. ibid. All this conclusion amounts to is an 
underhand mention of two of the facous and 
well-known "three historical components of 
Marxism" - German Philosophy, FroncU Socialism 
and English Political Economy - It proves 
nothing of Rousseau as "IMarx" or Rousseau 
outside natural-law protocol and other such 
one-sided attachments to his "originality". 
And hero the irresistablo pun begs due 
forgiveness: 
Marxist Philosophy - Beware of the 
'Return' of Joan-Jaquos Rousseaul 
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Summaa: "Nattircil" sympathies. 
It would be tuinecessary to dwell any further 
upon the consoquences which flow fron, the specious 
notion of "originality" Goind hand in hand with 
the attompt to turn Rousseau into a thinker outside 
his time. 1 Tho fact that Rousseau's inquiries were 
circui., is crib ad by oialiteenth century "naturalism" 
is ineradicable. Consequently, his "originality", 
if we must speak of such things, comas within the 
vicious circle thus described - not outside of It, 
but in tho ingonious attempts to break through it. 
Of course, the theoretical tools appropriate for 
the success of those attempts were unavailable to 
him, but, more than this, they were necessarily 
beyond his reach. This is procisely why it is most 
appropriate to concentrate upon Rousseau rather 
than 11obbos or Locko (both giants in their own 
right nevertheless), for his development beyond 
those (that he saw the barrenness of their naturalism 
otc. ) makes him the "freest" of the modern classical 
1. ".. in general, one ha *s 
to aclmowlodge that it 
is impossible, even for the greatest and most 
prophetic mind, to transcend the historical 
limitations and causes of his own time" says 
C0110tti, P-193 ibid. at the end of his essay. 
This conclusion would have been less feeble 
had "one" acknowledged it "in particular" 
instead of "in gonoral". 
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thinkers and, in this way, the finest illustration 
of tho necessity and inescapabilit,, R- of (modern 
classical) natural-law dogma. Freedom and necessity 
hero correspond with difference and sameness; terms 
which we mentioned in a similar connection earlier. 
Neithor side of the opposition can be stressed 
independently of the other without getting into a 
muddle, in whicU connection we notice philosophers 
(who are supposed to know all about Hegel) making 
Just this sort of mistake. But we have already 
taken sufficient note of this sort of thing. 
It was theoretically ir. mossiblo for the classical 
writers to transcend the naturalism within which 
their ondeavours were constrained. Rousseau, our 
prima o., cample, shows this quite clearly; the 
freest of the classical minds cannot escapa It. 
We must now say why this apparently well-known fact 
is so significant, why wo have given it so much 
(but really not enough) attention. A theoretical 
impossibility: what does this mean? We have already 
answored this question with the example of Rousseau's 
difficulties, but lot us briefly look again. 
Rousseau had noticed the defects In the naturalism 
of Hobbes and Locke. On account of their naturalism, 
Hobbes and Locku had not found a solution to the 
problem of right, its foundation and basis etc. 
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But who else could Rousseau consult, had anyone 
else -k(tvancod the science an), further? Whero else 
could Rousseau go? rxcopting the final recourse 
to literature, noted by Althusser, all Rousseau 
could do was to stay with them, to keep essentially 
vithin the naturalist problematic. The attempt to 
Co backwards, as it were, to Cat the required depth, 
that is, Rousseau's return to the ancients, could 
not help him. "I shall supposo myself In the 
Lyceum of Athens, ropeatinS the lessons of my 
masters, with Plato and Xonocrates for judges, and 
tho wholo human raco for audiancol's 
1 
Ue %, rri t0a 
Rousseau, nA Discourso. -otc. '*, p. 162. The 
connection botwoon Rousseau and the ancients 
is mentioned neither by Althusser nor Colletti, 
OP. cit. It is woll-notod, however, by another 
Rousseau acholar, Leo Strauss, trhom we shall 
have cause to mention in this connection very 
shortly. As tUo latter notes, Rousseau follows 
Monteaquiou In the viow that virtue Is the 
principle of democracy, since it Is Inseparable 
from equality -a viow which was not shared by tho ancients. cf. Strauss, "Natural RIaht 
and Historyle, p. 256; on Montosquiou, cf - 11000-1, "Philosophy of RIGht", P-177 et- seq. 
This distinction between ancients and moderns 
is important for the fact that It corresponds 
with the differina material bases of their 
respective societies. The "virtual' with which 
the ancients wrestled coaslessly had nothing 
to do with the form of equality whIch the 
early bournoois theorists hold in such high 
estoom, for ancient society was based upon 
slavery. For this reason, Rousseau's appeal 
to his "mastorall in this respect is all the 
more Obviously a doomed escape route from the 
ovorboarine naturalism of his eiChteentli century 
predecessors. 
-196- 
the second Dincourse, forgetting that his problem 
(the origin of inequality, hence also equality), 
in the terms in which he posed it, would have been 
utterly inconceivable for those particular judges. 
Bourgeois equality and its contradictions, the true 
historical essonco of Rousseau's problem, begin to 
appear only in the elghtoonth century -a considerable 
distance from the problems of virtue, knowledge etc. 
as they wero posed over three hundred years before 
Christ. 
A theoretical impossibility: twist and turn 
as he may, Rousseau cannot escape its clutches. 
Definite historical conditions proscribed it: the 
fact of the daiming of bourgeois civilisatLon in 
its most progrossivo phase, the more beginnings of 
the subsumption of all social relations under the 
form of equivalent exchange. Full-fledged bourgeois 
right is as yot still immature, still just on the, 
horizon, still weighed down and clouded over with 
the remains of the ancion regime - still finding 
its hichout scientific expression within the confines 
of naturalism. Two hundrect years after Rousseau 
It is a gross understatement to say that these 
conditions no longer obtain. Rousseau's naturalism 
is completely justified by the conditions of his time, 
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but even by t1to turn of the eighteenth century, 
in tho post-Rovolutionary ora, it can no longer 
be sustained - not even a la Rousseau. New moves 
nvo to bo mado; Saint-Simon has "groat things'' 
to do, as ho roputedly had his valot remind him 
evory mornina upon waking; 
1 
and, by tho tin, 0 
Marx's discoveries appear on the scene in the 
latter part of tho nineteenth century, bourgeois 
society is perceived in its fullest and most mature 
formo and naturalism, having lost all its credibility, 
is finally and completely surpassed. All this, it 
may be added, developed quite in keeping with the 
(necessarily thwarted) scientific spirit of Joan- 
Jaques Rousseau. 
TUus, it transpires how important it is to see 
clearly the historico-thoorotical conditions of 
classical-modern natural-law. Nothing could be 
more alien to the spirit of Rousseau than to 
imitate his problem two hundred years later on. 
Thus, ono Itsympathotic" Rousseau scholar, Leo Strauss, 
incredible thouCh it seems, still shows no notion of 
the significance of Political Economy, lot alone 
cf. Henri de Saint-Simon, "Social Organisation, 
the Science of Man and other writings". The 
anecdote appears an Vio first page of 
Markliam's introduction to this edition. 
ft-, 
cf. Strauss, "Natural RiCht and 11istory". 
Naturally, with this Clowin, - and spirited 
performance Strauss fins achieved the 
desired reputation for "roturni: ngll to 
natural-law. Strauss revives, as Sta=nlor 
did in the twenties, the late nineteenth 
century "noo-critical" view of law, whichg 
being of Kantian stampq contains formnlly til 
the same sort of naturalist problem w. hich 
is to be found in ]Rousseau. It may be 
noted here that the sort of opposition 
which Strauss puts up al; ain3t Weber in 
the second chapter of his book is not 
accidental 1: iven Weber's Conorally more 
acute historical sense and the threat 
which this equally Oneo-critical" scheme 
poses for any felt need to restore the 
authority of something which, by defirLitionp 
we do not know. Whereas the Kantian . "thing-in-itself" appears more cautiously 
in Weber as somothing which historical 
inquiry cannot reach, in Strauss it is 
somethina which such inquir-y emphatically 
must not reach. The difference is a question 
of the degree of emphasis placed upon it 
problem which for both is entirely of 
their own making. The extent of this 
difference can be CuaCod from the hard 
raps over the knuckles which Weber j; avo 
to Stammler in his day -a translation 
of this polemic by It. Albrow appears in 
the British Journal of Law and Society (Winter 1975)- So far as Strauss is 
concerned, his position Is made abundantly 
clear (or unclear, dopondina upon which 
way we look at it) when he writes: "to 
understand the problem of natural riCht, 
one must start, not from the 'scientific' 
understanding of political things but 
from their I natural' understanding, i. e., 
from the way in which they present them- 
selves in political life, in action, when 
they are our business, whýtn we have to 
make decisions. " ibid. p. 81. Empathy, not 
science; the mysteries of the "moral" 
decision rather than the conditions under 
which it must be turned into a mystery - 
but, we shall see, there are finer and 
wore historically justified moralists than 
Leo Strauss to whom we may pay our attention 
in this connection- Alon-side Straiiss, compare, 
JZawls, A Theory of Justice; Dabin, General 
Thepry of Law, and Stam: alor, Tacory or Justico. 
EX Iao 
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tho criticism of it, in t4o understanding of 
natural right. It is as if Saint-Sinon, Fourier, 
ReCel, Snith, Ricnrdo, not to mention Marx, had 
not existod. Strauss, in fact, is almost an imitator 
of Rousseau. Tiat wlLich was symptomatic in Rousseau 
of an attompt to got out of iiatural-law and its 
contradictory results, is taken up by Strauss in 
an attempt to return to it. The fliGht to antiquity 
in Strauss, however, is supplemented with the Diblo. 
1 
That "natural" s3inpathies can be sustained two 
hundred years after Rousseau, can only inean that 
the mystorios of the contract-forin, the logal. form, 
have been systomatically sustained also - independently 
Of their scientific disclosure. Now has this been 
Possible? After Rousseau, how has such a thine 
boon possible wit,, jout the Ular: LnC theorotical 
embarass-nont that Goes hand in hand with It, 
when the contract, the state of nature and so forth 
have boon so widely and woll-recoanised for their 
contradictory nature? The truth of the matter Is 
that the inner character of this naturalism, its 
h1storico-thooretical conditions and so on, have 
not boon widely and well-rocoanised. The pretence 
to the contrary is In fact a Guileless conceit of 
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modern legal culture supported, however, by a 
tremendously important development in the modern 
history of Ideas, a development which finds its 
1 
purest expression in the philosophy of Kant. 
After Kant the form of legal culture is fixed 
by the limits of "pure reason", which, in fact, 
Is nothing much more than a cleverly disguised mode 
of sustaining those same discrepancies which we 
observed in the naturalism of Rousseau and his 
seventeenth and eighteenth century predecessors. 
But we shall come to illustrate this in detail 
shortly. 
Immediately after Rousseau the contract-form 
Is elevated by Kant into an Idea of pure reason. 
In philosophy, Kant represents an enormous advance. 
But, so far as the legal form was concerned, this 
development represented a step backwards, a further 
mystification of it, a movement further away from 
the concrete conditions of. capitalist social 
reproduction directly behind it. In this way, 
Kant made a back-Ward step under the guise of a 
forward step, under the c1bak of a theoretical 
advance which supposedly "eradicated" the theoretical 
discrepancies so "obvious" in Rousseau. Nothing 
SYml)tomatic here is the wide acclaim given to 
modern writers such as Starmiler, Strauss and, in 
America, Rawls, Theory of Justice. The conditions 
of their IlXantiani. ýimtl will be considered in 
f; oneral infra. 
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could have been a more convenient development than 
this for the ideological requirements of subsequent 
legal culture. With the blessing of Reason (pure 
and unadulterated), the legal form could safely 
remain a mystery - right up to the present day, and 
in spite of the fact that this mystery was gradually 
decyphered in the nineteenth century. Thus, it Is 
no surprise that Kant has become the lodestar of 
modern legal culture and still remains the highpoint 
of its reflective capabilities. And for this reason 
we are obliged to continue our survey of the 
equivalent form and its modern classical connections 
with a more detailed observation of the Kantian 
philosophy and its social connections with the 
form of right. 
Before we do this, it is appropriate to 
recapitulate in a few words our primary aim in 
considering these classical connections of the 
legal equivalent form. It is, first and foremost, 
the aim of showing conclusively that this equivalent 
form is, in relation to these classical thinkers 
and their formulations, the same equivalent form 
which we revealed in the earlier part of this work 
as subsisting within the coT=odity structure of 
-201- 
specifically bourgeois society. In relation to 
Rousseau and others, whom we have considered in 
this respect, we have always supposed this to be 
the case, namely, that the same equivalent form 
subsists in (obviously) very different ways in the 
real mechanism of bourgeois society and in the 
Itideall? discourses which they bequeathed to us. 
In the case of Rousseau, for example, we have 
always supposed this to be the case at the same 
time that we tried to show it. If a little 
indulgence may be permitted, the results here 
seem to be immoveable: the real equivalent form 
furnishes the key to Rousseau and his immediate 
predecessors and, moreover, without doing any 
injustice tol or performing any vulgar reduction 
upon, the greatness and unrepeatable quality of 
their endeavours. For those who, for reasons less 
worthy than they are -wont to admit, are inclined to 
think otherwise this point must be made clear. 
Ife can pay the classical thinkers all the due 
respect owed to their Itoriginality", "genius" etc. 
precisely on this account; in other words, we can 
know and appreciate the depth and significance of 
the things they Imew precisely because -we are 
prepared to engage them with things which they did 
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not and could not know. As with Rousseau et al., 
the Kantian development and its connections with 
the equivalent form may be similarly appreciated, 
but this, however, takes on a different appearance 
and historical significance. To this we must now 
turn. 
Part Il 
Ch- 3. The Tijeox-y of Law as Pure Reason 
60. The Coguitive Faculty. 'IR: Lal-ltf ul" 
Cognition and tile "Science of Right". 
'Comical Niaiserie Allemande". 
... Further Considerations. 
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The T"Iieory of Law as Pure Reason 
At the beginning of Ilis "Institutions of 
Private Law", Karl Renner rem-arks that the Kantian 
conception of the legal world "as a lawful order 
of actions which in general resembles the natural 
order, " is a conception that is "based on a very 
narrow abstraction derived from a society of private 
oivners-connected solely by competition and contract. " 
This is all very well, but Rermer omits to explain 
why precisely this connoction is to be accepted. 
Unwittingly, he furnishes us with the clue to this 
ormLssion himself . 
Kant's definition of rig-it-, which Rermer also 
provides, runs as follows: "Right, therefore, 
comprehends the wfl-iole of the conditions under whIch 
the voluntary actions of any one person can be 
harmonised in reality w: Lt. h the voluntary actions 
of every other person, according to a universal 
law of freedom. 1t 
2 
Now it seems quite clear from 
this that the harmonising "in reality" of "the 
voluntary actioiis of any one person.. with the 
voluntary actions of every. other person", the actual 
Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and 
their Social Function, p. 46. 
2. Kant, Philosophy of Law, p. 45 (trans. flastie). 
If the treatment of Renner here seems 
unusually harsh in connection with an 
apparently minor oversight, it is to be 
pointed out that Renner's entire work 
is thoroughly saturated with such. over- 
sights. On the point in question, the 
German original reads: ".. dieses Philosophen 
ist hangrieflich der ideologische 
Ueberbau der einfachen Warenproduktion. 't 
- p. 2, Die Rechtsinstitute des I-Irivaterechts 
etc. Having thus crAticised Kant's 
definition of law, it is no surprise to 
discover that Renner proceeds in his 
enterprise with a definition that is of 
essentially the same character. "Thus 
Renner puts at the foundation of his 
d efinition of law the concept ofan 
Imperative addressed to the individual 
by society (considered as a person). This 
artless conceit seems to him a perfectly 
adequate exploration of the past, present, 
and future of legal institutions. " 
- Pashukanis, Theory of Law etc., P-117-3 (A. R., p. 28). The definitions of Kant 
and Renner only appear to be diff erent, 
but a moment's reflection shows that it 
is the same riddle of "abstract : Lndivi-d- 
uality" which is contained in each. 
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reality in which the Kantian conviction subsists, 
is a condition furnished by specifically bourgeois 
society, where, as in no other previous historical 
period, each for t1le first time relates to "all" 
on an equal legal footing. But this is not at all 
clear to Renner, for he adds: "It is clear that 
this kind of p. Uilosophleal dogma (i. e. Kant's) 
is the ideological superstructure upon a system 
of simple commodity production. " With this little 
word "simple". Renner demonstrates that lie has not 
grasped the connection at all. The Romans and, 
much earlier, t1he Phoenicians, the ancient Greeks 
etc. all had systems of simple commodity production, 
and in none of tI., ese cases could each relate to flall" 
on an equal legal footing and thus provide the flin 
reality" at the roots of a specifically Kantian 
lIkInd of philosopliical dogma. " 
1 
The modern legal form (and abstract philosobhical 
expressions thereof) arises not on the basis of more 
co=odity production, but, specifically, on the basis 
of capitalist co_-:, uaodity production. Only iulder 
conditions of ca,, litalist commodity production do the 
mass of producers move freely to market, exchange 
their power to create and augment capital-value in 
return for a wago, which is in turn divided into 
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further exchanges in the market for goods and 
services, and so on; that is to say, only under 
such conditions do the m. ass of people (the "all" 
reflects the rhetorical enthusiasm of the classical 
thinkers) acquire a common legal personality, provided 
by this very generalisation of commodity-exchange 
relations, whereupon it appears, for the first tima, 
that "the voluntary actions of any one person can 
be harmonised'in reality with the voluntary actions 
of every other. " 
Kant's definition of law, for all its apparent 
universality, is quite clearly particular and amounts 
to little more than an affirmation of a historically 
definite status quo. On the other hand, Kant's 
significance-does not lie with the fact that he 
produced an "ideological" definition of law; it 
doesn't require one of the greatest philosophers 
of all time to do that. His significance lies in 
the way in which he arrived at his conclusions; 
he found for them a basis in pure reason. And, so 
far as modern critics are prepared to ignore the 
details of Kant's reasoning here, they ignore at the 
same time the ultimate theoretical defence of modern 
legal thought. 
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. N'ol, r it might 
be objected t1aat if Kant's 
definition of lai-or is false, that is, if his 
consideration of Vie forim of law sub specie ae-torni 
is self-evidently contradictory (which it is, because 
the truth of its conditions is provided only in 
specifically bouraeois society), then the promises 
behind this result must also be similarly defective, 
and therefore once tUe conclusion has been shown to 
be false, to do the sarae in regard of tUe*premises 
is superfluous. Such an objection would be ill- 
considered, for it is precisely the failure to look 
into the reasons boUind such notions of which 
effects the continual repetition of t: ie sa. -te 
=istak-es. Tdo history of modern reflective legal 
thought, since '11ICant, is the testimony of just this. 
I. B1,1_ reflective leCal t1iouGht, we are to understand 
legal thought in its ', )roadest sense, i. e. 
inclusive of all those fragmented episodes of 
legal self-reflection in otlier disciplines 
t,, aat have considered law, to some extent, 
witt-iin their territor-y It is in this way 
that we find cause to consider writers such as 
Weber, Renner, Maine and so forth under tile 
auspices of reflective legal thought. On the 
basis of similar coviiections, Gurvitch considers 
Weber and Renner, amongst ot'llers, as "European 
founders" of the "Sociology of Laurtl. For no 
other reason than that it allows him to display 
the extent oA. Uis reading, GurvItch turns this 
arbitrary t'specialisation" into something which 
began with tUe ancients, proceeded through the 
1-1iddlo A-Cos and arrived fully-fledged on his 
own doorstop. cf. Gurviteii, G., The Sociology 
of Law. 
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In lKant's definition of law we observe that, 
"the voluntary actions of any one person can be 
harmonised in reality with the voluntary actions 
of every other person"; in other words, all equivalent 
form of persons. This comes about, according to 
Kant, as a result of a "universal law of freedom", 
which figures as the solution providing the connecting 
link of each with all. This "solution" is really 
just an expression of abstract individuality, the 
mere form under which apparently isolated individuals 
are brought together as equals. Of course, the 
material substratum underlying this form consists 
in an equal standard. that is furnished uniquely 
by bourgeois conditions of commodity production. 
But Kant did not ask the question, how does society 
produce this result,? Ile asked, instead, how does 
the individual pxoduce It? And his answer, to put 
it simply, was that the subject found within himself 
a "faculty" enabling him to realise, in an enlightened 
fashion, his universal (equal) nature. In tile case 
of law, the faculty reconciling the antithesis of 
individuality and equalit.,. is the faculty of will. 
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RighV, in tile Kantian scheme of things, is 
therefore a question that has to do with the faculty 
of will. But what does this mean? First of all, 
it falls within the sphere of what Kant called the 
Practical Reason. "The Practical Reason, " said 
Hegel, "is understood by Kant to mean a thinking 
will, i. e. a will that determines itself according 
to general laws.. " But if we are to accept this, 
we need to know why it is that the will should be 
so-described, we need to know, in other words, what 
those "general laws" are. And Hegel goes on to 
ask, appropriately, "What, then, is to serve as the 
law which the Practical Reason embraces and obeys, 
and as the criterion in its act of self-determination? " 
The basis of the Practical Reason is Pure Reason. 
flesel thus adds, "There is no rule at hand but that 
given by tile abstract identity of the understandiný;. " 
2 
In other words, if we want to know the reasons -why 
the will is accredited with, the quality of self- 
determinacy (which in Kant becomes the principle 
of law: thus, ORight, therefore, comprehends the 
whole of the conditions.. (etc. ).. accordinc to a 
universal law of freedon. 11ý .,, wo 
have to consult yet 
1. lIeu-el, LoCic, P-93- 
2. ibid. 
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another Kantian faculty, '11.1he faculty that has to 
do -tLth this "abstract identi-ty of the understanding", 
namely, the faculty of pure cognition. Right is 
an idea of Pure Reason. Therefore, to understand 
the reasoning behind the notion of right as conformable 
with "a universal law of freedomt' we must look at 
the coGnitive faculty which deduces it as such. 
Defore we do this, it might be wondered why 
It is necessary to take Kant at Us work even this 
far, for it is evident that he is on the wrong 
track to begin with In considering the form of law 
under the auspices of a faculty of will, I. e. a 
faculty belonging to an individual thinkina-subject. 
This seems to be clear in so far as the form of law 
does not concern individuality as such, but rather, 
a definite social form of individuality, one In 
which, moreover, Individuality as Euch readily 
becomes its opposite, as something characteristic 
of the mass of people, whereupon the individual 
appears as a legal subject and shows thereby that 
the matter In question is not one of individuality 
at all but just the opposite. On the other hand, 
this negation of individuality in the principle of 
right (as equality) Is precisely what Kant managed 
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to express in terms of individuality as such. Ile 
did this by turning individuality as such into 
individuality with "faculties". 'I"herefore, the 
proper criticism of Kant is not that he made 
individuality the basis of law, but that he made 
individuality in possession of "faculties" the 
basis of law. 
The Cognitive Faculty 
The faculty of pure cognition in Kant figures 
as a mode of reconciling the dualism of the subjective 
with the objective. With this, it immediately 
appear. ý, that we have the theoretical parallel of 
the dualism in the practical sphere of lawg namely, 
the dualism of individuality and the equivalent 
(objective) form of right which finds expression 
as "abstract individuality". Kant's entire 
philosophy, as a natter of fact, is played out 
on the various themes of a basic dualism of the 
subjective and the objective, and the characteristic 
solution of this dualism, that the subject finds 
within himself a "faculty" for coming., to terms with 
the object-world appears in all the principal subject- 
areas over which Kant casts his net. Thus, in the 
three principal areas of cognition, will and emotiong 
the subject finds himself in possession of a "faculty" 
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of cognition, will and so forth. 
1 Kant Is philosophy 
is therefore appropriately called "subjective 
idealism" and its consequent associations with the 
theme of "abstract individuality" (subjective 
idealism means individuality which is abstracted, 
equalised under the form of a theoretical construct) 
have made it into a veritable legal world-view. 
But we have to answer the question of how the 
faculty of pure cognition justifies considering 
the form of law as a matter of will, as a "universal 
law of freedom", i. e. as self-determinate will. 
Basically, the faculty of pure coanition enables 
this because it enables us, in the final reckoning, 
to say anything we like - and have grounds for it 
in nothing less than pure reason! The faculty of 
cognition, in other words, doesn't escape the age- 
old philosophical sin of relativism (scepticisml 
agnosticism - "no knowledge"). 
1. AlthouCh Kant 'wrote many other things besides, 
his philosophy may be considered as falling 
into three principal Critiques: of Pure Reason, 
of Practical Reason, and of Judoement. They 
correspond with what Kant understood to be the 
principal faculties of the human soul, 
respectively: cognition, will and emotion. 
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The cognitive faculty has this negative 
character because Kant makes it always conditional 
upon the activity of a subject-mind alone. Once 
Uhis is the case, there remains nothing to prevent t 
the Kantian faculty from merely standing in for 
the following kind of utterance: I know such and 
such to be true because I have thought it. Of 
course, the "III doing the thinking, in Rant, is 
not any old "I'$, but specifically an "I" making 
use of his faculty of synthetic judgement a priori. 
This, however, doesn't make a great deal of difference. 
But we have a duty to get a proper sense of this 
apparent trivialisation of Kant.. 
Kant asked, how are synthetic judgements a 
priori possible? Ile asked, in other words, how 
do we know things other than through the mere 
formalities of logical inference (the principle 
of identity) and the principle of non-contradiction? 
Really, how is knowledge possible? - since I'Kant 
rightly grasped that this was a process of synthesis, 
quite distinct from merely analytic judaer-qent and 
involving the connection of contraries. The 
synthetic judgement means that the given predicate 
is not already cogd-tated in the subject. Kant's 
answer was simply that "we-11 connect these contraries. 
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On the other hand, it involved Kant in a nost 
astonis4ing feat of philosophical profundity to say 
just this. How are synthetic judýg-ements a priori 
possible? Kant reduced the connection of contraries 
implicit in the notion of the synthetic judgement 
to a question of how "we" connect them, and therefore 
to a dualism of the thinkIng-subject on the one 
hand and the object of cognition on the other. He 
therefore ruled out at the very outset the possibility 
that the synthetic unity must be found in the objects 
of cognition themselves, regardless of how t1we" 
may or may not judge them, because he reconciled 
the subject/object dualism on the side of the 
subject. alone. 
It is not beside the point to illustrate briefly 
how Kant expounded his subjective process of objective 
cognition. Clearly this subjective/objective dualism 
is its dominant feature. Thus, objectively present 
in all the phenomena of experience are what Kant 
called the categories of the pure understanding. 
These latter fall into four principal divisions: 
of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of 
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modality. 
1 Still, these categories are also 
subjective - for all their objectiveness. This 
is so because the condition in whicli we receive 
them, even as such, i. e. even as they appear in 
Kant's theory of pure reason, independently of 
their presence in a syntlietic judgement proper 
(in mathematics'for example), is always sensuous. 
The categories thenselves, therefore, have to be 
transcendentally deduced, that is, deduced by 
means of our faculty for pure cognition. In other 
words, the categories have to be deduced by means 
of a process in which they themselves figure as 
elements of that process, or, to put it another 
way, the transcendental deduction of these elements 
supposes that those elements themselves are arrived 
at through the process which they seek to define, 
namely, the process of pure cognition. In Kant, 
In Kant, the categories of the pure under- 
standing are set out thus: of quantity (unity, 
plurality, totality); of quality (reality, 
negation, limitation); of relation (substance 
and accident, cause and effect, reciprocity); 
of modality (possibility/impossibility, 
existence/non-existence, necessity/contingency). 
cf. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 60-68. 
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our faculty for pure cognition must dete=ine 
itself as It were. 
1 And for him this process can 
onl., come about as a condition of the pure eler-ents 
in our sense experience. 
Apart from the pure categories of the under- 
standing, the other chief elements in the process 
of pure cognition are, according to Kant, the pure 
elements of sense, namely, space and time. But, 
just as the objective categories of the under- 
standing are nevertheless subjective, so the 
subjective categories of sense are objective. 
This subjective/objoctive dualism is supposed at 
the outset by Kant to be the essence of pure 
cognition and it is present throughout the entire 
journey through the labyrinths of the Critique of 
P14re Reason. The condition in which we receive all 
our knowledge of the world is that it comes to us 
alone through flour" senses. The purest possible 
eleifients of our sense mperience are, Kant says, 
"Kant asked himself: how are synthetic judgements 
a Prior! possible? - and what, really, did he 
answer? 'By moans of a facultyt ... But is 
that an answer? An c-4cplar-ation? or is it not 
rather merely a repitition. of the question? 't 
- Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 23-4. 
And Hegel had said, 'with the same thing in mind, 
"True, indeed, the forms of thought should be 
subjected to a scrutiny before they are used; 
yet what is this scrutiny but ipso facto a 
co. gnition? " - Logic, P-71. 
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space and time. Considering tliat these 6lements 
are ours and ours alone and do not belong in any 
part to the objects of our cognition, they are 
subjective; they belong to the thinking-subject 
and Kant considers them as categories of 4n Aesthetic. 
On the other hand, supposing that we do make 
synthetic judgements a priori, than the pure elements 
of sense being the condition under which they are 
necessarily made, must, in the best sense of the 
vrord, be objective. -ý I I 
Thus Hant has two sets of categories, the 
aesthetic categories of sense and the logical 
categories of the understanding. Using these he 
develops tile principles of pure cognition and Kant 
believed that with these he had developed the 
principles at the foundation of all other cognition. 
But there is no need to go into any further detail. 
The principles of the pure understanding developed 
by Kant still bear the marks of the subjective/ 
objective dualism posited at the onset as definitive 
of the problem of pure cognition; they are therefore, 
in Rant's terms, general a priori connecting conceptions 
(connecting subject trith object) premised in the 
pure ideality of space and time (which are subjective 
and ideal at the saine time and hence come foxivard 
in this way as the only possible connective)- 
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Trhat did Kant prove irith all this? Ire proved, 
really, that which he supposed as a condition of 
him provinC it at the outset, namely, that synthetic 
judgements a prior! are possible. A superfluous 
exercise it would seem, since scientific kno-%, iledge 
wasn't exactly non-ex-Istent in Kant's day. Hagel 
put Rant's achievement in this respect in the 
following way: 
Still, though the categories, such as unity, 
or cause and effect, are strictly within the 
province of thought, It by no means follows 
that they must be ours merely and not also the 
characteristics of objects. Kant however 
confines them to a subject-mind, and hIs 
philosophy may be styled subjective Idealism; 
for lie held that both Vie form and matter of 
knowledge are due to the tlEgo" or knowing 
subject, the form to our thought, the matter 
to our sensations. 
If we look at the content only of 
this subjective Idealism, there is indeed 
nothing to object to. it inight at first 
sight be imaGined, that objects would lose 
their reality, -when their unity was trans- 
ferred to the subject. But neither we nor 
the objects would have anything to gain by 
the more fact that they possessed being. 
The main point Is not, tUat they are, but 
what they are, Doid whether or not their 
content is true. 
By confining the conditions of knowledge of things 
to a subject, all Kant allowed on the side of the 
object, the thIng known, was the mere conditlon of 
its existence. Effectively therefore, Kant had 
said of any given object of Imowledge, that it exists. 
1. Hegel, Logic, P . 76. 
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But what seems more astonislaing to the modern mind 
is the fact that Kant clainmed for this demonstration 
the limits to the entire human understandinC. For 
the unfortunate object of cognition, all it can do 
is exist (on its own accord) - everything else 
about it is conditioned by "us" and we can know 
it to ex-ist in no other connection than that which 
is so conditioned. Ile cannot kno-w the "thing-in-itself" 
said Kant, we cannot know noiLmona, only phenomena. 
1 
"The main point is not t. hat they (the objects 
to be Icnoim) are, but what they are.. " says Ilegel. 
In other words, the object under consideration is 
certainly not to be considered only as something 
which exists - that is an automatic supposition and 
point of departure the moment an object comes within 
the realm of consciousness - but rather as something 
which exists in a certain connection. However, in 
so far as Kant figured as Hegel's object of criticism 
here, the latter didn't exactly practice his preaching. 
He did not, in other words, ponder the connections 
in -which Kantianism figured as an object of knowledge 
OThere is definitely no difference in principle 
between phenomena and the thing-in-itself, 
and there cannot be any such difference. The 
only difference is between that which Is 
known and that which is not yet known. And 
. philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other... is the sheerest 
nonsense, Schrulle, crotchet, fantasy. " 
- Lenin, Materialism etc., p. 89. 
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except as something existing within his (Ilegells) 
consciousness. The same is true of nineteenth 
century criticism of Kant in general and therefore, 
as we shall see, of Marx. And because of this, it 
is generally true of twentietli century criticism 
of Kant: the criticism of Kant here has for the 
most part consisted in the parroting of Hegel and 
Marx. But these things we shall come to later. 
First we must bring Kant and his "science of right" 
back into the picture now that we are in a position 
to appreciate the "science" that is in it. 
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"Rightful" cognition and the "science of rialit" 
Quite apart from the "science of right", it 
should be apparent that the faculty which gives it 
its "scientific" character is itself, in a way, 
"rightfult'. Kant already supposes that we are in ka 
possession of the faculty for making synthetic 
judgements; his aim therefore becomes one of 
whowing the Orightfult' limits under wbich this 
faculty is operative. What is the rightful 
character of this possession of ours? asks Kant, 
and the frequent anal,. ogies w1hich he draws with the 
character of juristic thought throughout the 
Critique of Pure Reason are for, this reason not 
accidental. Dut supposing that we already have 
in our possession the faculty enabling us to make 
synthetic judgements a priori, and supposing in 
particular, in Kant's case, that this faculty is 
being employed rightfully, before these rightful 
limits have been expounded, brings with it an error. 
It is the error of supposing that you know before 
you know. The particular circumstances of this in 
Kant we have already demonstrate. d in pointing out 
how he had to make transcendental deductions of the 
pure elements in the cognitive process, how, in other 
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words, he had to suppose the full and effective 
use of the faculty for pure cognition in order 
to arrive "rightfully" at tLie essential elements 
of that process. In this wa-3, even the pure 
categories of the understanding have as their condition 
(in being deduced a priori) their ineradicable 
mediation through an aesthetic. But that all 
knowledge must be limited by the subject In such 
a way always remains as a point of departure, as 
a supposition which must seal itself off from 
questioning. This error in Kant of believing the 
rightfulness of his answer as a conditinn of 
giving his answer is the principle of juristic 
reasoning par excellence. rtrom. the scientific 
standpoint it is, as Hegel remarked, the error 
of Scholasticus - who resolved not to venture into 
the water until he had learned how to swim. 
Now a "science of right" might seem superfluous 
once a "Juristic science" had been developed, that 
is, once Kant had developed the "riahtfult' conditions 
under which all things are known. On the other 
hand, it might be observedý that right exists in 
particular, as distinct from being a mode of knowing 
the world in general, and that Kant would not have 
been outside of himself to have looked at some of 
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these particulars. Dut Kant only considered right 
in general. Effectively therefore he applied a 
legal 'view of the world (if we may refer to his 
theory of knowledge in this way) to a legal view 
of the world (as object). This latter we have 
already considered in Kant's definition of law; 
it is the testimony of (bourgedis) law as the 
riddle of "abstract individualitylý. Accordingly, 
Kant got a mirror-effect. He applied subjective 
idealism, the idealisation of subjectivity, which 
is to say, its complete and utter reduction to the. 
puro ideality of space and time, 
1 
he applied this 
to "abstract individuality", to- its closest material 
expression - the form of bourgeois law. It was 
therefore without a great deal of effort that Kant 
managed to declare right to be an idea of pure 
reason, because secretly and all along the idea of 
pure reason had been the purest, cleanest-possible, 
unadulterated expression of right, the notion of 
what is "rightfult' masquerading as a theory of 
knowledge. Right is an idea of pure reason because 
"Let us get rid of a prejudice here: 
idealisation does not consist, as Is co. -=only 
believed, in a subtracting or deducting of the 
patty and secondary. A tremendous expulsion 
of the principal features rather is the decisive 
thing, so that thereupon the others too 
disappear. " - Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols (K. ant especially), P-72. 
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pure reason is a sublimated expression of the form 
of right - "abstract individuality" as subjective 
idealism. Right is an idea of pure reason: an 
effortless deduction. Kant didn't need to say 
anything at all about law as such (as object) in 
order to arrive at this conclusion because this 
conclusion is implicit in the mode of thinking. 
Of course Kant does say things about right 
(as object). He says, for instance, that right 
accords with "a universal law of freedom". But 
this is already cogitated in the subject, as Kant 
would say. In other words, It Is already posited 
as an identity with pure reason. Let us demonstrate 
this. Pure reason considers that It Is the form 
of the subject (as thinking-subject) which furnishes 
the absolute limits upon our understanding. It 
is always expressed therefore as a subject/object 
dualism, with the subject doing the reconciling. 
The subject must find within himself the faculty 
whereupon the objective world falls within his 
grasp. Ife know that this must be so. 1- otherwise 
there could be no knowledge of the world. So Kant, 
thinking that this alone is the condition under 
which things become known, sets out to investicate 
the limitations of this faculty. But to do this 
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properly he must use this very faculty himself, 
and not only this, he must suppose that he uses it 
according to tl-, Le specific rules of pure cognition 
which lie thereby hopes to deduce. Thus the 
juristic poise. Pure reason --Ust determine Its 
own limits. Causa sui. Similarly, the form of 
right accords with t1a universal law of freedom". 
Freedom means self-caused. Right is therefore 
causa sui. Hence the identity of right and pure 
reason. 
The Nantian t1science of riglit" Is merely the 
theory of pure reason in the so-called "practicalt' 
sphere -a mirror-Image of itself. Right and pure 
reason can parade as either. Tilis is precisely what 
Kant shows. Dut this Is not because pure reason 
lays doxvn the rule of right, as Kant said: it Is 
rather an effect of pure reason as a subliniated 
form of right. This is proved further by the fact 
that whenever Kant begins to speak of anything 
resembling right in concrete, i. e. independently of 
right as a mirror-effect of pure reason, pure 
reason has absolutely nothing original to say. 
With none of Rousseauts flair, Kant talks lamely 
of the decisions of state only being justified on 
the grounds of universal assent, "and therefore (7) 
--2C; - 
by means of a contract. " And further, of the 
sovereign will effecting commands to his subjects, 
as citizens, "only because (? ) he represents the 
general vrill. " 
1 
11ow pure reason manat-3-es to come 
up with these results rather than some other set 
of generalisations, Rant never says. But pure 
reason in any case doesn't say anything about 
anything in particular. 
On another occasion Kant says that the people, 
however, "cannot and must not (II) judge 
otherwise than the head of the state for the 
time being (? ) may will. " - which is most Lui- 
Rousseau-like. Those quotations from Kant 
are cited in Gierke (, Natural Law etc., PP- 134, * 
329,354) who, as an admirer of the Historical 
School of Law, was most upset that he couldn't 
find anything resembling the German "volksgeist" 
in Kant's scheme. He says: "By pressin,, -, his 
distinction between home phaenomenon and home 
nou: menon, and by making the : Lndi-%r: Ldual co-operate 
in the creation of the _-, eneral will 
'only in 
iiis pure hum. anityt as home nou: menon - i. e. 
only in so far as 'pure reason, which lays down 
the rule of right', displays itself in him 
- Kant really eliminates personality from his 
scheme.. He loses any conception of a living 
'Subject' of the cormon sphere.. " - ibid., 
P-135- Whereas the "'Subjectt of the common 
sphereft (merely another expression for the 
abstract subject) was purely formal, "empty"t 
"dead" in Kant, the Historical School and Its 
followers, instead of doing tae decent thing 
by burying it with. due respect etc., sought 
to bring it alive again. We shall have cause 
to mention the Historical School of Law in 
a little more detail post. 
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"Ccmical Niaiserle Allemande" 
Why did Kant base his synthetic judgements 
a priori on a subject-iaind? To answer that it ivas 
because he was, essentially, a pious old moraliser 
and needed "scientific" reasons for his moral- 
preaching, is an answer that has a Good deal of 
historical sense to rocom: Tend it. But this is a 
historical judgement on Kant, after Kant. It is 
a judgement that sees only Kant's agnosticism. 
I 
It is a judgement which, in a rather self-satisfied 
manner, points to the consequences of being a Kantian 
long after Kant himself is dead and buried. How 
would these critics have fared had they lived in 
the eighteenth century? How properly conscious of 
history are these historically-conscious (they come 
primarily from the Marxist caipp) criticisms? 
Kant's agnosticism is an invention of the 
nineteenth century. In other words, to make our 
Imowled, ge of the world conditional upon idealised 
subjectivity alone is not a mode of not-believing 
in the possibility of Rnowledge in the eighteenth 
century. Just the opposite. The Kantian limits 
upon the human understanding faithfully reflect the 
conditions of the possibility of Imowledge as 
knowledge (of I'man't at any rate) then existed, in 
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the eighteenth century. Kant's belief is not "no 
knowledge" (so that he can say what he likes in 
regard of how we ought to behave and pretend that 
his prescriptions are, in the best sense of the 
word, objective); just the reverse, his belief is 
in knowledge, because knowledge in the eighteenth 
century has precisely the kinds of limits set to 
it which Kant claimed. As we saw with Rousseau, 
the limit to. his inquiries into Political Right 
is the "abstract individual", and Kant can do no 
other than express this limit as a theoretical 
condition; he therefore says no raore than Rousseau. 
The properly Uistorical point is that Kant 
was a true and honest believer in knowledge, and 
expressed faithfully the conditions of the 
possibility of that knowledge, but that by the 
end of the nineteenth century this knowledge has 
become "no Imowledgeft. Kant does not deliberately 
and conspiratorally turn himself into an agnostic; 
the growth of Imowledge in the nineteenth century 
gives him the appearance of having done so. To 
call Kant an agnostic Is a conceit of the nineteenth 
century. It is therefore a conceit which is reflected 
In Marxism. It is a conceit which is reflected 
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perfectly by Nietzsche, who stands on the threshold 
of the twentieth century as Kant had stood on the 
tUreshold of the nineteenth. "Comical niaiserie 
Allemande, 11 said Nietzsche of Kant: 
The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, 
equally stiff and decent, with which he 
entices us into the dialectic by-ways that 
lead - more corrcctly mislead - to his 
"categorical imperative", makes us fastidious 
ones smile, we who find no small amusement in 
spying out the subtle Iricks of old moralists 
and ethical preachers. 
This is a profoundly just testimony, not to KanV, 
but to the tremendous distance traversed throughout 
the nineteenth century on the road to our knowledge 
of "man". Kant is no impostor to the eighteenth 
century, quite the reverse; buý the "Kantian" is 
already quite definitely, with absolutely no doubt, 
an anachronism by the end of the nineteenth century. 
The conditions of the possibility of knowledge 
have chang , ed radically. No longer is our knowledge 
limited by "our'$ faculties, by idealised subjectivity; 
this has become merely the theoretical expression 
of "abstract individuality", the juridical form of 
appearance of bourgeois man, man as an owner of 
co=odities and money. Kant becomes merely a legal 
philoSophor. And the modern legal philosopher becomes 
a t'Zantian". 
Niet--sclic, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 10 
(trans. Levy). 
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It Is therefore not true to say that Kant was 
an agnostic, that his transcendental subjectivism 
was subjectivisim nonetheless and in this way dented 
the possibility of knowledge. This is what 
Kantianism became: It is not what Kantlanism was. 
Kant did not deny the possibility of knowledge 
(this has become such a trite and hackneyed phrase 
In modern epistemology); he affirmed the theoretical 
conditions of knowledge and In so doing 
denied the possibility of knowledge outside of this 
field. He therefore denied not knowledge, but 
specifically modern knoi-r-ledge. This, we shall see, 
has important implications for the development of 
modern legal culture. 
It is also to be pointed out here that the 
notion of Kant the agnostic finds its counterpart 
In the notion of Kant the "ideologist". This too 
Is a conceit which is realised specifically in the 
nineteenth century and, in particular, by Marx. 
The epistemological configuration mapped out by 
Kant is that of eighteenth century knowledge of 
I'mant'. There is no doubt that it is an expression 
of bourgeois man, or, more specifically, man as a 
contradictory Itabstract individual", as the personified 
form of property in exchange; a condition which is 
Marx, German Ideoloayq The criticism to 
be made against Marx is of the Icind whicU, 
says, metaphysician heal theyself - ,, rh: Lch 
is Precisely the arduous struggle of which, 
the German Ideology is symptomatic from 
the standpoint of Marx's intellectual 
development as a whole. F! or this reason, 
Althusser calls the German Ideology a 
"transitional" textt pre-datin, -, as it 
does Mar. -c's "mature" work in Capital. 
The particular quotation from the 
German Ideology which is taken here j 
appears also in Lukacs introduction to 
his book- on Hegel (P. xxiv)t but according 
to him the quotation somehow shows that, 
"Here Marx has, - discovered and brilliantly 
formulated one of the chief reasons wlay 
philosophy had to develop in the direction 
of-idealism in Germany. " (ibid). But 
even if Lulcacs had chosen'a nor'e appropriate 
quotation to illustrate the view wIlIch 
he puts fonrard here, it is just this 
view, which is reflected in the Ger-man 
IdeoloCy and which is uncriticall,,, 
reproduced by Lukacs, idUcla is defective. 
That philosophy t1had to" develop in 
such and such a way is nothing more than 
an ex post facto generalisation of tile 
facts from the standpoint of a historicity, 
which those facts themselves could not 
possible possess. 
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made possible only where commodity-relations dominate 
social intercourse, namely, where capitalist ' 
production has fixed its roots. But this notion 
of the "ideological expressiontl only becomes 
possible as a condition of nineteenth century 
Imowledge of "man", wherefore it becomes equally 
historically determinate and equally susceptable 
to ideological distortion when it is cast over its 
pre-history. 'For this reason, 2%larx's "transitional" 
work, t! ae German Ideology, doesn't escape the same 
criticisms which it levels aGainst others. In his 
criticism of Kant's thought, for example, Marx 
finds merely the pure expression of "real class 
interests". Kant, he says: 
separated this theoretical expression from 
the interests it expressed, made the materially 
inspired determinations of the will of the 
French bourgeoisie into pure self-determination 
of the "free will", of will in and for itself, 
of human will as such, and so he transformed the 
will into a sot of puyely ideological concepts 
and moral postulates. 
In the sai,, io way that Mant was no agnostic, he was 
no transformer of the will "into a set of purely 
ideological conc. epts and moral postulates". Marx 
is here quite oblivious to the fact that the conditions 
for him saying this are rather different from those 
under which Kant gave expression to Ithuman will as 
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such. " By the time Marx comes to write t1lio Crorman 
Ideoloo,, 11hu=an will as such" has become something 
altogether new; not merely a common will (hence 
an abstracted "individual" will as it appears in 
Kant), but a conmion will that has become premised 
in a conflict of class interests, and therefore 
in the hegemony of one particular class will. 
This condition just does not exist in Kant's time. 
The condition of Xant having "transformed the will 
into a set of purely ideological concepts and moral 
postulates" does not exist for Kant because it does 
not exist historically; it only appears that this 
is what Kant did when the conditions for him doing 
it become a reality. To "criticisell Kant In th: Ls 
way is t. herofore to engage in the typically 
"ideological" procedure of shunting one particular 
reality back into its pre-history. Only by the 
turn of the eighteenth century does the polarisation 
of bourgeois and proletarian class interests become 
a feature of bourgeois society. The characteristic 
feature of bourgeois historical development before 
this is a condition just trio reverse of this 
polarisation. It is, as Allarx knew full-well, the 
era of bourgeois revolution, and therefore of unity 
of interest between bourgeoisie and masses against 
the landed classes, the Church, the aristocracy etc. 
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That which becomes "ideological" in tile 
nineteenth century is certainly, in general, the 
kind of kmowledge of social man which is conceivable 
within the limited space described by the epistomo- 
logical boundaries of subjective idealism. But in 
the eighteenth century is it something quite 
different. Kant didn't think for one minute that 
he was doing anything other than setting limits 
to the human understanding under the form of 
abstract subjectivity. He didn't "need" to believe 
in it, as Nietzsche said, that is to say, he wasn't 
on the defensive; more simply, he believed in it. 
Subjective idealism described the form of knowledge 
of man in the eighteenth contUr-, %r and, as Xant said, 
though this knowl6dge is grounded in the forra of 
the subject, it is also, in the best sense of the 
word, objective. Throughout the course of the 
nineteenth century, however, this "best sense of 
the word" becomes this no longer. 
Now it is not our aim to chart the developments 
in the growth of knowledge which bring this change 
about. Our aim is to clarify what happens to the 
ftscience of right" in all this. In the eighteenth 
century it has the same status as the knowledge of 
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social man in general, since the general configuration 
of knowledge of social man (as political, economic, 
religious, legal etc. ) is limited as a whole by the 
kinds of epistemological barriers that are expressed 
in Kant. In the nineteenth century, this set-up is 
completely shattered - nothing remains the same. 
1 
In particular, the "science of right" doesntt 
remain the same. Yet this is the one subject-area 
which more than any other appears not to change. 
The theory of law still remains limited by the 
mysteries of Itabstract individuality", whereas 
subject-areas hitherto constrained under this 
classical yoke are completely opened up, or rather, 
subject-areas that had hitherto not even been 
defined are discovered which situate the older 
fragmented commentaries having bearing upon their 
subject-matters in a new, more rigorous frame of 
scientific reference. In fact, this is -what happens 
It is in this connection that Foucault remarks, 
"Before the end of the eighteenth century man 
did not exist.. Ife is quite a recent creature, 
which the demiurge- of knowledge fabricated 
with its own hands less than two hundred years 
ago: but he has grown old so quickly that 
it has been only too easy to imagine that he 
has been waiting for thousands of yoars in the 
darkness for that moment of illumination in 
which he would finall, v be kno-mrns, - The Order 
of Things, P-308. 
I 
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properly to the old "science of right", namely, 
it is developed outside the boundaries of what is 
apparently the legal sphere. The problem that it 
had hitherto confronted, the riddle of "abstract 
individuality" which organised the manifold 
of its speculations, becomes properly defined 
x-rithin the sphere of PolitIcal Economy. "Abstract 
individualltylt becomes the form of individuality 
that is bound up with the problem of co=odity 
exchange, value and production. On the other 
I-and, the old "science of right", as such, doesn't 
go out of circulation; in fact, it gets a positive 
boost in this connection because once the "science" 
has been taken out of it, once the ground has 
collapsed from under it, it can only survive in 
tais, its old form, as legal 11sciencelt. What 
was the "science of righttf in the eighteenth century, 
is, by the end of the nineteenth, legal "science". 
The characteri3tic form of modern legal discourse 
is therefore pseudo-science. 
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Further Considerations 
Xant gave expression to the theoretical conditions 
of classical tholught, that is, a mode of representative 
thought which begins to be eclipsed around the turn 
of the eighteenth contury. 
1 
in tae generality of 
his summary, Kant gives expression in particular 
to a "rightful" mode of thinking and, not surprisingly, 
the form of right becomes identical with pure reason. 
The Contract becomes an idea of pure reason; an 
impossibility is made theoretically legitimate. In 
fact all the "sins" of classical thought are washed 
clean through Kant's discovery of a subjective 
faculty capable of delivering synthetic judgements 
a priori. 
1. Hence the verity in Ilegel Is well-known line 
that Rlilosophy always appears on t! ie scene 
too late and, like Minerva's owl, spreads Its 
wings only at dusk. - Preface, PhilosopUy of 
RiGht. Classical thought as a mode of 
representational thought which is s- .,, -stamat: 
Lcally 
shattered throughout the course of the 
nineteenth century is the dominant theme of 
Foucault's study in "The Order of Things". 
The analysis of wealth gives way to Political 
Economy, Natural History to Diology, General 
Grammar to Philology. Foucault's is an 




True, Kant did not want to cleanse all "sins", 
far from It - only his own. And as "Kantianism" 
inevitably became an excuse for the shallowest 
forms of utilitarianism, it is strange that no-one 
has recognised a perversion of language here. 
There are sins and sins. Yet poor old Kant the 
agnostic has been made to take the blame for them 
all, thereby condoning the entitlement of the legal- 
utilitarian scribblers to their preferred description 
the "Kantian't. The term "Kantian" has become a 
term in the vocabulary of the most appalling pseudo- 
critical scholarship. A most approprIate example 
here concerns the legal theorist, Kelsen. He is 
called a "Kantian". Lot us see how good a 
description this Is. 
According to Kelsen, "The science of law 
endeavours to comprehend Its object 'legally', 
namely from the point of view of the law. 1t This 
at least is honest, if we overlook the rather 
pathetic inverted commas around the word "legally". 
In other words, Kelsen at least has the decency not 
to expand upon this "legally" with the addition, 
"namely from the point of view of science". But 
elsewhere throughout his "Pure Theory of Law" Kelsen 
Kelsen, The Pure Theory , of Law, P-70. 
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time and again shows no such restraint and repeatedly 
declares his efforts to be conformable with the 
utmost scientific riCour. The "Pure Theory of Lai-ill 
is apparently a latter-day "Law as Pure Reason". 
However, whereas in Kant's day the idea of law as 
pure reason was, in the best sense of the word, an 
objective consideration of law, in Kelsen's case 
it is just the reverse; Kelsen's "Pure Theory of 
Law" is objective in the worst possible sense of 
the word. The "Science of law" a la Kelsen is 
anything but a science. Comprehending its object 
"from the point of view of the law", Kelsen's 
tUeory leads, not unnaturally, to a mere extension 
of the legal principle. Kelsen's theory is therefore 
"more" impartial, "more dispassionate, "more" formal 
- more typically legal. 
Kelsen's theory, therefore, neversays, "you 
ought". This is its "scientific" condition. 
Instead of "you ought", which is a prescriptive 
statement, it gives the descriptive counterpart: 
it says, instead, "legal norm1t. This profound 
transformation from the prescriptive to the 
descriptive category becomes Vae crucial turning- 
point from laif as such to legal science. This is 
because the descriptive statennent, unlike the 
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proscriptive one, can be either "true" or "false". 
In this way the given classification of the given 
"legal norm" (because it is firstly either a legal 
norm or not a legal norm, and secondly either falls 
or does not fall within the said classification) 
is rendered unto the delights of analytic treatment. 
This analytic treatment amounts to the classification 
and systematic organisation of "legal norms" according 
to the principles of the analytic statement. The 
principles of the analytic statement are that they 
may be organised according to the rules of identity 
and non-contradiction. 
Kelsen is therefore a representative of analytic 
Jurisl5rudence. There is nothing at all "Kantiant' 
about it. To call Kelsen a "Kantian" overlooks 
everyt]-Ling which distinguishes Kant in the history 
of Philosopfty, namely, the transcendental logic, 
the theory of the synthetic statement. The analytic 
statement and the principles thereof (Kant, incidentally, 
calls the principle of non-contradiction, tUe principle 
of contradibtion) were for Kant old-hat. Kant's 
concern was with the synthetic statai-. -ient, the 
statement in which is expressed tha principles of 
scientific knowledge, the statement in which the 
object is not already cogitated, as he would say, 
in the given subject. The application of the rules 
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of the more analytic state. --, lent to "legal norms", 
indeed, attests to the fact that nothing now Is 
to be produced in reaard of this subject (the 
"legal nornitt) , which, in t1iis way, 
f igures 
logically also as object. In other words, such a 
procedure is logically the mode of contemplating 
nothing else other than that which is posited 
within the limited '11lorizon of the subject as such. 
Accordingly, the grand conclusion of analytic 
Jurisprudence can never be anything other t'lian, 
law equals law - in Kelsen's case, a "basic norm" 
as "basic norm". Again, iitterly different from 
the causa sui at the roots of the I-Cantlan Identity 
of law and pure reason, which is grounded in a 
synthetic unity of subject with object. 
But If modern criticism has missed the distinction 
between the synthetic and the analytic, so basic 
to Kant's enterprise, it Is perhaps even more 
astonishing that it has not been disturbed by the 
I mperishable gulf which separates the ethics of 
Kant from those of the "ICantian". The ethics of 
a Kelsen are "no : Othicsn, i. e. utilitarian ethics. 
Utilitarian ethics hre the natural ethics of modern 
"ethical neutrality", a phrase which, contrary to 







Schwegler in his "History of Philosophylt 
says: "The moral purism of Hant - that is,, 
his anxiety to purge the raotives of action 
from all the Creeds of sense - ends thus in 
rigorism, or the gloomy view that duty caxy 
only be reluctantly performed. " p. 23.5. 
This exaggeration, he adds, was poetically 
captured by ScUller: 
Willing sein-re I my friends all, but 
do it, alas, ý%, 7ith affection; 
And so gnaws me my heart, that I'm 
not virtuous yet - 
Help, then, but this, there is none: 
you must strive with might to contempt 
them, 
and with-horror perform what the law 
may enjoin. 
"Maturally, the Christian spirit gave Hant's 
denial of the flebh (so rigorous as to 
amount to the denial of life) a ready and 
willing ear. The Rev. Henry Calderwood, 
for instance, in his introduction to Hant's 
"Metaphysic of Ethics" is full of praise 
for the 11(m)oral, or practical part" of 
Kant's philosophy; it brings with it, he 
says, "high positive results. " For this 
reason, he believed that It should be 
considered in isolation from the "(I)ntellectual, 
or theoretic part" otherwise it would be 
tainted with an essentially sceptical deduction; 
The credit owed to the preception, in Scotch 
Philosophy generally, of such things as Kant's 
scepticism, is due in a large part to the 
work of J. Hutchinson-Stirling. The 
English undersitanding of such things (around 
the turn of the nineteenth century) was, 
by comparison, 'ýruly backward. 
In this latter connection It may be 
noted here that the general significance 
of appreciating properly the issues of 
Hant and "Kantianism" in their relation 
to legal culture is still much less likely 
to be grasped by the AnaloLAmerican legal 
mind (if such an expression is permissable). 
An English translation of Kant's "Science 
of Right" by W. Hastie (a Scot, be it noted) 




ACain, a strange perversion of language has taken 
hold here (which is as much the result of Marxian 
narrowness as it is of bourGcois decadence). Kant, 
far from being "ethically neutrallt, was completely 
and utterly "ethically convinced". Kant without 
the "categorical imperative" is no longer Kant, and 
so far as the ethics of Ilethical neutrality" were 
concerned, he loathed and despised all forms of 
utilitarian opportunism. Post-Kantian "ethical 
neturality" corresponds with what Kant would have 
called merely a t1maxim of volition", which under no 
circumstances could be accredited with a claim a 
1 
pr or . 
note 1 cont. 
"Here is Austin's estimate of xantis 
"Science of Right": 'A treatise darkened by a 
P11ilOSOP11Y Which, I own, is my aversion, but 
abounding, I must needs adLUt, with traces 
of rare sagacity.. etc. etc. ' And here is I-Lis 
account of German Jurists generally: 'It is 
really lamentable that the instructive and 
admirable books which many of the German 
Jurists have certainly produced, should be 
redered inaccessible .. by the thick co4t of 
obscuring jareon with which they have wantonly 
incrusted their necessarily difficult science' 
*. * So long as such statements passed as 
philosophical criticism there was no possibility 
for a genuine Philosophy of Law in Dngland. 
Austin, notwithstanding his -English reputation, 
is entirely ignored by the German Jurists.. 
Dr. Hutchinson-Stirling has dealt irith Austin's 
commonplace Hedonism in a severe way, yet not 
too severoly, in his 'Lectures on the Philosophy 
of lawl-11 - T). xxiv. 
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"Ethical neutrality" is "Kantian" in the same 
way that the U50 of merely the principles of the 
analytic statement is "Kantian", the Kantian 
philosophy as such figures not at all. But If the 
"Nantian't element is merely a name wliich has been 
appropriated on behalf of these principles, it is 
clear that they must stand for so-mot. hing else. 
They are, In fact, the principles of modern legal 
ideology and to confound them with the old t1science 
of rightfl, the old identity of right and reason, is 
a perversion of the facts. 
The modern identity of right and reason proceeds 
merely through "ethically neutral" abstraction. 
Abstraction here moans systematically dissolving 
the object supposedly under consideration. It 
begins with the concrete thing and abstracts the 
most general characteristics from it and in so 
., uish: 
Lng doing progressively disregards the factors disting 
it from other things. In this, it becomes a process 
increasingly indifferent to the object supposedly 
Under consideration: increasingly "ethically neutral". 
The ftethical" is clearly a. superfluous addition here, 
because the aim of the process as such is ultimate 
neutrality in regard to everything. This, as we 
have already mentioned, is definitive of the analytic 
f 
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principle, namely to say absolutely not1iing about 
Vie world which isn't already said. Its aim is to 
add zero to the object under consideration. For 
instance, tille analytic principle will say, "Socrates 
is a man". Par from concernina itself i-rith Socrates, 
with what lie vrote, where he travelled, Athenian 
culture and his popular role witAiin it etc. etc., 
it dissolves hitd altogether. In the same way, the 
analytic principle will swy, "Right consists in 
the application of rules". The object under 
consideration is itm-lediately throi-m out of the 
window, all that remains now are 11rules1t and the 
problein then becomes one of ti'ylng to re-find the 
object again amidst school rules, the rules of 
cricket, football, moral rules etc. etc. 
1 
CertaInlys this is not "Kantianism", it is 
"positivism". Many will agree with this. Dut 
very few will Rnow the difference. This is because 
the many will inevitably fail to notice the peculiar 
nature of the special "thought-sins" which Hant 
washed clean through his discovery of a subjective 
faculty capable of delivering synthetic judgements 
.a priori. 
They will think this leads to "no knowledge" 
ef . Ilart, The Concept of Law. 
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just as does the analytic principle. And they 
will be reinforced in their convictions because a 
Good old washine-powder, as efficient as that which 
Nant discovered, doesn't go out of circulation. 
Capital manufactures its cultural achievements over 
and over again, but what will escape their notice 
is the condition upon which it does this - that 
Increasingly less "labour-time" is embodied in the 
final product.. The historical result: "Kantianism" 
is "positivIsmit. 
The Identity of "Kant iani smlt and "positivism" 
is a historical result, not a theoretical one. 
Theoretically, therefore, it is-to be grasped as 
a historical result. The process which we have 
generally attempted to observe is a historical 
bifurcation of the old "science of right", the old 
identity of r1alit and reason. IPhat happens here is 
that the "science of righttl is, on the one hand, 
dissolved into a problematic which comes to be 
occupied by the sci, ence of Politteal Economy, and 
on the other hand, and on this account, begins an 
ideological fliall-it into "Kant ianism" . These two 
completely antithetical developments are descended 
from a unity to which neither can return, a unity 
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articulated in the Kantian identity of right and 
reason. Both, in completely opposing ways, claim 
succession; one by uniting right with reason in 
the-theory of capitalist production (viz. by deducing 
the reason which is embodied in the form of right as 
essentially "economic" reason), and the other by 
merely cling-ing to the fai. -iily name. Both these 
developments naturally pervert the old identity of 
right and reason; the former by consigning it to 
an ideology comparable with the latter, and the 
latter by Nrulgari: sing it beyond recognition. 
In the Kantian (no inverted co=as) identity 
of right and reason is to be observed the final 
sublimation of the old "natural-law prejudicet'. 
Thereafter its course is one of disintegration: 
a rigorous re-formulation within the domain of 
Political Economy on the one hand, and a debasement 
at the hands of legal culture on the other. As 
we have already remarked, this radical re-formulatlon 
of the conditions of the problem. is -, not entirely 
blameless in the process under which the old solutions 
become debased - not unnaturally., since this re- 
formulation is, at the same time, a mode of putting 
the old solutions into scientific disrepute. Dut 
these old solutions have a rather special integrity 
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which is all-too-easily forgotten as their scientific 
disrepute (which is not in question) slips into a 
neglectful sUorthand expression with the word 
"ideology", whereupon the actual debasement of the 
old solutions, which in general consists in a 
rudely eclectic parroting of them in what has 
become a wholly inappropriate context, becomes 
identified under the same auspices. 
So perhaps now that we have escaped from some 
of the more obviously restrictive confines of 
11b ourgeois ideology" we can claim to understand 
the language of equality a little better. For 
this latter is what the ", old solutions" amount to. 
The Contract of Rousseau, the Reason of Kant: 
solutions to the antithesis of one with all, the 
subject with the object, the individual with right, 
solutions which seek to reconcile the dualism on 
the side of the subject, which appear therefore In 
the form of "abstract*individuality". It is "man" 
therefore who "wills" the conditions under which 
he becomes equalised under the for= of right. Yet 
"man" here is already abstracted as a presupposition. 
In "man" we already have an abstraction, a unit of 
equality. We have a language of equality. But more 
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than tais, we have a language of equality working 
in respect to a real object. Mic equivalent unit 
actuates itself in the form "subject of a right". 
Tlierefore there is no question of a dominantly 
reliGious element in this language ýobvious in 
Rousseau even if Kant presents some serious doubts)- 
The object of equality is not posited iýi the nether- 
ivorld; -equality as a matter of right is not equality 
in the eyes of a redeemer. And for this reason a 
connective becomes possible between the old 
solutions, the itm,. ionsely rich language -Olich they 
articulated on the side of the subject, and the new 
develop=ents of tha equivalent form on the side 
of the object, the development of*the analysis of 
exchange, co=: iodities and human labour, production 
and, finally, tile Critique of Political Economy. 
Part III 
Post-ClassIcal Reproduction of Legal Culture: 
Ch. 1 Me Example of Vie Historical School 
of Law. 
Law, Natural and Posit±ve. 
... Further Considerat: Lons*. 
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Post-Classical Reproduction of Legal Culture 
The Example of the Historical School of Law 
No amount of legal thought can got beyond 
"rightful" thought, and that is why, once we have 
understood Kant, we have understood the finite 
limits of bourgeois legal culture. it may be 
objected that there are others besides the Hantian 
theory of "rightful" thought. This is true, but 
It is not an objection. Only the Kantian limits 
are (legally speaking of course) in the best sense 
of the word, objective. And, indeed, there Is no 
post-Kantian example in modern legal culture of 
thought ever reaching beyond the limits imposed 
by ttrightful" thought, I. e. the Kantian Identity 
of right and reason. As an example of this we may 
consider the school of law which considered itself 
to have got beyond Kant, the Historical School of 
Law. 
Against the Hobbesian Ilbellum omnlum.. " man, 
according to Puchta,. is endowed with the sense of 
right. "This sense", he says: 
is.. destined to guard the condition of 
equality among men, by reducing their individual 
inequalities under that which belongs equally 
to all, namely, personality as the possible 
will/ 
-248- 
will of all, and by thus setting limits to 
the Impulse and tendency of the individual 
to refer and subject others to himself. The 
function of equalisatIon is effectuated by 
the individual being led to reco 914 so others 
as possessing rights like his own. 
Here we have merely another re-statement of the 
antithesis of. individuality and equality. Right 
becomes the form under which individuals are made 
equal, a result of the individual "being led" 
thereto. The result is presupposed in the sense 
of the individual: subjective idealism. 
- But Puchta Is of the Historical School and 
therefore, unlike Kant, he must bring the principle 
of the abstract subject to "life"; he must 
demonstrate its historical existence. And here it 
becomes tied up with a second principle, the - 
principle of arranging Its "development" amidst 
circumstances In which it never existed. Thus, 
when confronted with the historical development of 
law In Roman times, for instance, where the principle 
of the abstract subject is openly contradicted by 
the institution of slavery, Puchta and the Historical 
School declare that here we have right as such, but 
as yet unrealised. In other words the principle of 
right is there (because they say so) but the 
1. Puchta, Outlines of Jurisprudence, p. 22. 
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ft. . 
historical evidence doesn't show It because History 
is still working on it and hasn't quite got it 
ready. (The jus gentium, of course, is pointed 
to as ample evidence that Roman history was getting 
on with the job). And so: 
The principle of right has gradually unfolded 
itself to greater purity and clearness by 
laying aside, at stage after stFage of its 
history, the accidental develpments which 
have covered and obscured it. 
For Puchta, a more trifle such as slavery, the 
material basis of the whole of Roman civillsation, 
is just another "accidental development" concealing 
the purity of the principle of right. What is 
displayed here (pace Karl Popper) is the true 
poverty of historicism. 
According to the principle of right, 11(t)he 
function of equalisation is effectuated by the 
individual being led to recognise others as 
possessing rigUts like his own. " This, clearly, Is 
the principle of bourgeois right; the "Individual" 
(already an abstraction) recognises in others 
"rights like his own". The principle of right here 
is therefore not just an equivalent form, but an 
equal equivalent form: bourgeois law. And without 
supposing the equivalent form as general in this way, 
there is no sense in talking of the "person" as 
1. Puchta, ibid. 
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the bearer of a righto as the abstract unit of 
of right as such. There is no such thing as the 
"person" as a right-bearing unit in pre-bourgeois 
society. 
But for the Historical School the "person" is 
the principle of right sub specie aeterni. "Relation- 
ships of right are relations of persons to one 
another", says Puchta. 
1 
"Every jural. relation 
consists in the relation of one person to another 
person, " says Savigny. 
2 The person is the unit 
of equality, the embodiment of the principle of 
right. But as such, as Itpersont', he is abstract 
- thinkable because real (as bourgeois law) but 
not real because thinkable alone. "Personality is 
a common characteristic which is thinkable as 
subsisting equally in the most different individual 
circumstances.. it is just the prominent manif6station 
of the principle of equality, 113 Puchta says, but 
with no notion as to why it is "thinkable" as "the 
principle of equalitylt and form of right, even when 
it is expressly negated by his "historical" sense. 
1. Puchta, ibid., p. 67- 
2. Savigny, System of Modern Roman Law, Bk. 11, pol. 
3- Puchta, Outlines etc., p. 68. 
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The interesting thing about the historical 
School Is how their "historical" sense becomes 
accommodated within the language of equality, 
because it would appear that the sligatest 
tincture of the historical would naturally move 
the abstract subject from its Kantian basis in 
"our" thought to something subsisting as a quality 
of the object of thought. In other words, It is 
reasonable to think that a little historical 
erudition would be sufficient to shift the question 
from right being considered under the form of 
abstract subjectivity to the conditions under which 
it is possible to consider the form of riglit in 
such a way. Where, for instance, is the impersonal 
form of the subject apparent in Roman law, in feudal 
law? The Historical School merely said here, the 
principle of right, i. e. of the abstract subject, 
is "'gradually unfolding1f. 
The language of equality speaks of Itman", the 
"person", the "subject of a right" etc. without 
addition. But nowhere else other than In bourgeois 
society can these terms be connected as such with 
the form of law, because it is only bourgeois law 
which admits of such categories, which does not need 
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to ask, wlUch "person"? Freedman, slave, lord, 
vassal etc.? On the other hand, bourgeois law 
does make distinctions regarding "personst' and 
this enabled the Historical School (and legal 
theorists before and since) to blur the essential 
distinction, namely, that the distinctions In 
regard of "persons" In bourgeois law (e. g. adult- 
hood, sanity) are not of the same order. Puchta, 
for example, believed that he was talking of right 
in general when he said: 
... the manifoldness of the propositions of 
right, are related to the fact that by the 
principle of right, the conditions of 
inequality In human life have to be subjected 
to the principle of equality, without, 
however, being abolished by it. The formation 
of right thus arises out of the continual 
antagonism of unequal relations, and continual 
subjection of them to the control of right. 
From this procefs the various institutions 
of right arise. 
But the antithesis between individuality and equality 
which is expressed here is the peculiar condition 
of bourgeois right, and the "continual antagonism" 
between the two Is the process at the roots of the 
I'manIfoldness of the propositions of (bourgeois) 
right". 
2 
1. Puchta, ibid., p. 45. 
2. ante. Pt. I, C11- 3, where this process is 
illustrated in Its proper connection. 
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The language of equality, the language of the 
antithesis of individuality and equality, of the 
abstract subject, the Itpersont' etc. - this Is the 
language of the Historical School. They scorn 
Kantian formalism yet remain fixed precisely within 
the boundaries which It defined - one 11undred years 
after Kant. Here is another example of the 
"historical" language of the Historical School. 
"If in the examination of the jural relation, " 
writes Savigny, "we remove by ab straction, all its 
specific content, there remains over as a common 
nature, the united life of a plurality of men.., tl 
in other words, an abstract subject. Again, a 
specifically bourgeois condition innocently expressed 
in the fact that the plurality which is united In 
the jural relation figures merely as "men", subjects 
already abstracted. But Savigny goes on ,' 'life might 
naturally be led to stop short at this abstract 
conception of a plurality and regard law as Its 
discovery... but such an accidental meeting of an 
undefined multitude is a conception both arbitrary 
and entirely wanting in truth.. " Savigny Is aware,. 
in other words, of the circularity of a language In 
which the abstract subject is always supposed. How 
1. Savigny, System of Modern Roman Law, Bk. 1, p. 12. 
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to get beneath it? 1.1hat is this abstract subject? 
Savigny's answer is well-known; it is the t'spirit" 
of the people, the t'volksgeist", an answer which 
left the question as much a mystery as if he had 
completely left it alone. Accordingly the simple 
idea of "custom't became for Savigny the means for 
observing the life-blood of law, as the manifold 
bringing the abstract subject to 1±fe. 
1- 
For those who are led to believe that Savigny's 
ideas inay be freely associated with those of 
Hegel, the following is noteworthy: "The 
supposition that it is customary law, on the 
strength of its character as custom, which 
possesses the privilege of having become part 
of life Is a delusion, since the valid laws 
of a nation do not cease to be its customs 
by being written and codified - and besides, 
it is as a rule precisely those versed In the 
deadest of topics and the deadest of thoughts 
who talk nowadays of 'life' and of 'becoming 
part of life'. " - Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 
P-135- Hegel attacked those who believed 
custom to be the "badge" of law (as Savign y 
put it) because he was wholeheartedly in 
favour of the codification of the laws. To 
deny a nation the right to codify its laws 
was for Hegel tantamount to tyranny, since it 
meant that the laws would be less accessible 
to the public and analogous to the act of 
Dionysius the Tyrant, who hung the laws so 
high that they could not be read clearly. 
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NothIng could be a more erroneous assessment 
of the Historical School than the following which 
is given by Gierke: 
In Germany the theory of Natural Law disappears 
before the new world of ideas introduced by 
the Historical School. It was the achievement 
of that School to transcend, at last, the old 
dichotomy of law into natural and positive. 
Regarding law as a unity, and conceiving it 
as a positive result and living expression 
of the common consciousness of an organic 
community, the third-cers of the Historical 
School refused to content themselves with 
merely continuing to emphasise one or the 
other side of the old antithesis - they 
sought to achie Yea synthesis of both in 
a higher unliy. 
The theory of natural-law "disappears" at the hands 
of the intellectual achievements of the Historical 
School of Law. On the contrary, the Historical 
School, if it did anything at all, brought the 
theory of natural-law back to life. It merely 
re-articulated the old "natural-law prejudicelt 
in a "historical" manner. It did absolutely 
nothing to break through the mysteries of the 
abstract subject, and this despite the fact that 
the conditions in which these mysteries had 
hitherto been beheld no longer held sway. In 
place of the abstract subj6ct it aBrely coined 
another expression with precisely the same 
theoretical content: "common consciousness". 
Gierke, Johannes Althusius, in Natural Law 
etc.. p. 223- 
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Or, to use Gierke's expression, "living expression 
of the common consciousness of an organic community". 
How an inorganic community could be attributed 
with the form of consciousness is something which 
we may ignore; but the turn of phrase is not-eFworthy. 
"Life, " "consciousness", "living", "organic" - the 
11istorical School (of which Gierke himself Is 
effectively a latter-day representative) were 
desperately concerned to force "life" into the old 
abstract subject, into the old "natural-law prejudice". 
Gi erke himself repeatedly informs us that the "group - 
porson" (sic. abstract subject) Is "real", cancrete, 
actual etc. and again and again delights In the 
stylistically distasteful expression, f1real-group- 
persont'. 
1 
Gierke's extraordinary enthusiasm over the 
existence of "real-group-persons" was something 
which he enjoined people to prove for themselves: 
"In our ordinary daily life any effort of 
attentive introspection will suffice to convince 
us of these spiritual forces. But there are 
times when the spirit of the community reveals 
itself to us with an elemental power, in an 
almost visible shape, filling and mastering 
our inward being to such an extent that we are 
hardly any longer conscious of our individual 
existence, as such. Here, in Berlin, in the 
Unter den Linden, I lived through such an hour 
of consecration on the 15th July, in the year 
1870-" - the day of the famous Ems telegram. 
cited, p. J-xix, Gierke, Natural Law etc. 
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Law, natural and positive. 
As for the Historical School having "transeend(ed), 
at last, the old dichotomy of law into natural and 
positive, " there are a whole mass of co=on errors 
concealed here and now Is as godd a time as any to 
consider them. In the first place, the "transcendence" 
of the "old dichotomy" refers to a development which 
takes place quite independently of what the 
Historical School may or may not have said, and 
so far as the Historical School Gave expression 
to this development they really added nothing to 
what is already clearly apparent in Grotius, 
Puffendorf or Hobbes two hundred years earlier, 
namely, that "natural-law" had become "positive". 
Secondly, it is not really at all the "old dichotomyll 
which Is "transcended" here (the condition of the 
"old dichotomy" was that It could not be "transcended")p 
but rather a question that has to do with the 
emergence of an entirely new form of law giving 
rise to the appearance that "natural" and "positivett 
law are collapsable. 
The "old dichotomyff of natural and positive 
law is a charactarlstic feature of medieval political 
circumstances. But it may be considered older than 
this; a dichotomy of natural and positive law is 
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clearly evident in ancient and RoL-mn times, but 
again it is of an altogether different nature from 
the dualism as It subsisted later on in later Roman 
and medieval political thought. Natural law in 
general, however, embodies the principle of 
equality. Thus it becomes apparent why, in the 
bourgeois era, the dualism disappears and the 
theory of natural law becomes identical with the 
theory of lawýas such, for here the principle of 
equality becomes the indiclum of positive law. 
But this has nothing to do with the realisatIon 
general 
of the Christian principle on earth, the principle 
with which natural-law was associated In medieval 
times, nor, Indeed, with the Stoic principle, with 
which natural-law was associbýied in ancient and 
earlier Roman times., I-lore mundanely,, it has to 
do with the developm'ent of capitalist commodity 
production and the equal relations of generalised 
commodity-ownership which It ushers forth. 
Let us Give a schematic picture of the historic 
metamorphoses of the so-called "old dichotomy" 
it Is a veritable fountain of errors Jm legal 
historiography. 
cf. Friedrich, Philosophy of Lajr in Historical 
Perspective; DID-ntreves, Natural Law, for the 
cir munven t ions of these problems. 
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Firstly: natural-law according to the Stoic 
view. Tae equality principle here is tUat all men 
are naturally equal, which means neither equality 
only in the eyes of God (as distinct froin the world, 
which is tue principle of inedieval natural-laxr) 
nor equality in the eyes of the law (bourgeois 
natural-law). Its meaning is specifically ancient. 
For example, the "Republic" of Zeno, the founder 
of the Stoic sect, is sumlilarised by Plutarch as 
aimix, g singly at this: 
that ne: Ltlier in cities nor in toinis should we 
live under laws distinct one from another, 
but that we should look upon all inen in general 
to be our fellow-countrymen and citizens, 
observing one i. aanner of living arid one kind 
of order, like a flock feedina togptlier with 
equal right in one cor-mon pasture. 
TUis is utterly un-Christian. I'iie Stoics wore 
concerned exclusively witb. 'It'als world" and were 
pan-theistic (God and the world being identical)- 
T12is is also, needless to add, utterly un-bourgeois. 
But the important point hero is that such a doctrine 
is completely antithetical to the positive laws 
of antiquity: "Neitiller in cities nor in toxms 
should be live undor laws-Uistinct one from anothert'. 
A doctrine symptomatic of the ruin of tUe city-states. But 
Plutarch, Norals, Vol. 1, "Of t1le Fortune or 
Virtue of Alexander th. e Great". 
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as Greece becomes a province of Rome and as 
Diogenes takes Stoicism to Rome, the antithesis 
is no less acute. Roman law is still Roman law. 
The Roman jurists, accordingly, could have 
nothing to do with natural law. Even in regard 
of the "law of nations" it could only mean confusion: 
For Gaius jus gentium. and ius naturale are the 
same thing: the law which nature has instilled 
into all nations. But other jurists who 
mention the matter, who are later, commonly 
distinguish, pointing out that slavery Is 
iurls gentlum, contrary to ius naturale (contra 
naturam). Ulplan goes further and identifies 
ius naturale with instinct, and Justinian 
adopts the views of Yaius and Ulpian as if 
they were the same. 0 
k 
Buckland, Roman Law, P-53-- Buckland, however, 
has no understanding of the dualism in questiont 
for he adds: "Accordingly it has been maintained 
that, for the age of Hadrian and before, there 
was no difference, but that in the late classical 
age the two ideas began to be distinguished 
and the distinction became a standing part of 
medieveal political thought. 0 - ibid. As 
shown in the text, just the reverse is true. 
That there was "no difference" up to around 
the time of Hadrian means really that the 
Jurists pre-Hadrian had not troubled themselves 
with the issue of natural-law, i. e. not because 
there was "no difference" between this (which 
still had strong connotations with Stoicism) 
and the law as such, but because the dichotomy 
was glaringly absolute. That "In the late 
classical age the two ideas began to be 
distinguished" is symptomatic of their coming 
together in a new form, so requiring distinction, 
especially along the lines of "rendering unto 
Caesar.. etc. 1f (positive law) and unto God that 
which is His (natural law). 
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The identification of natural-law with the jus 
gentium, the legal-form which grew up because and 
so far as commerce and trade had become the imperial 
rule, is rather like a distorted premonition of the 
bourgeois synthesis. But In general the Roman 
jurists were utterly unconcerned with the natural-law 
principle in anything resembling the true Stoic 
sense. To have attempted any involvement of such a 
principle with their law would have marked their 
complete ignorance of the latter - and only a 
lunatic would want to assert that the Roman jurists 
were ignorant of Roman law. Such cre the conditions 
of the dualism of natural and positive law in these 
early times. Basically it is a dualism of the 
principle of human equality (for this world) and 
the institution of slavery. 
But slavery can accomodate Christian natural-law: 
the principle of equality im the eyes of a God 
separated off from the world, from life, from every- 
thing 
... 
For all their severe austerity, the Stoics 
had never "denied" after the fashion of a "kingdom 
not of this world", quite the reverse. But the 
"kingdom not of this worldIt, music to the ears of 
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Pilate, neCates completely the conditions of the 
"old dichotomy". 
1 
This new "old dichotomy" is 
Perhaps a few words of explanation are required 
here in rejard of the "music to tile cars of a 
Pilate". Tile oriCinal scene runs as follows: 
"Pilate therefore entered again into the judgement 
hall and called Jesus, and said unto him, 'Art t1lou 
king of the Jews? ' Jesus answered hini, "Sayest 
thou this of thyself, or did others tell it thee 
of me? ' Pilate answered, "ACI Ia Jew? Mine own 
nation and the chief priests delivered thee unto 
me: what hast thou doneV Jesus answered, I'My 
kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were 
of this world, then would my servants fight, that 
I should not be delivered to the Jews: but now 
is My kingdom not froin hence. ' Pilate therefore 
said unto him, 'Art t1iou a king then? ' Jesus 
answered, 'Thou sayest Viat I ar3 a king. To this 
end was I born and for this cause came I into 
the world, that I should bear witness to the 
truth. Dveryone that is of the truth heareth. 
my voice. ' Pilate sayeth unto him, 11rhat is 
truth? "' - John 16,33. According to Negel, 
Pilate asked the question, IlTvliat is truth? " with 
tile air of a man who had settled accounts in that 
quarter long ago (Logic, p. 27). Tile reason 
for what Hegel considered an apparently complacent 
gesture here is that Pilate didn't need to know 
any more. As soon as he heard the words, ItTly 
kingdom is not of this -mrorld", he was happy - no 
threat to the Roman imperium here. 'Art thou a 
king then? ' he goes on to ask, in an amused kind 
of way, to which Jesus replies, "Thou sayest 
that I am a king. " Pilate, of course, had said no 
such thing; lie was m--rely teasing out what was to 
him a rather irrelevant notion of kingship. 
Compare Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy, p. 273 et. seq. 
I cannot resist quoting Nietzsche in this 
connection, who says, "Do 1 still have to add 
tUat in the entire New Testament there is only 
one solitary figure whom one is obliged to 
respect? P; Uate, the Roman governor. To take 
a Jewish affair seriously - he cannot persuade 
himself to do that ... The nobel scorn of a Roman 
before whow an impudent misuse of the word 'truth' 
was carried on has enriched the New Testament with 
the only expression wilic: a possesses value - which 
is its criticism, its annihilation even - "What is 
truth? "' (Anti-C, '. irist, p. 162). cf. generally 
Fouerbach, Dssence of Christianity. 
The original independence of Christ from politics, 
of course, became subsequently a basis for the 
political harnessing of Christianity. 
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something else again. Really itis no longer a 
dichotomy, but a synthesis -a synthesis-which 
is the result of a principle of equality that is 
capable of living in harmony with every conceivable 
form of worldly human degradation. The historical 
conditions of this particular "old dichotomy" are 
charactdristically feudal and date roughly from 
around the eclipse of the Roman imperium to the 
dai, ming in the West of bourgeois civillsation. 
The "old dichotomy" in the Middl6'Ages is 
therefore grounded In a synthesis of Christianity 
with the feudal order, of prelate with prince. 
And because this is so, there arises the continual 
need to distinguish one from the other: natural 
law from positive law, the justification from the 
beastly act. But the justification only offers 
"redemptiont' on the condition of "sin", and 
similarly the brutal "positive" laws of the prince 
may only be executed on condition that they are 
"Justified". The finest expression of the mutually 
parasitic character of Christian theology and feudal 
petty absolutism, which finds for it a basis in 
t1higher reason", is achieved in Thoridst scholasticism. 
But, of course, this "higher reasonft is still 
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Christian theological reason, for all the respect 
which is paid to Aristotle. However, our aim is 
not to go into these matters in any detail, but 
merely to draw a very schematic outline of the 
historical conditions of the 0old dichotomy" of 
natural and positive law. 
Finally, we come to the "old dichotomy" in 
the bourgeois era. No longer is the principle of 
human equality in the eyes of a God who is 
independent of the world a sufficient reason for 
the form of law. And yet, for all appearances, 
bourgeois law is more "Christian", or rather, more 
positively "Christian" than feudal law. But at 
the same time the historic appearance of bourgeois 
law coincides with the eclipse of Christian 
theological natural-law dogma, that is, just at a 
time when one would reasonably expect. it to have 
become more convincing. Still, there should really 
be no surprise, since Christianity has always been 
consistent in this: it has never sought positive 
evidence in "this" world, only negative evidence, 
only the "bad" things, man's corruption, his greed, 
his 11sin", his misfortune (old age, sichmess etc. ), 
that is to say, evidence conducive to "faith" in 
a world somewhere (Psychologically speaking, any-where) 
-26.5- 
else. Accordinj; ly, it is an entirely now principle 
of equality which is expressed by Unatural-la, %01 
in the bourgeois era. It is the principle of law 
as such. 
By way of recognition of this radical break 
with Christian natural-law, vulgar historiography 
observes the "transcendence" of the "old dichotomy", 
the "secularisation" of natural-law, the appearance 
of "Positive" natural-law and so on and so forth. 
From all that we have said about bourgeois "natural- 
law", the "natural-law prejudice", its conditions 
and limitations, the mode of its articulation and 
variations within that mode, it. is clear that such 
expressions are completely and utterly inadequatep 
if not false. Such expressions are commonplace in 
modern legal historiography and as a general rule, 
wherever they appear, it is a "'positive' natural- 
lawyer" himself who is speaking, namely, an empty 
vessel. For, really, there is no such thing as 
"secular" or t1positivet' natural-law, or the process 
of the "secularisation" of natural-law (as it is 
called). It is not the 11samet' object which undergoes 
a supposed cleansing of theological dogma in this 
connection. Subtract theology from scholasticism 
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and one is left, perhaps (it is not an entirely 
rigorous proposition), with a few propositions 
from Aristotle. But in any event, one would 
certainly not have Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, 
Rousseau etc. etc. amongst a host whom the modern 
legal historiographer artlessly subsumes under a 
process of Itsecularlsation" of natural-law. 
On the more mterial side of things, (medieval) 
natural-law, as that which Is supposedly t1secularlsed", 
figures and can only figure as itself, i. e. as 
natural-law: the expression of the conditions of 
the feudal order, the unity of theology with the 
form of law, the form of political rule. The form 
of law here is heterogeneous, unequal, enmeshed 
In priviledge and vested interest, often brutal 
and barbaric: hence, it is inextricably bound up 
with the Christian "promiself, with "justification". 
This is the essence of natural-law. "Secularised" 
it becomes naked barbarism. "Secularised" 
theoretically, that is, taking it in Its finest 
and most reasoned sense (in Aquinas), this barbarism 
is displaced in a sublimated flight back to the 
. 
refuge of the ancients. Aquinas subconsciously 
seeks refuge with his "philosopher", as the 
scholastics called him (Aristotle): a profound 
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testimony that his theology is inadequate, that 
it is indissolubly mixed with the miserable 
conditions of the feudal order. 
The 11secularisation" of natural-law, if such 
a thing is to be sensible, must refer to its stated 
object, namely, the conditions of the feudal order. 
If we do this, we learn a little about the 
character of the feudal order; we learn that 
without religion it is barbaric and that with 
religion this barbarism is "Justified". But for 
all this we learn absolutely nothing about bourgeois 
"natural -law". The modern legal historiographers 
who think otherwise, who move freely from the Stoics 
to Aquinas, to Kant and literally all over the 
place, displaying their erudition in the process, 
commit themselves to a conclusion that they would 
be appalled to admit: that the modern classical 
position in regard of the theory of law reflects 
the historical emergence of pre-feudal barbarism. 
This at least is the proximate conclusion which may 
be ascribed to those who believe the modern classical 
thinkers to be 11seculariserst' of natural-la-tir. 
The bourgeois era ushers in nothing at all 
r6sembling the "secularisation" of natural-law, and 
nor therefore is it the "old dichotomy" which is 
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reconciled hero. TUe "old dichotomylt was already 
reconciled, transcended and united as a condition 
of the feudal order of things. Natural law was 
not in the least bit independent of positive law 
in feudal times; each was absolutely conditional 
upon the other. What comes to be articulated in 
classical t1liought is therefore an altogether 
different unity: not God and the world (as an 
antithesis), but man and inan - individual and 
individual, the principle of general equality as 




Let us return to the "example" of the 
Historical School of Law. The error of historicism, 
of distorting both past and present by reading 
back the superficial appearances of the latter 
Into a past in which they never existed, Is not a 
distinction which is peculiar to the Historical 
School of Law. The Historical School just presents 
a "good example". Tile superficiality which is 
read back Into bygone times is the form of the 
abstract subject. This the Historical School 
considers to be the historical form of law in 
general. But in previous periods it is constrained 
by various circumsýances: this "it" can only 
figure therefore in the principle of natural-law 
in medieval times (as distinct from the Upositivelt 
law) - However, the Historical School considered 
it to be their good fortune to be living at a time 
when "the" principle of right had been fully 
unfolded; no longer is "itt' (it never occurred 
to them that "it" might be something rather different) 
confined to tile world beyond. Here "it" was on 
their doorsteps: the abstract subject, no longer 
there by the grace of the Holy Spirit, but here 
in the "real", I'livelts 10organic" etc. form of the 
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"Volksgeist". Thus the Historical School's 
"transcendence" of the tiold dichotomy": a 
circumspect way of saying that God becomes the 
Fatherland. Vulgar, belated (late nineteenth 
century) German bourgeois nationalism. "One school 
of thought that legItimises the infamy of today 
with the infamy of yesterday, lt said Marx, "(1s) 
the historical school of law - this school would 
have invented German history were It not itself 
an invention of that history. " 
1 
But just as theoretically disreputable are the 
schools of legal thought which appear later - and 
not merely in Germany. Nothing- Is changed when 
the "Volke, goist" is made even more "positive", 
when It is turned into the "common purposes" of 
the Tnterest School of Jurisprudence, or the 
"socially organised purposest' of the French legal 
theorist, Duguit (who in this connection plagiarlses 
the sociological positivism of Durkheim), or the 
aspirations of the patty bourgeois IlEgolt of the 
latter-day followers of Bentham In England. All 
these are merely modes of inflating with the most 
unspeakable theoretical rubbish the same old abstract 
subject long since eclipsed at the twilight of 
classical thought. 
1. blarx, Early Writings, p . 24.5. 
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Since the Germans are useful in the provision 
of "good examples", lot us bring the story into 
the twentieth century with the post-Historical 
School developments in the theory of law. Clearly, 
with the turn of the nineteenth century, the idea 
of the "Volksgeisttl begins to look a little specious, 
"a little too close to natural-law after all", the 
legal thinkers began to say. Spirit still meant 
spirit when all said and done, and with this the 
I 
search began for something a little more "positive" 
with which to re-vitalise the skeletal frame of the 
abstract subject. On the other hand, this frame 
wasn't exactly bare - theoretically perhaps, but 
not empirically. It may not have been "spiritual", 
but it was still the "living expression of the 
common consciousness of an organic community". A 
scientific-sounding phrase like this didn't need 
to go into the dustbin. But what was this "common 
consciousnesst'? In other words, again the question, 
what is the abstract subject? Gierke had persisted 
that it was Itreal", a "real-group-person't and, after 
his little experience in the Unter*den Linden, 
decided that its secret rested finally In an appeal 
to the "spiritft of natural-law (the "old dichotomy" 
wasn't dead after all)- 
1 
And this rule did not 
1. Gierko, Natural Law etc. cf. ante. 
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change, that is to say, the answer to the question 
of the abstract subject remained that "well must 
determine it to our own judicious satisfaction. 
The legal theorist, Ihering, baptised this as 
the "teleological metUod", whereupon the Interest 
School of Jurisprudence established its foundations. 
With the "teleological method", a method 
distinguished by its built-in facility for first 
deciding, quite arbitrarily, upon a given result 
before the historical "evidence" is adjusted 
accordingly, the errors of the old Historical 
School were shamelessly and openly declared as a 
principle of Jurisprudence. 111herIng was originally 
a conceptualist", says Heck, the principal exponent 
of the Jurisprudence of Interests, but, 11(h)e 
turned from a Sdul into a Paul. He advanced the 
following principle: Lax? is not created by concepts 
but by interests ... Therefore Ihering is justly 
recognised as the founder of the Teleological 
School and consequently the Jurisprudence of Interests. " 
The notion of the "conceptualist" here refers to 
the legal theorist who applies the analytic principles 
of logical thought to the legal form, who is doomed 
therefore to saying nothing more about law in particular 
P. Heck, in 20th century Legal Philosopl-j3r, 
Vol. 2., P-35- 
cf. Ibering, Law as a Means to an En(I. 
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than literally any other set of propositions about 
the world. 
1 
Accordingly, there is a measure of 
sense in this "conversion" of Ihering's. But what 
is the hallucination (Ifeck's analogy is fitting) 
In this instance? "Law is not created by concepts 
but by interests. " This seems quite the reverse 
of a hallucination, almost a materialist principle 
in fact. But what is really expressed here is an 
extremely vulgar dichotomy of 11concepts" and 
"interests". What is meant is that "conc6pts" (and 
not merely those of the "conceptualists") are 
Irrelevant In the Interest School's view of law. 
Simply because "law is not created by concepts" 
(it hardly needs be said) it by no means follows 
that our understanding of law is not thus created. 
But-the "teleological method" sees law as the 
expression of "common purposes" or "interests" 
and, not being able to get to the bottom of this 
(which is just yet another term. for the form of 
the abstract subject), its exponents artlessly 
declared that these "interests" were something 
to be determined by them alone - after the manner 
of the judge's determination of the "public interesttý. 
cf. ante, tho discussion of analytic principles 
in connection with "Kantlanism" - 
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T'he Interest School draws out in a "positive" 
manner (that is, an "unashamed" manner) the 
inevitably anti-scientific stance of modern 
jurisprudence. In this is to be observed a 
characteristic repulsion of any scientific solution 
to the riddle of the abstract subject. The old 
Historical School, for example, had said that It 
was the "living expression of the common 
consciousness" of the community. Subsequent 
legal thinking can say no more; It can only turn 
In on itself: the ttcommon consciousness" becomes 
a matter which It must decide purely on Its own 
account. it is not resolved as an object, but 
quite arbitrarily as a subject pretending to think 
It as an object. Law Is to be determined as a 
moment of the community in which it finds its 
expression, the Historical School had said, yet 
on the other hand it became a matter for legal 
thought to decide the true content of this relation. 
Law Is thus posited as both object of inquiry and 
"solution" to the problems posed therein. Legal 
thought becomes a playground for the duplication 
over and over again, in a manifold variety of IraYst 
the tlKantianfl and historleist errors - 
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In the case of the Interest School, "rightful" 
thought becomes "teleologicalts thought: l1we ti 
decide upon tho form of law, "well interpret the 
abstract subject, the Ocommon purposes" inscribed 
therein - not as an object in itself, but as 
something which is exclusively "for ust'. Binder, 
a "Hegelian" supporter of the Interest School 
observes its essentially juridical character when 
he says: 
Let us grant that the Jurisprudence of 
Interests has progressed beyond the most 
narrow positivism in so far as it has 
rediscovered the teleological element of 
law. Nevertheless Stammler's saying applies 
to it, that he who maintains that the "just- 
ness" of law must be measured by its appropriate- 
ness to the end persued, "has not thought 
(the matter) throughtt. For the question of 
whether something is an appropriate means for 
this or that purpose has fundamentally 
nothing to do 1 with the question of whether this 
means is law. 
Ile may just take the opportunity to further observe 
that neither the "Hegelian", Binder, nor the "Kantlan" 
Stammler, were capable of "thinking the matter 
through". The form of law for both of these 
involved (again) nothing else but a re-formulation 
Binder, J., in 20th century Legal Philosophy, 
Vol. 2, P-301- 
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of the mysteries of the abstract subject. Stammler 
merely re-asserted the "natural-law prejudice" in 
deference to its classical origins, symptomatically 
pointing out that contemporary developments in 
legal theory had in no way surmounted the "solutions" 
of nearly two hundred years earlier. 
1 
Binder, on 
the other hand, simply parroted Hegelian terminology 
in considering the form of law as a unity of 
universal and particular will. In this there is 
nothing more than yet another circumspect expression 
of the abstract subject, namely, as the equallsation 
of a host of particular wills under the form of one 
which is in common - all of which goes to show 
the truth of the statement with which we began 
this section: no amount of legal thought gets 
beyond the limits of "rightful" thought, the 
limits of thought itself as abstract subjectivity 
- proscribed by Yuant In the eighteenth century. 
1. cf. Stamm-ler, Vieory of Justice. 
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Legal Sociology. 
The Return of the "Contract": the "free" contract 
1. In legal sociology are reproduced the e rrors 
of the old t'Contract": pre-posited at the da-tm of 
cIvilisation (Rousseau) and considered in this 
as conformable with reason itself (Kant). They 
are reproduced, however, in connection with a more 
Itpositlvett contract - the "free" contract. 
The "freeft contract is, in the common phrase, 
a "bourigeoisit notion. In other words it is a 
notion which cannot properly be applied in general 
(to Rome or the Middle Ages for example); it 
expresses a definite legal content and consequently, 
corresponds specifically with capitalist social 
development of production and exchange. The t1freeft 
coritract Is essentially bound up not with the 
historically general existence of commodity exchange, 
but with the historically specific existence of 
generalised commodity exchange -a distinction 
which is systematically overlooked in legal 
sociology. 
Once the "free" contract is considered 
independently of bourgeois society, its definition 
becomes impossible. Of course, there is no need 
to be dogmatic about the issue; it is not impossible 
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to say of a contract juris gentium, for example, 
that 11X freely contracts with Y11 - But if this is 
an instance of the "free" contract, one of its 
conditions becomes that neither X nor Y are slaves, 
which is to say, that the existence of slavery 
is supposed. Further, the form of property in 
exchange around which contracts juris gentium 
became articulated is not merely tiiis, not merely 
the commodity-form, but the commodity-form because 
and so far as it had been developed under slavery. 
In this way freedom of contract becomes conditional 
upon slavery - which is definitely not what those 
who liberally. apply the notion. in this way wish 
to conclude. Max Weber, for example, applies the 
notion, freedom of contract, to pre-capitalist 
social formations. What does that turn the Itfroe" 
contract into? It turns it into something which 
is utterly indifferent to both the nature of the 
contracting agents and the subject-matter over 
which the agreement is made. The subject-matter 
of the agreement may be res mancipi, feudal labour- 
service or gilt-edged stock, and by subsuming all 
and sundry in this way under the development of 
freedom of contract (which is what Weber does)-any 
differentiation of the thing an historical grounds 
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becomes impossible. In other words, the "free" 
contract becomes Impossible to define: the "free" 
contract remains the "free" contract. Butwe shall 
look at Ifeber more closely in this connection shortly. 
The historical ground of the "free" contract 
Is only bourgeois society, where commodities, money, 
labour-power all circulate "freely", without any 
apparent compulsion. There Is no knout hanging 
over the wage-slave, no feudal lord with all his 
overtly coercive appurtenances weighing in the 
balance with the wage-labourer's inclination to 
perform t1labour-servIce" for his subsistence. The 
mass of people here move "freely" to market, "freely" 
contract with their employers in return for a wage 
which in turn becomes divided into nu: merous "free" 
contracts in the purchase and sale of wage-goods, 
and the product of labour, in the hands of the 
capitalist, Is converted via innumerable "freeff 
contracts into money which in turn divides into 
further such contracts in the replacement of 
equipment, purchase of raw materials, re-purchase 
of labour-power etc. etc. not forgetting the 
capitalist's own expenditure upon the luxuries which 
his "enterprise" has earned him. Only In these- 
circumstances Is the abstract right-bearj-ng unit 
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of the "free" contract generated. Only here is the 
contractual agent "free". "Free" because equal: 
no apparent compulsion on either side whether the 
agents concerned are building societies, Trades 
Unions, John Does, Richard Roes, Assorted Fabrics 
and so on and so forth. 
Yet given all this, it is possible that one 
(a persistent formalist perhaps) would still want 
to say that the Roman citizen, for instance, was a 
"freell contractual agent and that the slave, being 
an exception, is analogous to the infant or the 
idiot, who are exceptions to the rule in modern 
times. However, in that case one'is also committed 
to the view that infancy, idiocy etc. furnishes 
the material basis of the bourgeois social edifice, 
for the slave in Roman times was anything but a 
"technicallf exception from "free and equallf legal 
personality. The "free" contract on closer 
examination cannot possibly be merely a form: 
form always supposes content, even when posited as 
mere form. And for this reason the "free" contract 
cannot possibly be arbitrarily ascribed its content. 
It already has a content, so to speak-, and it Is 
quite erroneous to have it pro-posited merely as 
a form, in antiquity for instance, and from there 
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have it "develop" through history, taking an 
increasingly large proportion of society under its 
auspices. This is the error of historicism. It 
is the error of Max Weber - which Is nevertheless 
precisely the same error made by the man who, 
supposing his understanding of money, labour, raw 
materials etc. applied under all circumstances, 
sailed from England equipped with a plentiful supply 
of such things only to find when he got to his 
Crusoesque destination that he had forgotten to 
take with him the capitalist mode of production. 
His "free" waae-labourers deserted him. Similarly 
the "free'# contract deserts the. legal historian 
and sociolo, -,,,: Lst when he looks for its t1origins" 
outside the conditions of capitalist social 
production and exchange. But we must now look at 
the "freet' contract in a little more detail. 
2. The "free" contract supposes the commodity- 
form of property. Lot us see how. The notion of 
"freedom" appertaining to the act of exchange means 
that there is an absence of compulsion on either 
side of this act. But how does this come about? 
How Is it that the contracting agent is supposed 
Itfree"? - especially as it Is patently obvious, 
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for example, that if a worker does not "freely" 
sell his labour-power on the market, ceteris 
paribus he will starve. "Freedom" here is merely 
a reflection of the equivalent form of exchange In 
which the contracting parties are equal because 
and so far as they are owners of commodItles. As 
equals, neither of the contracting parties exercises 
any compulsion over the other; thus they are "free". 
The "freeft contract arises on the basis of the 
commodity-form of property. 
Hegel, interestingly enough, deduced this 
relation the other way around: the commodity-form 
of property becomes a result of-the contract. 
He says: 
The two wills and their agreement In the 
contract are as an internal state of mind 
different from its (the contract's) 
reallsation in the performance. The 
comparatively "ideal" utterance (of the 
contract) in the stipulation contains the 
actual surrender (! ) of a property by the 
one, its changing hands, and its acceptance 
by the other will ... Thus in the stipulation 
we have the substantial being of the contract 
standing out in distinction from its real 
utterance in the performance, which is 
brought down to a mere sequel. In this way 
there is put into the thing or performance 
a distinction between Its immediate specific 
quality (its use-value) and its substantial 
being or value, meaning by value the quantitative 
terms into which the qualitative feature has 
been/ 
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been translated. One piece of property is 
thus made comparable with another, and may 
be made equivalent to a thing which is (in 
quality) wholly heterogeneous. It is thus 
treated in general ýs an abstract, universal 
thing or commodity. 
Of course the stipulation does not contain "the 
actual surrender of (the) propertyU. It certainly 
takes an imagination to see in the formal stipulation 
the "actual" transfer of property; 
2 this is only 
1. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, p. 245. The brackets 
are mine. Everything here Is made an effect 
of 1111ind1t, i. e. Hegel's mnd. 
2. The stipulation is the contract as such, i. e. 
as it exists legally. Hegel perhaps had in 
mind the Roman stipulatio, which as a form of 
contract was contained perfectly simply in the 
use of the words: "Dare spondes? " - "Spondeo". 
Historically it amounted to a simplification 
of the older more cumbersome and ritualistic 
forms of nexum and mancipatio. It came into 
being during the most important period in the 
development of Roman law, viz. the period 
of the Republic, when great conquests were 
laying the foundations of the Empire. The 
corresponding growth of commerce*and trade 
facilitated by efficient political administration 
revolutionised the older Roman legal forms. 
- "The obligation created by thu words, 
Dare Spondes? Spondeo, is peculiar to Roman 
citizens. The others - Promittisne? Promitto; 
Fidejubesne? Fidejubeo, etc. - belong to 
the jus gentium, and therefore hold good 
between all men, whether Roman citizens or 
aliens. " - Gaius, Institutes, 111,93; 
cf. Justinian, Institutes, 111,1.5. 
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what is relevant from the lecal standpoint. But 
what Ilogel adds to this legal view, which sees 
only 11two wills and their agreementt', is an 
important logical condition which arises therefrom, LP 
namely, that the things exchanged are reduced to 
a common form, the commodity-form. On the other 
hand, the commodity-form is not the effect of the 
contract, that is, somothine resulting from the 
contract as such, i. e. as ftt, %, ro wills... " otc., but 
rather the commodity-form is the condition of the 
contract. 
What malcos it possible for the mutual alienation 
and appropriation of property to be conceived as 
a "free', contract, as a free act of will, is a 
preparedness to subsume whatever is exchanged 
under the commodity-form. But the commodity-form 
is so because and so far as production Is production 
for Oxchango and because and so far as human labour 
has became homogoneous social labour. Tho conception 
Of the "free#' contract, of two mutually independent, 
yet equal wills forming an aareement Is therefore 
similarly conditioned. 
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At this stage it is not beside the point to 
recapitulate upon the proper "actual" conditions 
of the commodity-form of property. In bourgeois 
society the commodity-form of property is a 
relation of capital and wage-labour. Wage-labour 
assumss the commodity-form of labour-power which 
like all commodities is alienated and appropriated 
in exchange. But this is not all. The "substantial 
being" of labour-power Is hardly as property in 
exchange, which, following Hegel, is supposedly 
contained as such merely in the formal utterance 
of the contract. Labour-power subsists far more 
"substantially" in the labour-process. Labour- 
power, the ability to create, re-create and expand 
value, is alienated by the worker and appropriated 
by the capitalist who consumes it in effectuating 
that ability with his (the capitalist Is) means 
of production (machinery, land, raw materials etc. )_ 
The product of the labour-process which is thus 
set in motion, i. e. the goods produced as a result 
of the given productive operation, which represent 
an augmented value in relation to the value 
Initially laid out and used up in the productive 
process, belong to the capitalist. Labour-power is 
"substantially" appropriated therefore not in the 
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contract but in the labour-process. It is 
appropriated here for a given duration. Consequently, 
it is not immediately apparent that anything 
"substantial" has been Given up, as in the*case 
of alienation and appropriation of bread,, wool, 
books etc. - the labourer's commodity Is still 
captive in his own being at the end of the working 
day. Still, if nothing had been alienated in this 
Instance, there would be no product at the end of 
the labour-process, no bread, wool, books or 
anything. What actually happens is that flesh, 
bone, brain and muscle, in their operation, have 
been given up and transforred to the subject of 
labour and have become materialised in the product 
-a product which is owned by another. "Labour 
has incorporated itself with its subject: the 
former is materialised, the latter transformed. 
That which in the labourer appeared as movement, 
now appears in the product as a fixed quality. 
The blacksmith forges and the product is a forgino. 11 
It is only here, in the form of the commodity- 
product, where the legal form again picks up the 
thread, so to speak; where the form of property 
1. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, P-176. 
"Ifill" again determines the form of 
property for'Hegel In the case of landed 
property, in which connection Marx says, 
"Nothing could be more con, ical.. According 
to this, man as an Individual must endow 
his will with reality as the soul of 
external nature, and therefore must take 
possession of this nature-and make It 
his private property. If this were the 
destiny of the 'individual', of man as 
an Individual, it would follow that 
every human being must be a landoimer, 
in order to become a real individual. 
Free private ownership of land, a very 
recent product, is, according to Hegel, 
not a definite social relation, but a 
relation of man as an individual to 
'nature', an absolute right of man to 
appropriate all things.. " - CapItalt 
Vol. ill, p. 616-7- 
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again becomes undifferentiated from the form in 
wlAch it began the productive operation, i. e. the 
commodity-form. In other words, the legal form, 
since It only supposes the form of property as 
property in exchange, since it expresses one true 
thing and gently declines to recognise anything 
else, misses entirely the particular form (here, 
the capital-form) by which commodities are produced 
and re-produced over and over again. The legal 
form therefore systematically declines to look 
into itself, as it were; it stops at the commodity- 
form, it begins at the conraodity-form - It is the 
commodity-form, as abstract subject, as "freet' 
contractual' agent and the numerous developments 
and determinations thereof. 
The contract, according to Hegel, supposes 
the com.. odity-form of property. But in this it 
supposes a great deal more, because the commodity- 
form is conditional upon the development of 
homogeneous social labour - which is properly 
realised only in bourgeois society. Hegel's 
view of contract, as the meeting of free independent 
wills, is therefore particular, not absolute. 
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30 Let us now look at the position of Max Veber 
in regard of the "free" contract. "Freedom of 
contract", according to Weber, "exists exactly 
to the extent to which such autonomy is recognised 
by the legal order. tl 
1 
if by this it is meant that 
"freedom of contract" is a specifically legal notion, 
that it exists because and so far as it Cigures as 
a legal category, then there is nothing to object 
to. But what are the conditions of this existence? 
Somehow it appears connected with "the market", 
i. e. the sphere of property in exchange, for Weber 
adds: 
There exists, of course, an intimate connection 
between the expansion of the market and the 
expanding measure of contractual freedom or, 
in other words, the scope of arrangements 
which are guaranteed as valid by the legal 
order or, in again different terms, the 
relative significance within the total legal 
order of those rules which pthorise such 
transactional dispositions. 
Again, there appears to be nothing to object to in 
this statement. A slight suspicion creeps In, 
however, when we look more closely at what is being 
shid about the apparently historical connection 
between "the market" and this legal notion of the 
"free" contract. In fact, nothing is being said In 
1. Weber, Law in Economy and Society, p. 100. 
2. ibid. 
-289- 
this respect; there is mthing to prevent the 
connection between "the market" and the t1freell 
contract from being supposed at any time after 
Mammon or, to be precise, at any time where "the 
market" is in existence. "The market" appears 
amidst the most varied of social conditions: it 
is developed under slavery in ancient times, it 
becomes the basis of merchant capital In the later 
Middle Ages, it is developed par excellence, becomes 
the dominant relation between man and man, under 
capital and wago-labour in the modern era. But 
the "free" contract becomes a notion characteristic 
of the latter conditions alone. Not so for Weber: 
the 91intimate connection" between "the inarket" 
and the 11freell contract is between two things which 
t1expand". Their connection is purely quantitative: 
one "expands", so does the other. Hence the use 
of the merely quantitative terms: "expanding measurelt 
11scope of arrangements", "relative significance"; 
the mere expression of magnitude here suspends 
over and over again (regardless of the "in otlier 
words", and t1again different terms") the nature of 
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the connection, the thing to be defined. 
1 
Weber, in fact, makes the assumption that 
since the "free" contract is a legal notion, we 
may only understand it legally. Weber is therefore 
at least consistent this far, since he also 
systematically prevents himself from defining the 
thing. If the legal form "freedom of contract" 
is "intimately connected" with "the market", if 
the "free" contract is a specifically legal 
connection of the commodity-exchange relation, 
then something must make it so. This "something", 
as we have made clear elsewhere, consists in the 
specific form of commodity exchange, namely, its 
Generallsed form, which is a condition provided only 
where social production is exclusively production 
for exchange, where production is capitalist 
production. These are the conditions of the "free" 
"Mathematics usually define magnitude as what 
can be increased or diminished. This definition 
has the defect of containing the thing to be 
defined over again: but it may serve to show 
that the category of magnitude is explicitly 
understodd to be changeable and indifferent, 
so that, in spite of its being altered by an 
increased extension or intension, the thing 
does not cease to be; a house, for example, 
remains a house, and red remains red. " 
Ilegel, Logic, p. 1.59. 
-291- 
contract as a legal form. The "free" contract is 
not something which "expands" alongside the general 
historical "growth" of commodity or "market" 
relationships. This is only so once bourgeois 
conditions have become established, and in any 
case, even if this proviso is admitted (which 
it isn't in Weber), the crude quantitative terms 
in which the connection is expressed still throw it 
beyond the boizidari-es of cognition. What is the 
connection between the legal form and f1the expansion 
of the markett'? An "expanding" legal form, says 
Weber - "the expanding measure of contractual freedom". 
Tile connection is quant: Ltative, -wh: Lcli is to say, 
the connection exists. But if two things grow 
together, "expand" together, become "significant", 
"important" etc. together, we need to know not 
that this is so, but why this is so. Accordingly, 
as Weber persists with these terms the inner 
connections of the legal form become self-evidently 
beyond his grasp. 
Weberfs apparent grasp of the economic connections 
of the legal form is therefore only this, a mere 
semblance. Ttius, 
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The present-day significance (sic) of contract 
is primarily the result of the high degree 
to which our economic system is market- 
oriented and of the role played by money. 
The increased importance (sic) of the private 
law of contract in general is thus the legal 
reflex of the market orientation of our 
economy. 
And further, 
The exact extent to which the total amount of 
"freedom" i4thin a given legal community is 
increased (sic) depends entirely upon the 
concrete economic order anq especially upon 
the property distribution. 
The "free" contract is pre-posited wherever "the 
market" has existed. But the "free" contract, like 
the commodity-form of property ("the market") which 
is contained in it as a premise, depends upon definite 
socio-economic relations. Thus, if it is to be 
found in differing historical puriods (which is 
what Weber dommits himself to saying), then those 
self-same socio-economic relations must prevail 
in them all - which is clearly not the case. 
Indeed, Weber himself is forced into recognising 
this as he approacUes more concretely certain 
differine historical "contents" which he has initially 
and uncritically subsumed under the form of the 
t1freell contract. Hence, - 
I. Ifeber, Law etc., p. 10.5. 
2. ibid., p. 189. 
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That extensive contractual freedom which 
generally obtains to-day has, of course, 
not always existed; and even where freedom 
of contract did exist, it did not always 
prevail in the spheres in w1alch it prevails 
to-day. Freedom of contract once existed 
indeed In spheres in which it is no longer 
prevalent or in whi? h it is far less prevalent 
than it used to be. 
Here even the mere quantitative connection of the 
"free" contract i73. th t1the market" disappears from 
the scene. As Weber develops his narrative more 
concretely in looking at historically differing 
kinds of social relations, e. g. in early Roman times, 
this economic connection of the legal form slips 
out of sight - precisely because the "developed", 
idea he has of it is uniquely a product of bourgeois 
society and is no longer appropriate, not even as 
a barren underived quantitative relation. Accordingly, 
the "voluntary agreement" becomes posited historically 
as the "status" contract, which becomes gradually 
and through the ages the "purposive" contract. 
This historically is the t1development" of "freedom 
of contract". 
"In accordance with this fundamental trans- 
formation of the voluntary. agreement, " says Weber, 
1. ibid., p. 101. 
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"we shall call the more primitive type . 
'status 
contract' and that which is peculiar to the 
exchange or market economy 'purposive contract'. 1t 
That which is "peculiar to the exchange or market 
economy" is, of course, the "voluntary agreement", 
I. e. the Itfreell contract. Nothing Is added by 
calling it "purpo. sive". But it is an absolute 
impossibility for this same thing to undergo a 
"fundamental transformation" from its existence 
as 11statust' contract. Indeed if anything undergoes 
a ? 'fundamental transformation", it is no longer 
that which it was. The "voluntary agreement" is 
"fundamentally transformed" from itself into itself; 
the error of historicism. What the "voluntary 
agreement" Is remains completely and utterly elusive. 
Lot us summarise Weber's errors. ]First error: 
the "freet' contract is merely a quantitative relation 
of "the market economy"; as one "increases" in 
"significancefl, "expands", becomes "important" etc., 
so does the other. Logically therefore the Itfreell 
contract is posited wherever the rudiments of "the 
market economy" are In evidence, i. e. anywhere where 
1. ibid., p. 105. 
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man has emerged from the forests and has begun to 
exchange his producPs with his fellow-men. Second 
error, a compound error of the first: the "free" 
contract is not in evidence as a category of legal 
thinking in these circumstances. Even in Justinlan 
one will look in vain for the "free" contract. 
Thus the "free" pontract, since it is erroneously 
pre-posited as something which must exist merely 
with "the market economy" (regardless of its form)# 
must be considered to exist in such circumstances 
not as itself, but as something else. The "free" 
contract becomes the "voluntary agreement", a 
guileless change of expression for the same thing. 
A form of voluntary agreement becomes the "status" 
contract. The f1status" contract becomes a general 
category inclusive of every conceivable form of 
primitive agreement characteristic of pre-bourgeols 
social formations. The t1freelt contract disappears 
completely - because it was never really made an 
object of thought at the outset. 
4. The quantitative connection between "the 
market economyll and the legal form of the "free" 
contract counts merely as an empirical observation. 
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Theoretically it has the status of a merely 
analytic proposition: thus the commodity-form, 
the form of property simply in exchange ("the 
market economy") is already supposed in the notion 
of the "free" cnntract - already cogitated in the 
subject, as Kant might say. But property is 
not merely property in exchange, and so something 
else is also supposed In the "free" contract. In 
other words, to suppose property in exchange is 
to suppose property in another connection, a 
connection in which property in exchange is itself 
produced as such: property in the sphere of 
production. 
Under bourgeois conditions the commodity-form 
of property is the capital-form as it pertains to 
the sphere of circulation. But as such it bdlies 
itself; It does not come stamped with these 
particular origins. The sphere of circulation 
of commodities in fact appears quite alien to its 
real nature, I. e. the mechanism which works it. 
The commodity-form belies its capital-form in which 
labour-power is systematically exploited in the 
production thereof. 'ItT)he capitalist, " says Marx, 
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"again and again appropriates, without equivalent, 
a portion of the previously materialised labour 
of others, and exchanges it for a greater quantity 
of living labour. " Thus the process of capital 
accumulation. "ýIarx continues: 
At first the rights of property seemed to us 
to be based. on a man's own labour. At least, 
some such assumption was necessary since only 
commodity-owners with equal rights confronted 
each other, and the sole means by which a man 
could become possessed of the commodities of 
others, was by alienating his own commodities; 
and these could be replaced by labour alone. 
Now, however, property turns out to be the 
right, on the part of the capitalist, to 
appropriate the unpaid labour of others or 
its product, and to be the impossibility, on 
the part of the labourer, of appropriating 
his own product. The separation (from labour) 
(of property) has becoma tne necessary consequence 
of a law that apparently originated in their 
identity. 
It is in precisely this way that the legal form of 
the "free" contract or "voluntary agreement" also 
becomes more fully developed as its opposite 
compelled disagreement. The "free" contract is the 
legal expression of these same llcomnodlty-oiiners 
with equal rights (who) confronted each other... ", 
but its necessary consequence becomes the containment 
of disagreement. 
1- Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 ., p.. 547. 
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Perhaps a few words about this "containment 
of disagreement" are necessary. Pirstly, it is 
to be emphasised that our dealing with the "free" 
contract is a dealing with a form of modern law, 
that is to say, not as the law of contract as a 
specific branch of legal doctrine, but as an 
abstraction of Vie form of law as a whole, as a 
historically more "positive" expression of the 
role played by. the old social contract (which didn't 
need to be "positive" since, unlike this, it conformed 
with the scientific protocols of its day)- 
Secondly, the "containment of disagreement" which 
this passes into, therefore, is a containment in 
general - not a reconciliation of an individual 
breach of contract, but a containment of class 
divisions within society as a whole. The "free" 
contract is an abstract expression of legal language 
as a whole, a category within tUe legal language of 
equality. It therefore operates in the same contra- 
dictory way as this language gencrallynamely, under 
the auspices of power (as outlined in Pt. 1, 
Chapter 111). In speaking "freedom", therefore, 
the law's aim is just the opposite - constraint, 
not for freedom's sake, but for the sake of the 
property relations which it belies as a theoretically 




The merely empirical coruiection of the form 
of law with "the market" is very much "old hat". 
It is to be observed in Carlyle, for example, who 
saw the new equality of law ushered in and proclaimed 
by the French and other less dramatic bourgeois 
revolutions as coincidental with cash payment 
becoming increasingly the only remaining social 
nexus betwoen man and man. The legal historian, 
Maine, with none of the same talent, observed the 
replacement of all hitherto existing forms of 
social bondage by the relation of "free" contract. 
And the more recent historian, Tawnoy, tells us 
that with the eclipse of the ancien regime: 
All men, at least in theory, become equal 
before the law. -All men may enter all 
occupations. All men may buy and sell, 
trade and invest as they please. Above 
all, all men may acquire property of all 
kinds. And property itself claanges its 
nature. The element of sovereignty in it 
- such at least is the intention - vanishes. 
What remains is tile right of excluslv7 
disposal over marketable commodities. 
Here the commodity-connection of the legal form is 
sketched out. But it is still only a legal view, 
since the commodity-form is posited as the only 
f orm of property. "(A)II. knen may acquire property 
1. Tawney, Equality, p. 96. On Maine cf. post. 
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of all kinds" - this is not so. The worker, 
ceteris parlbus, cannot become an owner of capital; 
the condition of capitalist ownership is that the 
mass of people are systematically prevented from 
becoming owners of the means of production and 
hence purchasers of labour-power and appropriators 
of surplus-value. That form of property which 
"all men may acquire" is property in exchange, 
commodities, and "property of all kinds" does, 
indeed, take this form at one time or another. 
But it by no means follows therefore that "all men 
may acquire property of all kinds" not even "in 
theory at least", because it is a theoretical 
condition that "all men" do not have the means 
of acquiring "property of all kinds", regardless 
of its necessary appearance at some time or other 
in the sphere of exchange. The labourer, for 
instance, cannot be a purchaser of another's 
labour-power. 
It does absolutely no good to merely point 
to the existence, true though- it is, of the 
commodity-connectlon of the legal forra; for, it 
is precisely the commodity-form of property which 
belies its real (capitalist) inner nature. There 
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is no need to go into this any further since we 
have considered it elsewhere (especially in Pt. I 
Chapter 11). But it is symptomatically here, at 
the commodity-connection, that the empiricist 
historians and sociologists (Tawney, Weber etc. ) 
come to a complete Impasse. It is just at this 
pointýv, rhere it is generally forgotten what the 
relation in question was about, namely, a definite 
set of socio-historical circumstances In which law 
appears as a reflex of market conditions. Accordingly, 
the "origins" of this legal form become rooted 
out elsewhere - especially in Rome. This brings 
us to the subject-matter which we shall now deal 
i-rith: Rome, where the commodity-form was developed 
quite independently of the specific connections 
peculiar to its modern socio-legal character, where 
the commodity-form. was developed according to an 
altogether different mode of social production. 
Similar kinds of "originst' are also dredged from 
the feudal era, a matter which we shall also consider. 
Both cause and effect of these misplaced "origins" 
of the modern legal form is that it is never fully 
grasped in the first place and remains in the same 
state of mystery at the end of it all; it remains 
as it started, an underived commodity or "marketkl 
connection. 
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"Origins" and the Legal Form 
1. Roman law and the idea of its "reception". 
We showed in the last section how the cor. mnodity 
connection distinguishes hardly anything in respect 
of the form of law. This is so at least in so far 
as the material basis of such a connection is left 
out of the recknning, in so far as it remains a 
merely empirical, quantitative or analytic observation. 
Further, it islas such, i. e. as a merely empirical, 
quantitative etc. observation, that it becomes the 
basis for postulating the sameness of law in the 
most diverse of historical circumstances and 
conditions. 
The commodity connection is evident, for 
example, in the ancient Roman form of contract per 
aes et libram which appears as early as the 4th 
centu, ry B. C. Legal transactions per aes et libram. 
(through copper and balance) related to property 
in exchange. But the form of property in exchange 
here is a relation of slavery. The mancipatlo, 
with which these transactions were primarily associated, 
was a mode whereby slaves, land and cattle (res 
mancipi) were exchanged. The slave appears here, 
himself, as a commodity. On the other hand, the 
slave as property in use becomes the producer of 
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of property in exchange and is therefore, objectively, 
the producer of himself, i. e. as a slave. As -tire 
made clear in part 1, commodities and mono), in Roman 
times could only figure as such, as value relations, 
because and so far as they were posited by slave 
production. It can only have been the labour of 
slaves therefore, which rendered copper as a universal 
equivalent in those very early times. Hence, when 
a slave, a piece of land, cattle etc. exchanged for 
such and such an amount, that quantity could nnly 
be on average a portion of materialised slave labour. 
Thus on either side of the transaction per aes et 
libram we would have, say, a slave on the one side 
and a quantity of copper on the other. On each 
side we would therefore have, materially, the slave- 
labour which a. the slave embodied, in, for instance, 
the slave-produced grain etc. which he had converted 
into bone, muscle and so forth, and which b. the 
copper embodied, in its having been mined by slaves. 
Per aes et libram means, implicitly, a form of 
transaction grounded in slavery. Moreover, the same 
is true of the later Roman contractual forms, regard- 
less of their having been cleansed of the ritualistic 
elements characteristic of much earlier times. In 
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this connection, Maine, despite an earlier warning 
that, "the mistake of judging the men of other 
periods by the morality of our own day has its 
parallel in the mistake of supposing that every 
wheel and bolt in the modern social machine has its 
counterpart in more rudimentary societies, " senses 
no such I'mistake" -when he says a few pages further 
on, -with Roman developments alone in mind: 
The transformation of (the) ancient view 
(of contract) into the familiar notion of 
contract is plainly seen in the history of 
jurisprudence. First one or two steps in the 
ceremonial are dispensed with; then the 
others are simplified or permitted to be 
neglected on certain conditions; lastly, a 
few specific contracts are separated from the 
rest... the selected contracts bejmg those 
on which the activity and energy of social 
intercourse depend. 
Here, "the familiar notion of contract" is arrived 
at purely through a documentation of specifically 
Roman developments.; By the time Maine has arrived 
at the "consensual" contract juris gentium, he has 
somehow arrived also at the modern form of "free" 
contract; for, he says of the former: 
The motion of the will which constitutes 
agreement was now completely insulated, and 
became the subject of. separate contemplation; 
forms (he means the older ritualistic and 
cumbersome forms) were entirely eliminated 
from the notion of contract, and external acts 
were only regardV as symbols of the internal 
act of volition. 
1. Maine, Ancient Laur, PPs - 32.5,327. 
2. ibid., P-346. 
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All that is posited by the "internal act of 
volition" here is the exchange form of property, 
property as an object in exchange. In other words, 
all 'Maine expresses is the sameness of the Roman 
form on the basis of the commodity connection alone. 
But the conunodity form supposed in contracts juris 
Centium. is just as much a relation of slavery as 
in the case of the foregoing example of the 
transaction per aes et libram. And apart from 
this, tile idea of simply an "internal act of 
volition" is quite alien to the Ronan jurists, 
since there was no abstract willing subject 
capable of being produced, as a-legal conception, 
under slavery. I-Mat Maine effectively does is to 
covertly slip the "familiar notion of contract" 
into what he understands as the Ronan form. The 
net result is that neither the "familiar notion" 
nor the Roman form are properly grasped in their 
real connections. How the "internal act of 
volition" wills a relation of capital and wage 
labour in the one case and a relation of slavery 
in the other, Maine, needless to add, does not say. 
It is, of course, the "free" contract which 
Maine reads into tile contract juris Gentiun. The 
source of the error is that the "free" contract is a 
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relation not of commodity exchange per se, i. e. not 
of the historically gencral existence of commodity 
exchange, but(lof the historically specific existence 
of generalised commodity exchange. In thinking 
otherwise, 14aine cor-=its himself to the view that 
either the "familiar" contract is a relation of 
slavery or that "every wheel and bolt in the modern 
social machine has its counterpart in more 
rudimentary societies-" Similar errors arise in 
connection with the idea of the "reception" of 
Roman law, and to this we may now turn. 
It is quite strange that the idea of the 
"receptiont' of Roman law into modern legal 
institutions has attained almost the character of 
a statement of fact for modern legal thinking; for, 
even without much further thought about the m=tter, 
it poses the most elementary of logical problems. 
Roman law supposes the conditions of Roman law. 
If Roman law is "received". then so also must its 
conditions be similarly "received" - which is not 
the case. Therefore the "reception" of Roman law 
is not the Itreceptiont? of Roman law. 
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Weber, for examPle, says: 
Among the ancient jurists, as a result of the 
historically conditioned analytical nature of 
Roman legal thought, properly "constructive" 
ability, even though it was not entirely 
absent, was only of small significance. Now 
when this law was transposed into entirely 
strange fact situations ( 1. ), unknown in 
antiquity, the task of "construing" the 
situation (In the "strange fact situations") 
in a logically impeFcable way became almost 
the exclusive task. 
"In this way, " Ifeber adds, as if he had explained 
something, "that conception of law whi'ch still 
prevails to-day and which sees in law a logically 
consistent and gapless complex of 'norms' waiting 
to be "applied' became a decisive conception for 
legal thought. " "In this way, " as a matter of 
fact, "that ennception of law which still prevails 
to-day" is completely and utterly mystified. Firstly, 
in Roman times legal 111constructivet ability", Weber 
correctly observes, is "historically conditioned". 
The 111constructivel ability" of Roman legal thought, 
In other words, is a child of its time. This is a 
condition of Its nature as specifically Roman legal 
thought: It cannot "construct" as modern law because 
it is not materially furnished with abstract personality; 
it "constructs" therefore on an altogether different 
basis. Consequently, it is quite erroneous to go 
1. lereber, Law etc., p-277- 
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on and say that, "this law was transposed into 
entirely strange fact situations, " (by which is 
meant primarily bourgeois Itfact situations") 
because "this law" logically entails specifically 
Roman "'constructive' ability". If Roman 
"'constructive' ability' is "transposed ... 
(etc. )", 
then by that very act it is no longer distinctly 
Roman, because what originally distinguished it was 
the fact that the conditions for such a development, 
for becoming un-Roman, were logically antithetical 
to it. 
Roman constructive ability (there is no real 
need to have inverted commas around it - Ifeber's 
use of these is symptomatic of the erroneous attempt 
to give it a dual meaning) is a relation of slavery. 
This is its differentia specifica. Accordingly 
there is no abstract subject in Roman law; there 
is no material basis for such a thing as a self- 
sufficient legal category. The legal subject here 
is not abstract as a subject, but as a freedman, 
a Roman citizen and so forth. 
1 
The entire ground 
and foundation of Roman legal abstraction is the 
1. cf. Justinian, Institutes, Bk. 1, titles 3-8. 
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slave system which pre-deter. =nes the height, limit 
and form of all Its constructions. Hence Roman law 
is no more "received" in modern times than the 
system of slavery. 
Historical inquiry into the "reception" of 
Roman law, in so far as it is bent upon upholding 
the implied thesis, naturally has a self-defeating 
character about It. For, the more the matter is 
gone into, the more It transpires that Roman law is 
just and precisely that, i. e. Roman law, the law 
appropriate to specifically Roman conditions. 
"once the origination of an institution has been 
shown to be wholly to the purpose and necessary 
in the circumstances of the time, " said Hegel, 
"the demands of history have been fulfilled. tt 
Hegel also had the historicist error in mind, for 
he adds to this: 
Dut if this Is supposed to pass for a general 
justification of the thing itself, It turns 
out to be the opposite, because, since those 
circumstances are no longer present, the 
institution so far from being justified has 
by their dtsappearance lost its meaning and 
its rialit., 
1. HOGGI, Pll-ilosophY of Right, P-17. 
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Indeed, as Weber and others talk about the "reception" 
of Roman law, they fail completely to "justify" the 
form of law which they have in mind, i. e. bourgeois 
law, for their mode of "Justification" or reasoning 
here, in persisting with connections of a legal 
form grounded in slavery and lone since passed 
away, does just the opposite. In this connection, 
popular criticism (of Weber especially) which points 
to "bourgeois apologeties", "Just: Lf: Lcat: Lon of status 
quot' etc. etc. needs to think-again. 
1 
Naturally as Roman law transpires increasingly 
as something essentially connected with Roman conditions, 
it correspondingly becomes increasingly alien to 
the form of modern law - and the grounds of the 
"reception" agrument must accordingly be modified. 
Marxist criticism of Ileber is of ten vulgar: 
Weber becomos here the embodiment-of 11self- 
evident" falsities such as "Kantianism" 
(cf. ante), "liberal nominalism", "value- 
freedom'19 "empiricism" etc. etc. On the other 
hand, "sociological" adulation of Weber with 
the most inapproprIate of phrases and 
descriptions: "rigorous", "profound", "genius", 
"the answer to Marx", "Marx's intellectual 
equalf' (to be found in most sociology textbooks 
- even tho best, cf. Giddens, Capitalism and 
Modern Social Thoory)-- all tkiis is equally 
vulgar if not =3ýe so. 
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Such modification, however, doesn't alter the 
theoretical error; it merely disguises it. Thus 
the following is generally accepted: of course 
Roman law is not received in complexu, only certain 
of its elements - or some such argument of the kind. 
In Weber, for instqn. co,, the elements ttreceivedit 
turn on the "logical", t1formal*11, "rational" etc., 
characteristics of Roman law. Here is an Instance: 
As Ehrlich has properly emphasised, in order 
for them to be received at. all, the Roman legal 
institutions had to be cleansed of all remnants 
of national contextual association and to be 
elevated into the sphere of the logically 
abstract; and Roman law itself had to be 
absolutised as the very embodiment of right 
reason. The six centuries of civil law juris- 
prudence have produced exactly this result. 
At the same time, the modes of legal thought 
were turned moro and more in the direction of 
formal logic. The occasional brilliant apercus 
of the Roman jurists ... were torn out of the 
context of the concrete cases of the Pandects 
and were raised to the level of ultimate legal 
principles from iqýlch deductive arguments 
could be derived. 
But then, after six hundred years or so since the 
early glosses of the twelfth century, after all this 
so-called "cleansing", stripping and tearing from 
context etc., the question must arise as to what is 
particularly Roman about the result. The impression 
given by lieber is that there is something implicit 
1. Ifeber, Law etc. , p. 276-7. 
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in the Ro.,, ilan form which over the ages has rendered 
itself capable of extrapolation, "cleansing" etc. 
(this latter term is a typically German piece of 
arrogance in this connection). : In other words, we 
have here just another re-statement of the 
historicist error: the modern form is covertly 
pro-posited in the ancient, but here it is dormant, 
latent, unrealised (in fact, not there at all); 
however, thanks to the juristic labours of almost 
two millenia, the thing emerges fully fledged, 
completely "unfolded" in modern (but especially 
the German variety) legal science. German legal 
science: a sealed gift from Rome that had taken 
almost two millenia to uncover. This at least was 
the =essage of the pandectists of the Historical 
School - in no uncertain terms. But for Irober, 
"Kantian" that he is, this must be given the blessing 
of reason itsblf. The sealed gift is therefore 
the "rational" or Itlogical" elements contained 
within Roman legal thoiýght, and, not surprisingly, 
the perfect embodiment of rational legal thought is 
that body of doctrine developed by the modern 
(especially German) pandec. tist civil lawyers: 
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Savi, -, ny, Ifindscheid, Puclita, Unger etc. 
1 
But what does it mean to say that modern law 
has "received" the "logical", "rational" etc. elements 
of Roman law? By the same token present-day cuisine 
has "received" the logical elements of ancient 
Babylonian cookery, present-day mathematics has 
"receivedif the logical elements of Aztec construction, 
and so on and so forth. Logic, since its form is 
universal, is "received" by everytUing at all times 
in all places* 
2 
The "reception" of Roman law is basically a 
historicist error. In Weber it is disguised with 
a little "Kantianism" whereupon it appears in the 
forn of a "reception" of law as rational thought. 
Still, the underlying historicist error by no means 
disappears with this much-abused sleight-of-hand 
trick. In comparison with the nalvelties of the 
old Historical School, the modern legal form is 
1. of. Ehrlich, Principles of Sociology of Law, 
p, 319 et. seq., where the Roman connections of 
these thinkers appear much less mysterious 
than in ITober. 
2. In any case, as Hegel once had cause to point 
out, it was to a- considerable extent by dint 
of their being illogical, that the Roman 
jurists and praetors achieved their high 
distinction as legal thinkers; by considering, 
for example, that a filia was a f1lius in 
regard of the twelve tables, and so forth. 
cf. Hegel's discussion of Hugo's I'LeI31: buch", 
Philosophy of Right, p. 20. 
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here just as much covertly presupposed, in fact 
much more covertly presupposed, In the ancient form. 
The only difference is that now the legal form is 
no longer a principle of equality, but rather a 
rational technique in the application of "norms" 
to "fact situations". 
Quite apart from the fact that t1rationality"I 
"logical form" etc. can be abstracted from literally 
anything, and can therefore connect literally anything 
together (obviously at the most ind ifferent and 
superficial level - at the analytic level of mere 
being, to give it its precise philosophical expression), 
there is still the question as to why so many 
hundreds of commentators have persisted with the 
idea of the "receptIont' of the Roman into the modern 
legal form. The basis of this is the commodity- 
connection of the legal form which is clearly 
apparent in both bourgeois and later Roman law. 
This, at any rate, is the basis for the association 
in modern times (in Haine and Weber, for example). 
But the whole issue is easi ly confused by the 
immensely complicated historical developments 
connecting Roman and feudal law - which is an 
entirely different matter. Generally these 
developments have much to do with the position of 
the Roman church throughout the Middle Ages. The 
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The first ttreception" of Roman law thus occurs 
in Italy and Southern France around the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries, at whicli time the first 
glosses are made upon the Roman sources. But the 
practical application of Roman law under feudal 
conditions was impossible, and the medieval jurists 
in effect were set with an unworkable forced error 
at the hands of the Rom-an church. The inevitable 
result was that Roman law, so far as it became 
anything other than an esoteric pursuit, became 
feudalised, i. e. no longer Roman law but feudal 
law in Roman style. The material basis of this 
subsists in the antithesis of property relations- 
arising from slavery art the one hand, and property 
relations arising from the feudal system of land- 
tenure on the other. Ehrlich shows a sense of this 
when he says: 
At the time of the (medieval) reception, 
irresoluble questlons.. cried out to the 
Continental jurists' from every line of the 
corpus juris. Had they been men of scientific 
training, lot us say of the Historical School 
of Savigny or of the modern sociological 
school (sic), they ivrould never have undertaken 
this task (of applying the Roman sources). 
They would have said to themselves at the 
outset: The kind of ownership that the 
sources speak of does not exist among us; the 
unfree person thýt we are dealing with is not 
the Roman slave. 
1. Ehrlich, ibid., P300 
Why the bourgeois "reception" should be any less 
contradictory, "scientific" no less, Ehrlich does 
not say. But we have seen how "scientifically" 
the ILIstorical School "receives" Its Roman law, 
namely, on condition that the latter Is first made 
the disguised embodiment of the bourgeois principle 
of right; in other words, with a not dissimilar 
"scientifib" spirit from that of the medieval jurists 
who in their day dredged from It similarly impossible 
principles of feudal right. 
There are two "receptions" of Roman la-.. t: the 
medieval and the bourgeois. They are, in their 
completely different ways, equally contradictory 
affairs. This is because the property relations 
of bourgeois society (wage labour, capital - 
generalised commodity-oi.; nership etc. ), of feudal 
society (feudal land-tenture) and of ancient 
society (slavery) all correspond with very definite 
and specific forms of law that are inextricably 
bound up therewith. History, however, isn't as 
clear-cut as this, and one *especial confusion 
over the "reception" may be illustrated in this 
connection. It concerns the uneven development 
of societies. In the seventeenth century, for 
example, Holland is taking great steps towards 
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maturity as a bourgeois society, whereas Germany 
is still, quite definitely, feudal. The Dutch 
jurists are therefore working upon the Roman sources 
from a bourgeois standpoint while their German 
counterparts are still involved with the distinctly 
medieval usus modernus of the Roman pandects. It 
is only in, the nineteenth century that the Germans 
begin to consider Roman law in anything resembling 
a distinctly bourgeois connection, whereupon the 
older medieval conceptions of the usus modernus 
are vigorously repulsed for their "unsclentifict' 
character. Corresponding with this, the German 
Imperial Code at the end of the n: Lnet*eenth century 
systematically overrides a w1iole mass of medieval 
"Roman influences" within the old common law. Sohm 
expresses the belated arrival of the new bourgeois 
notion of the "reception" w1hen he says of this code: 
In the code all regulations focus in the private 
individual, considered in the abstract. It 
deals with property, family and inheritance. 
Not the farmer nor the nobleman is considered; 
only the legally eligible subject, the abstract 
unit of the jus gentium being, here in evidence. 
Tlais unit or person appears in but one capacity 
- either as creditor or debtor; and this 
conception may be truly said t? embody the 
highest ideal of the merchant. 
Solim, Institutes of Roman Law, cited in Lee's 
Historical Jurisprudcnce, p. 41.5. 
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A distinctly bourgeois code: "the private 
individual considered in the abstractitp namely, 
as the owner of property in exchange -a result of 
generalised commodity-ownership. But as quick as 
li, ghtening-this commodity-connection is swept back 
to Rome, generalised commodity-ounorship becomes 
conflated with commodity-ownership in general, 
"the abstract unit of the jus gentium (appears) 
in evidence"... Thus the bourgeois "reception" of 
Roman law: basically the historicist error, a 
mode:. -of expressing complete indifference to the 
form of commodity-ownership and thus the form of 
law also, both Roman and modern.. 
To repeat: the commodity-connection of the 
persona juris gentium is a relation of slavery; 
this Itabstract unit of the jus gentium" is conditioned 
In form and content by slaverys just as was the 
development of the exchange economy upon which it 
arose as a legal form. As we remarked in Chapter II, (part 
the development of exchange rel ations here is in 
contradiction with its basis, because the rational 
and unhindered development of exchange demands the 
equalisation of human labour. Slavery becomes the 
irrational limit to any further development of the 
productive forces actuated thereupon, and the historical 
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result of this contradiction between the relations 
and forces of production is the eventual disintegration 
of the Roman Empire. This, furthermore, is the 
secret behind the much-observed but little-understood 
struggle b6tween imperial law and the jus gentium 
in the later Empire. The jus gentium, or 11la, %-i 
of nations" is the legal form of the expansion of 
those productive forces on the surface of exchange; 
hence, almost all contracts are juris gentium. It 
is this legal form which increasingly "sees no reason" 
in slavery, which is the fetter upon the social 
development of the economic relations upon which it 
arises as a legal form. It Is therefore a threat 
working under the very foundations of the Roman 
imperium. No slavery, no ancient civilisation. 
And imperial power accordingly (more or less 
unconsciously) struggles to contain the "law of 
nationst'. 
But to return to our main point, the latent 
demand for "individuality" to which the development 
of the persona juris gentium bears witness, has 
nothing to do with "concealed" bourgeois Individuality; 
it Is a symptom of the impending fortunes of slavery 
and the Roman imperium. The persona juris Gentium 
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is no less a relation of slavery for the fact that 
it is a contradiction within itself. The "abstract 
unit of the jus Gentium", to use the words of 
Sob=, is a legal relation of slavery and is no more 
"in evidencelf in the modern legal form than is the 
slave in the modern factory or the Roman centurion 
in the modern army. In the juridical vein, which 
guilelessly constitutes a "reception" of Roman law 
here, it is "inadmissible evidence". 
In summary, the Roman "origins" of the modern 
legal form are constituted on the basis of a historicist 
error, basically the error of conflating the legal 
evidence of generalised commodity relations with 
the legal evidence of commodity rolations in Roman 
times (i. e. commodity relations in general). This, 
sche=atically at any rate, is the mode upon which 
the modern t1reception" is articulated. It is, of 
course, a product of bourgeois society and thus 
beco=es distinguished historically from the medieval 
"reception" as bourgeois legal relations begin to 
emerge in the general transition from feudalism 
to capitalism. But to view the bourgeois "receptiont' 
as "scidntificit, "rational" etc. on this account 
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(as do Ehrlich and Weber, for example), i. e. in mere 
contradistinction from the overtly irrational medieval 
plagiarism of tile Roman sources, in other words 
merely "because it is bourgeois" (if the expression 
may be pernatted) - this just glorifies the 
historicist error. And it is really hardly any 
better than the commonplace historical descriptions 
of the "receptiont' that do not even bother to 
distinguish the medieval from the modern in any 
shape or form, that describe an unterrupted continuum 
beginning around about the time of the re-discovery 
of the Justinian Digest at Almalfi in the twelfth 
century and proceeding through the various glosses 
and "applications" in the feudal era, and then, as 
if the exact "same tfUng" is at work, to the blossoming 
of Romanism in the works of the great jurists in 
Holland in tile sixteenth century, Scotland in the 
seventeenth century, France in the eighteenth, 
Germany in the nineteenth and so on and so forth. 
But having got at tile essential elements of the 
Roman ItoriginsIt of modern law, we must now pass on 
to other matters. 
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ItStatus" distinctions 
The "origins" of t1le modern legal forn, it 
should now be apparont, reside in modern society 
and nowhere else. 
1 
lie have concentrated so far 
primarily upon ancient "origins" in this connection, 
but it would not be merely for the sake of symmetry, 
to look briefly at the possibility of feudal "origins". 
Unlike the case of 'the Roman form, there Is no 
notion of the-11reception" of feudal law into the 
Ehrlich summarises his Principles of the 
Sociology of La-; %r in the following sentence: 
"At the present as well as any other time, the 
centre of gravity of legal development lies 
not in legislation, nor in juristic science, 
nor in judicial decision, but in socioty 
itself. " - foreword, ibid. It is a pity that 
Ehrlich didn't notice the extent to which 
"Juristic science" encroached upon the domain 
which he marked out as the sociology of law, 
throwing his investigations well outside this 
gravitational field. Of course, to make 
statements about the social character of law 
just in so many words is a very easy thing 
to do, whereas to remain consistent with this 
principle is an altogether different matter. 
Such a consistency, needless to add, requires 
a recognition of the cardinal "juridical 
sins" all of which promote the apparently 
ahistorical character of law In an innumerable 
variety of disguises - in general they are (methodologically speaking) the "sins" of 
"Hantlanism", historipism, 
.. etc., but it must be remembered that it is also easy 
to say this "Just in so many words". 
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modern legal form; but there is a Popular notion 
which connects the feudal with the modern (yet not 
in so many words, since the feudal form is never 
properly distinguished, as it ought to be, from 
the ancient form in this connection), it is the 
idea of the development of law from "status" to 
contract. Wo shall first consider the kinds of 
connections that are implied by this idea as it i-ras 
initially expounded by the legal historian, Maine. 
And secondly, more importantly, we shall consider 
the real connections of status law proper, namely, 
not as a connection of the modern legal form, but 
as the form of law of feudal society. 
It was the legal historian, Ilaine, who popularised 
the idea of "status to contract" as a description 
of the historical development of legal relations. 
Ile says: 
The-,: movement of progressive societies has been 
inliform in one respect. Through all its course 
it has been distinguished by the gradual 
dissolution of family dependency, and the 
growth of individual obligation in its place. 
The individual is steadily substituted for the 
farxily, as the unit'of which civil laws take 
account ... Nor is it difficult to see what is 
the tio between man-and man which replaces 
by degroes the forms of reciprocity in rights 
and duties which have their origin in the family. 
It is contract. Starting, as from one terminus 
of history, from a condition of society in which 
all/ 
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all the relations of persons are summed up in 
the relations of the family, we seem to have 
moved steadily towards a phase of social 
order In which all these relations arise from 
the free agreement of individuals ... 
(w)e may 
say that the movement of progressive societies 
has hithe T to been a movement from status to 
contract. 
Azain, pre-capitalist society (Maine never bothers 
to distinguish any particular pre-capitalist social 
formation in this connection) figures merely as 
something uponwhich the modern might be articulated. 
The only difference is that whereas here we have 
the individual, tilero we have its opposite, the 
Croup, the family. But even this is hardly a 
difference, since the individual here is the 
expression of a group in being "the unit" of which 
civil laws take account", and by this same token, 
the family becomes conceived under the legal form 
of individuality. In any case, if we look at 
the most important older legal forms, the contract 
juris gentium for example, there is nothing of the 
"familYtin it. Even in the case of the paterfamilias, 
tUe Ronan legal unit subsuming all that was contained 
within the familia (slaves, children etc. ), its 
basis is not the t1family"13ut the economic. -system 
upon which the fari: Ll: La, as such, arose, namely the 
slave system, the "oriCint' of the Roman legal form 
in f; eneral. 
1. inaino, Ancient Law, P-172-4. 
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Maine connects "status" and "contract" in a 
Journey-liko fashion. The connective, which places 
them at opposite ends of the same road, av it were, 
is that they both similarly express the "tie between 
man and man", that is to say, they both express this 
thing legally. Still, every legal expression is of 
a "tie boti-reon man and mn" in one way or another, 
and so the connective boils doim to the fact that 
both "status" and "contract" are categories of law, 
which is only a sufficient reason for being a 
connective in so far as it is the same law which is 
under consideration. in Maine this is the case. 
For, he is talking all the time about bourgeois law, 
while giving the impression that he is talking about 
just the opposite. Hence, in talking of "status" 
he really talks about "contract". In this way, 
"status" figures as a "form of reciprocity in 
rights and duties", a "unit of which civil laws 
take account", a "tie between inan and man" - terms 
which can describe the modern form and the modern 
form alone. The Itstatusll relation can have nothing 
to do with firociprocity" (mutual give and take), 
cannot possibly figure as a legal "unit" implying 
the relation of equality, the relation of merely 
Itman and man". This is the form of contract, i. e. 
1)6- -3ý 
of the modern legal relation. Maine's celebrated 
"status to contract" is, in fact, contract to Itstatus" 
and back again. 
1 In other words, the j-, lodern form, 
which is all about "contract", "reciprocity", 
"Maine's now celebrated dictum as to the movement 
from status to contract, " says Pollock, who 
wrote some notes to Maine's book, "is perhaps 
to be understood as limited to the law of 
property, taking that term in its widest sense 
as inclusive of whatever has a value measureable 
in exchange" - Ibid., P-183- Pollock, however, 
did not mean here that Maine's "status to 
contract" was nothing more tiaan a historicist 
embellishment of generalised commodity-relations. 
His objection was rather that IMaine had 
considered his "status to contract" in relation 
to the legal form of "persons", i. e. the 
"individual", "man and man" etc. - forgetting, 
of coursev that the legal form of "person. 511 
here is, precisely, the legal form of property 
in exchange. But Pollock, whose Gaze focused 
backwards to the tradition of Coke, Bracton 
and Blackstone, found any number of "bouraeoist' 
developments distasteful - the erosion of the 
old doctrine of privity of contract, for 
instance, and, in the present case, the idea 
that the legal person reduced itself to a 
matter of contract. "rholaw of persons", 
he says, "may be and has been cut short; but 
so long as we recognise any differences at 
all among persons we cannot allow their 
existence and nature to be treated merely as 
a matter of bargain. " - ibid. Sentiments 
worthy of a knightly champion of the common 
law: Honi soit qui*mal y pense. cf. Sir 
F. Pollock and F. 17.11aitland, History of 
English Law. 
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"man and man" etc., in a word, a Ceneralised 
equivalent form, automatically posits its opposite 
as "status" or, at any rate, a relation of 
inequality, privilege, distinction etc. But as 
soon as this opposition, this t1status", is formed, 
It is made to return to that which initially posited 
it as a merely negative reflex of itself, namely, 
the modern form. Thus "status", having never really 
been anywhere outside the modern form, returns to 
contract; it becomes a form of "reciprocity", a 
relation of Itman and mant', an abstract "unit" of 
legal thought etc. But we know that this language 
of equality has just the opposite of the ttstatus" 
relation in mind. Hence, Maine's thesis in truth 
is not "status to contract", but "status-as-contraettl 
-a purely imaginary historical journey, since 
"status" never really leaves contract. "Status to 
contract" is just a superficial appearance of 
contract posited as self-reflected opposition, 
journeying back to itself, reaffirming itsolfýby 
seeing only itself in that to i.. rhich it is opposed. 
But before he turns "status" into contract, 
Maine aý least brings out first of all that w1iich 
the form of contract itself tells us (at the merely 
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analytic level), namely, that contract opposes 
"status". Or, more generally, equality opposes 
inequality. Maine, of course, t1nen proceeds to 
try and refute the analytic propo sition here (a 
slieer impossibility since analytic propositions 
are alirays true), i. e. by turning "status" (inequality) 
into contract (equality - "man and man't, "unit" 
of law etc. ). Departing from the analytic principle 
in a more appropriate direction, we G. et the following 
general historical proposition: "status", so far 
as law is concerned, is firstly a mark of pre- 
capitalist law (Maine, of course, can only imply 
this, whereas by turning t1statusIt into the form 
of contract he contradicts this implication)- 
Still, this distinguishes very little. Left here, 
"status" becomes applicable to totally different 
forms of law - ancient and feudal law for example. 
Indeed, at this level of indifference, I'statusit 
may be deemed applicable to bourgeois law, to 
isolated instances such as diplomatic immunity, 
parliamentary privilege, or even the legal distinctions 
that are made on the grounds of sanity, aGe and so 
forth, which are all Itstatus" distinctions of one 
kind or another that are recog,,, nIsed in modern law. 
Clearly we have-not departed very far from the 
analytic principle with t'-, is ninor development of 
the historical sense of "status. " 
]Regarding bourgeois society, ancient 
society etc. it needs hardly be said that 
we have always supposed primarily only the 
abstract average conditions behind their 
respective systems of property relations. 
Thus in connection with ancient society we 
mention primarily the slave and his master, 
even though empiric-ally a whole host of 
further distinctions may be made. The 
same is true in regard of the wage-labourer 
and the capitalist in bourgeois societyq 
where clearly not everyone is either a 
wage-labourer or a capitalist. These 
class relations (master/slave, capitalist/ 
wage-labourer) are nevertheless the 
scientific indIcia around which the 
respective systems of property relations 
(hence law) are established. Similarly, 
the abstract relation of lord and serf in 
regard of feudal society, with which we 
are now dealing, is naturally an abstraction. 
Still, it is of no less value for the 
fact that feudal society is par'excellence 
the ground of innumerable class distinctions, 
for this manifold nevertheless coalesces 
around either the abstraction of serf 
or lord. 
"In England, modern society is 
indisputably most highly and classically, 
developed in economic structure. Never- 
theless, even here the stratification of 
classes does not appear in its pure form. 
Middle and intermediate strata even here 
obliterate lines of demarcation everywhere 
. oo However, this is immaterial for our 
analysis. " - Marx, Capital, Vol. 111 , p. 88.5. 
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"Status", if it is to become a scientifically 
reputable socio-legal category, must be grounded 
in a definite form of law. The ground of status 
law (to rolieve it from its inverted commas) is 
feudal society. 
Status law is a relation of lord and serf 
in the same abstract way that Roman law is a relation 
of slavery and modern law a relation of capital and 
wage-labour. Status law is the legal reflex of the 
feudal system of landed property. Let us see how 
this connection comes about. 
Feudal society is articulated around a distinct 
mode of production ,a distinct system, of property 
relations. It is based neither upon slavery nor 
capital and wage-labour, even though villeinaGe 
often approached the condition of slavery and 
worse, and quite regardless of the fact that "free" 
hired-labour was not uncommon as well as largo 
accumulations of merchant capital (especially in 
later feudal times). 
Under feudalism the serf, unlike the waGe- 
labourer under modern conditions or the slave under 
ancient conditions has a property-right in a portion 
of the means of production. The serf is neither oimed 
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as a means of production (the case of the slave), 
nor is lie completely separated from o-%, rnersliip of 
the means of production (the case of the "free" 
wage-labourer). The peculiar relation of the direct 
producer to the means of production in feudal 
society, as is the case with all societies, determines 
the specific social form of property in that 
society and therewith its form of law. In 
bourgeois society this relation is one of complete., 
separation of the direct producer from ownership 
of the means of production; the wage-labourer 
must therefore sell as a commodity his ability to 
create value to the owner of those means; the 
capital-form of property here appears in the form 
of Generalised commodity-oimership, and the specific 
legal form which arises thereupon appears as an 
abstract subject, and so forth - tUese connections, 
we have, of course, dealt with in detail elsewhere. 
Similarly, in Roman times this relation of the 
direct producer to the means of production consists 
in the direct producer being oirned as a means of 
production, i. e. as a slave, and this in turn 
posits. the form of Roman law - connections which 
we have also dealt with in detail elsewhere. 
Similarly again, in feudal society, which we have 
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not said a great deal about, the relation of the 
serf to the land, the specific conditions of this 
relation, determines the form of law here - status 
law. lie s1iall now give an outline of these 
connections. 
The serf has a right to a portion of the moans 
of production (his strip of land, for instance) on 
condition that surplus-labour is performed by him 
for his lord (in one form or another: but, as we 
have already noted, we are dealing here with an 
abstracted average set of conditions in regard 
of feudal property relatlons). having a right to 
property, the serf naturally becomes recognised 
as a person in law; but having the right to property 
in this particular way, namely, on condition that 
he works, for example, three days on his own land 
and three days on his master's (resting on the 
seventh), means that, as a legal entity, he is not 
the same as his master. As a legal entity, the 
serf is unequal with other legal entities. In 
other words, the form of law is status law. The 
serf has his rights and duties, and the master has 
his, and their different status as legal entities 
is directly refle, cted in feudal law. This, it is 
of'. ' . 
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crucial to point out (especially to English legal 
historians), is not because one is landlord and 
the other tenant in the sense of the modern landlord 
and tenant agreement. The feudal form is completely 
and utterly different on account of the specific 
form of property underlying it. The modern landlord 
and tenant are not differing types of legal person; 
their distinction, which is made for obvious technical 
reasons, is made on the basis of their fundamental 
equality as legal persons and has nothing to do 
with status distinction. It is only the feudal 
property relation which is reflected as status law, 
as a heterogeneity of separate right-holders. 
Roman law has notaing of this because the direct 
producer, the slave, does not need to be considered 
as a legal person. Modern law has nothing of this 
because tile direct producer, the wage-labourer, 
is considered as an equal with all others as a legal 
person. 
The serf is distinguished from the slave in 
that he is a person in law, and from the "free" 
wage-labourer in that he Is an unequal person in law. 
This, schematically, is how feudal law is to be 
distinguished as specifically status law. Before 
ive look at this matter in a little more detail, 
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it Is to be pointed out that this is no mere 
quibble about the use of the word "status", yet 
nor does it seek to be dogmatic about the use of 
this word in connection with legal matters. Indeed, 
it is quite sensible to want to sa-, - that the Roman 
citizen had a special 11statust' in Roman law, or 
that the member of parliament has a special "status" 
on the floor of the house of Commons in having a 
certain immunity from libel laws in this connection, 
and so forth. But then, the word "status" here is 
only of descriptive weight and has no theoretic 
bearina so far as the form of law is concerned; 
hence the form of privilege-right in question is 
never distinguished from one case to the next by 
calling then all instances of "status" law. 
Lot us say a little more about tae social form 
of property under feudal conditions. The serf has 
property in land on condition that he performs 
surplus labour for his master. Surplus and necessary 
labour, as Marx often used to point out in contra- 
distinction from the capitalist mode, are here 
separated in space and t ime. That which the serf 
produces for himself on his own piece of land, i. e. 
his means of subsistence, is clearly and distinctly 
separated from that which he produces for his master 
on his master's estate. The relation of exploitation 
is therefore quite explicit; the serf must produce 
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not only for hinself, but for his lord too by 
viture of the latter's monopolistic position in 
relation to the conditions of land tenure. The 
lord, really, is'the law. And on the business of 
the serf's legal rights it is to be pointed out 
that, although certain forms of action were 
available to him if the lord treated him "wronGfully", 
such evidence must be treated with far more caution 
than is characteristic of the legal history books. 
The fact that the feudal lord was often effectively 
the arbiter of right and wrong, that he presided 
over his own court of law, that he had God on his 
side, that he had a monopoly over the means of 
physical coercion amongst other th1nas (e. g. his 
ownership of the mill for the grinding of corn) 
- all this tends to be overlooked by the legal 
historians who think that they get at the real 
character of feudal law by fastidiously poring over 
the forms of action written down in Glanvill. 
Indeed, had the various rights of the feudal tenant 
vis a vis his lord been so siGnificant, there 
could have been no general historical expropriation 
of the. peasantry (which occurred at different times 
and in different ways in all the modern capitalist 
a 
cf. Maitland, Forms of Action etc. and, more 
recently, Milsom, Tlie Legal Structure of 
Feudalism. 
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nations); hence no creation of a mass of "free" 
wage-labourers, no transformation of merchant 
capital into industrial capital, no growth of tUe 
towns and citiesg no eclipse of feudalism, In a word, 
no modern society. 
This latter point brings us to something which 
is rather important in regard of the heterogeneous 
cdaracter of feudal law. For, the natural economy 
of feudal society, I. e. the simple relation of lord 
and serf to the land, is as we have already noted, 
an abstraction of the form of feudal society. Thig 
relation does not exist in the towns and cities. 
Accordingly, the development of tj'. ie towns, urban 
development in general upon the basis of manufacture, 
handicrafts etc., is a development which eventually 
stands in an antithetical position in relation to 
the. feudal system as such which is based upon 
agriculture. Let us illustrate what this means. 
The towns are the centres of commercial activity, 
of the production of luxury and other Goods circulated 
by the capital of the merchant. But production here 
is still in the hands of the guildmaster and his 
journeymen, who are craftsmen owning their own 
instruments of production and bound together in a 
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caste-like manner. As such the guild-system poses 
no threat to dominant system of feudal property in 
landt since the capital of the merchant can only 
purchase from the guildsmen their products, but 
not the guildsmen themselves nor their instruments 
of production from which they are inseparable. 
The strict regulation of the guild-system, which 
becomes one of the heterogeneous elements within 
feudal law as a whole, thus limits the scale of 
production. The merchant or usurer who has 
accumulated a considerable amount of money cannot 
simply assemble together the instruments of 
production under one roof and invite the skilled 
craftsmen to come along and start producing for 
him. The guilds have first to be broken up. Such 
a process corresponds with the expansion of 
production, the growth of the urban areas, the 
ruin of the feudal landlord who falls within the 
clutches of the usurer because the surplus which 
the former extracts from his serfs cannot compensate 
for the new consumption levels to ihich he has 
become accustomed as a result of this general 
expansion of production. As the guilds become 
a fetter upon the devLalopment of manufacture, so 
the feudal system of land tenure becomes a fetter 
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upon the production of agricultural goods. As 
tUe feudal land-oinier becomes increasingly dis- 
contented with the living provided for him by his 
serfs, as he becomes increasingly the market for 
the various luxuries that are brought his iray by 
the merchant who is encouraging at the same time 
the break-up of the guilds and the general 
expansion of production in the urban areas, as all 
this is taking place, this same land-oimer must 
"rationalisell his own methods of production to 
compensate, i. e. he must become more oppressive, 
must extract more surplus from his serfs. 
1 But 
this is not enough at a certain stage: where the 
commutation of specific services into money payments 
is not feasable, the landowner begins to throw his 
peasants off the land in order to meet the productive 
levels that are beina set for him in the towns and 
cities. At the same time, the reasants who are 
expropriated drift towards these toims and cities 
and form a readily available source of "free" labour 
Empirically this process would gather 
momentum such that the lowest classes of the 
feudal order feel the oppression worst: The 
lord would become more oppressive upon his vassals, 
who in'turn would pass the buck on to 
their serfs, and these if they were bettex%- 
off serfs, onto their employees. 
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for the fast expanding "capitalist" system of 
manufacture. Eventually this process (which is 
long and protracted and by no means so simple as 
we have described it) spells the ultimate demise 
of feudalism and the transition to capitalism as 
the dominant mode of social production. 
The growth of the urban areas in the 1%1iddle 
Ages and the expansion of production and trade which 
this brings is in latent opposition to feudalism, 
but as such it is still a feudal development just 
as the growth of commerce and trade throughout the 
Roman hý, ipire was nevertheless distinctly a Roman 
development. The "empirical" character of this 
opposition is expressed by Marx when he says, 
"If the country-side exploits the town politically 
in the Middle Ages. the town, on the other hand, 
exploits the land economically everywhere and 
without exception, through its monopoly prices, Its 
guild organisation, its direct commercial fraudulence 
and its usury. " 
1 
This opposition only becomes 
"theoretical" as the guildsmen become separated 
from their means of product; ion, as the resulting 
Marx, Capital Volý 111, p. 801. 
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exeeptional Increase in the production of 
manufactured goods begins to pose a real threat 
to the production of agricultural goods still under 
a purely feudal Integument, as the feudal landlord 
becomes compelled to alter his productive methods 
and begins to throw his peasants from their land, 
i. e. to separate these also from their means of 
production. It is only once this general separation 
of the direct producers from the means of production 
has begun that it gains momentum and begins to 
destroy the feudal system of property. Italy in the 
11iddle Ages is an early and somewhat Isolated example 
of the beginnings of such a process, -where, as 
Marx points out, exceptional urban developipent 
breaks feudalism down. 
1 
To this extent the city 
laws, the particular forms of guild regulation here 
are not strictly feudal. 
cf. Dobb, Studies in the Development of 
Capitalis, m. "In Florence in 1338 there were 
said to be as many as 200 workshops engaged 
In cloth nanufacture, employing a total of 
30,000 work-men or about a quarter of the whole 
occupied population-of the city; and bitter 
struggles were waged over the workman's right 
of independent organization. " - i. e. over the 
workman's (feudal) right to a portion of the 
means of production. ibid. P-1.57. 
cf. also Streezy, Transition from Feudalism to 
Capitalism. 
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Reflecting these developments on the legal side 
of things, Mirlich says, OtUe city soon became very 
important, and achieved a considerable measure of 
independence, which in effect placed it outside the 
feudal constitution. The feudal constitution, in 
fact, has always remained a constitution of the 
open country. WithIn the walls of the city... for 
the first time fully developed legal institutions 
were expressed in a number of legal propositions: 
the law of real property, of pledge, of contract, 
of Inheritance. 11 
1 
It is these particular legal 
davelopments which correspond with the economic 
growth of the cities and which therefore come into 
confrontation with status law as the of the 
land" in accordance with the general eclipse of 
feudalism. Dut so far as the separation of the 
direct producers from the means of production has 
not properly begun, in other words, so far as 
property is still feudal property, law is still 
predominantly status law and the legal developments 
in the cities remain merely a heterogeneous element 
existing insignificantly alongside it. 
EhrlicU., Principles atc., P-34. 
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As feudal property relations are progressively 
shattered througli the gradual separation of the 
direct producers from their means of subsistence 
production, so status law grad uall. - gives way to 
the birth of a now legal form. And here, historically 
at the dawning of bourgeois society, we approach, 
at last, the movement from status to contract. 
Certainly this movement corresponds with a long 
and protracted historical process - but not over 
the wholo of history. Feudal remnants are long 
carried over into the new era, sometimes gradually 
disappearing in an apparently piecemeal fashion 
as in England, sometimes Going with an apparently 
"clean swoop" as in France. For this reason, we 
shall see in our next section, an important debate 
has arisen in legal sociology about the "irrationality" 
of Enalish law, but which for rather different 
reasons passes into a debate not quite the same. 
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Let-al RationalitX 
Lot us locate t1le subject-mattor of this 
section with a few propositions. Eýiglish legal 
lWhought, t according to Max ober, displays a 
I'dog-ree of legal rationality (which) is essentially 
lower than, and of a type different from, that of 
continental Druope. 11 
1 The quantitative "degree... 
lower than't does not, of itself, yield the qualitative 
"different type". Quantitative difference may or 
may not pass into qualitative difference; water 
only becomes steam at one hundred dog-roes centigrade. 
Contrary to Weber's supposition, English legal 
thought is not of a. "different typot' from that of 
continental Europe. On t! ie other hand, English and 
continental European legal thought have their 
"degrees" of difference. 
Continental European law (here, as throughout, 
we mean modern law) is very rational, says Weber, 
because it "received" tho rational elements of 




Conversely, English law is less 
rational because it didn't. The truth of the 
matter is that the jurists on the continent 
historicised their law on a more rational terrain 
(Rome), wnereas the Unglish jurists h1storicised 
their same "boureeois" law on feudal soil. 
cf. ante, on the "reception". Ifebor's "ideal 
type" of modern legal rationality in this 
connection is given as follows: "Present-day 
legal scienceg at least in those forms which 
have achieved the hiChest measure of method- 
ological and logical rationality, i. e. those 
which have been produced through the legal 
science of the Pandectistst Civil Law, proceeds 
from the following five postulates: viz., 
first, that every concrete legal decision be 
thellapplication" of an abstract legal proposition 
to a concrete "fact situation"; second, that 
it must be possible in every concrete case 
to derive the decision from abstract legal 
propositions by means of legal logic; third, 
that the law must actually or virtually 
constitute a "Capless" system of local 
propositions, or must, at least be treated 
as if it were such a Gapless system; 
fourth, that whatever cannot be "construed" 
legally in rational terms is also legally 
irrelevant; and fifth, that every social 
action of human beings must always be 
visualised as either an "application" or 
"execution" of legal propositions, or as an 
"infringement" thoreof. t' - Ibid., p. 64. 
Only bourgeois law, or rather the description 
thereof, could possibly be so odourless, 
colorless and, above allq tasteless. 
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The real ground of Weber's arguments here is 
therefore the ancient as opposed to the feudal, 
wliere the abundant superiority of the noble Romans 
in all matters concernina the rational is 
indisputable. The profound truth of this is that 
it comes through in spite of Weber's observations: 
continental legal thought is "more rational". 
But before we go on to look at this, there is 
an underhand motif which Weber slips in belUnd 
these differences of modern leZal thought that 
deserves special mention. It is a notion not 
unconnected with the assumption that these 
differences constitute differing 11typesO of legal 
thought; it is the notion that capitalist social 
organisation is not ltdecisivelt in regard of the 
form of law. Whereas Weber's elusive quantitative 
description of things enablGd him to posit sameness 
in connection with Roman la-w (as we saw earlier), 
here it enables him in the same arbitrary manner 
to posit difference. Again it may be noted that 
to talk merely in terms of the quantitative: degree, 
measure, scope, extension, intension, more, less, 
greater, smaller etc. etc. (Weber's entire sociology 
is packed irith this lwý, guage), 
1 
leaves the qualitative 
1. Cf. Ivreber's Econouly and Society generally. 
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wide open to idle speculation - an ambiguity which 
Ifeber exploits to the full with I. Lis "value-free" 
prejudices. 'Weber never says -%, rI-iy the less rational 
qualities of English law should amount to a differing 
form or "type" of law - and by "type" it is only 
rational to suppose tuat he means legal form (in 
our sense), that is, in so far as he connects it 
with specifically capitalist social organisation. 
Briefly, Weber's position here is this. 
Britain and Europe (-%, re use the term IfDuropell as 
an abstraction of tlie continental European 
jurisdiction) are capitalist societies at roughly 
the same stage of development; but on account 
of the differing degrees of rationality in their 
respective systems of legal taought, "capitalism" 
hansIt determined the 'Itype" of law in either 
case, but rather such things as the t1intrinsic 
intellectual needs of the legal theorists" 
1 
have 
figured as the major determining eloLient. The 
political psychology which belies this little 
example of "value-free" sociology consists in the 
supposition of a ghostly opponent in the shadows 
arguing that "capitalism" should have produced 
1. Weber, ibld., p. 278- 
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German or French legal theorists in England, or 
some such unfathomably mystical notion. lt(T)ho 
essential similarity of the capitalistic development 
on the continent., and in England, " says Weber, "has 
not been able to eliminate tae sharp contrasts between 
the two types of legal systems. " 
1 
Apart from the 
"two types of legal systems", which we shall come 
to, there Is a great deal which hangs on this 
"essential similarity of the capitalistic development". 
For, it is difficult to see what is "essentially 
similar" about the "capitalistic development" In 
England, which began to take root as early as the 
sixteenth century, and that of Germany, which was 
practically non-existent until the early part of 
the nineteenth century. Further, it is precisely 
for these reasons, namely, that England developed 
early along capitalist lines and Germany late, that 
England appears legally "back-ward" and Germany 
legally "advanced". 
"The Germans have thought. -what other nations 
have done, 'ý Marx wrote. If the German leCal thinkers 
I. Ueber, : Lbid., P-318- 
2. Marx, Early Writings, p. 2.50. - which continues, 
"Germany has boen'their theoretical conscience. 
The abstraction and arrogance of Germany's 
thought always kept pace 'with the one-sided and 
stunted character of tLeir reality. " 
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cudgelled their logical and systematic brains in 
order to "think" the most appropriate legal 
expressions for the requirements of modern social 
development, the English achieved tile same result 
by "doing" that which was required. The specifically 
capitalist expansion of production and trade does 
not depend on the wisdom of legal philosophers and 
professors of Roman law (something which Weber 
admits); but for this same reason, neither does 
the form of law depend upon the absence or presence 
of such wisdom (which Weber doesn't admit). The 
jurist does not determine the form of law, he meroly 
articulates it - well or ill depending upon the 
circumstances. And in this connection Weber is quite 
right when he writes: 
The differences between continental and common 
law methods of legal thought have been produced 
mostly by factors which are respectively 
connected with the internal structure and modes 
of existence of the legal profession as well 
as by factors related to differences In 
political development. The economic elements, 
however, have been determinative only In 
connection with these elements (they could not 
be otherwise -S. '11-1. ). What we are concerned 
with here is the fact that, once everything Is 
said and done about these differences in 
historical development, modern capitalism 
prospers'equally and manifests essentially 
identical economic traits under legal systems 
containina rules and institutions which 
considerably differ from each other at least 
from the juridical point of view. 
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Absolutely correct is the addition, "at least from 
the juridical point of view". Dut utterly misleading is 
the following further addition: 
Indeed,, %, re may say that the legal systems 
under which modern capitalism has been 
prospering differ profoundly from each other 
even in th? ir ultimate principles of formal 
structure. 
The form of law under modern capitalism contains 
one "ultimate principle of formal structure" which 
is the same in both continental and common law 
jurisdictions quite independently of the "juridical 
point of view"; it is "the" ultimate principle, 
namely, the principle of Coneralised equality, of 
Ifeber, LaW etc- P-315-6. Ti. Le General character 
of Weber's argument here and throughout his 
entire sociology has been seen as a dialogue 
with Marx. "Weber and Marx" has become a 
rather infamous conjunction of modern sociology. 
Ifeber and Oeconomic determinism" -would be the 
more appropriate conjunction, for it is only by 
setting up such a terrific distortion of Narx, 
that Weber may appear on the same stage - and 
11wIn" the debate. For example, a principle 
of Weber's sociology in general: the economy 
does not "determine" religion, politics, law, 
thought, etc.. Everything turns here upon 
first Giving a rude impression of tiie connective, 
of bringing it over as some kind of insensitive 
mechanistic relation of cause and effect. in 
its place, Weber makes a more "sensitive" and 
Itsubtleli connective: - the flelective affinity" 
(a phrase artlessly and insensitively appropriated 
from Goethe). On the other hand, so much of 
modern-politics, law and thouGht in general is 
so unashamedly a direct and mechanical reflex of 
the changing fortunes of the capitalist economy, 
that one hesitates in regard of the General 
usefulness of pointing out the errors of 
"economic detenninism" and its erst-whIle, critics. 
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generalised right- w1iiell arises on the basis of 
capitalist commodity ownership. All the "juridical 
point of view" can do is express this ultimate 
principle in dlffer: Lnf; ways, more or less rationally 
depending upon the particular historical circumstances. 
i; e shall now consider some of these circumstances. 
Miglish legal thought is "less rational" than 
that of continental Europe. TUeoretically this is 
a quantitative difference which cannot possibly pass 
i-nto a qualitative difference of legal form. The 
legal form is a relation of capital and waac-labour, 
and this is so quite regardless of the varying 
degrees of juristic wisdom that have reflected it 
in different ways. Apart from ti-lis, which is no 
small matter, Weber has a fair appreciation of the 
facts. English law, or rather the common law method 
by which it may be characterised, proceeds 
"empirically" from case to case in a haphazardly 
casuistic manner. Historically, the monopolisatlon 
by the Inns of Court of leaal training accounted 
for a good deal of the lack of intellectual rigour 
associated with keeping this mode of legal thinking 
alive. The result: LnZ "craftlike specialisation of 
lawyers", as Weber Jýoints out, meant that any fully 
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I comprelionsIve and clear treatment of tae body of 
law as a w1iole was systematically prevented and 
that legal practice in General aimed simply, in a 
passive way, at adaptina to a "practically useful 
scheme of contracts and actions, oriented towards 
the interests of clients in t, -, rpicall3r recurrent 
situations. " In this R: ind of situation there could 
be little or no inducement to clear away the 
intellectually clumsy results and to generate 
concepts "by abstraction from concreteness or 
by loGical interpretation of meaning or by 
Ceneralisation and subsumption. 11 But as Weber 
himself Coos on to say: 
Once the patterns of contracts and actions, 
required by the needs of interested parties, 
had been established witii sufficient elasticity, 
t' he official law could preserve a highly 
archaic character and survive the Createst 
econam3. c transformations without formal change. 
Or rather, to put it a little more precisely (since 
the "official law" by this very fact does not 
really "preserve a highly archaic character"), 
once the bourgeois form of legality has smashed 
through the feudal for all practical purposes, those 
remaining feudal appearances I'survivell in the same 
way that a dead man. "survives" - by leaving us with 
a few bones and parts of his skeletal frame. 
1. Weber, Law etc., p-201-2. 
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But let us look a little more closely at this 
"archaic character" of tho common law method. One 
of its prime "irrational" facets emphasised by 
Weber ýn contradistinction with the continental 
method is its system of binding precedent (stare 
decisis), whereupon past decisions of higher 
courts become binding upon future decisions of 
courts of the same and lower levels. For all 
appearances such a thing constitutes an irrational 
constraint of the past upon the present. However, 
the significance of this as something wholly 
Irrational in comparison with the methods of legal 
decision on the continent is dubious: firstly, 
because it is only the "reason" (the ratio 
decidendi) of the precedent decision which is 
binding and secondly, because a similar, albeit 
far more informal, system of judicial deference to 
"authoritative" decisions has evolved on the continent. 
In fact, the "reason" or ratio of a precedent only 
"binds" to the extent that the jurists in quostion 
decide that it "appropriately" binds them; and 
whether or not such a thina is "appropriate" is 
greatly assisted by what is generally recognised 
as the "open textural' of le,.., al decisions. Clever 
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jurists can gesticulate remarkably freely once 
they realise that it is only elastic by which their 
hands are tied. Apart from this, it is to be pointed 
out that this distinctive feature of English law 
is not "archaic". The strictly binding system of 
precedent is of very recent origin, having corae 
into being in England gradually throughout the latter 
part of the eighteenth century. Hitherto, case 
law had figured as a mode of analogy, with no formal 
criteria of distinguishing its authority. Consequently, 
the emergence of rules proscribing the use of 
precedents (reggardless of the crudeness of these 
rules, i. e. merely in regard of. their - the precedents' 
- origin in the court hierarchy) can equally be seen 
as a "rational" development in English law. 
Still, for all the arguments wlilch may be used 
to narrow the degree of difference, there Is no 
, the 
fact that English law is "less ratio; ial" escaping 
than*that of continental Europe. But not in Weber's 
sense of the word. Although his descriptions are 
factually correct, the sense in which they are 
construed is distorted by the leitmotif of the 
, ainst Itecnnomic determinism". 
The sense polemic ag 
of the "loss rational" Is inseparable from tUis In 
Weber. Nor is Itla superstition du cas", as the 
French jurists call it, a sufficiently rigorous 
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f orin of argument iii this A connection. As we have 
already pointed out, the "binding" character of 
precedent can be made effectively just as rational 
as 'Ila jurisprudence", which equally recognises the 
authority of precedent decisions wdere it sees fit. 
However, the correctness of the "less rational" 
proposition does indeed concern the common law and 
the "empirical" character of legal thought in this 
connection. But this is not a self-evident truth. 
The absence of a civil code and the development of 
private law throuGh case law does not automatically 
mean that it is "loss rational". Moreover, it is 
vitally important to give such. a difference as 
precise and specific a formulation as possible. 
For, as a difference of private law it becomes a 
difference which concerns the form of law as such. 
The most important place to look for the precise 
character of tile "less rational" is therýfore the 
sphere of contract. It Is here that this difference 
of degree can be exactly located from the properly 
scientific standpoint. 
1. Pt- Is ch- 3-, ante. 
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Ile have said enougji already elsewiliere about the 
relations that are involved in the modern legal 
for, -, i of contract: the form of property in exchango, 
the abstract subject of the exchange act etc. They 
are of course supposed in the English form of 
contract just as much as they are on the continent. 
The difference, to repeat, is not and cannot be 
a question of legal form. The difference consists 
in the articulation of this form - "less rational" 
in the case of the English version. Let us now 
see what this means. The English expression of the 
form of contract has an irrational peculiarity which 
is due to the solidly empirical character of common 
law thinking. This peculiarity is what is known as 
the doctrine of consideration, and from tho purely 
legal standpoint it is theoretically unnecessary. 
This is recognised implicitly on the continent 
where the form of contract is articulated Generally 
in terms of the utterance alone. On the other hand, 
the English' contract, with the doctrine of consideration, 
takes in a little bit of the performance. Thus, in 
the English contract we have not just the conception 
of the utterance. (offer and acceptance), but along 
with this an irrational observation of the performance 
which constitutes a third element. The English 
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contract is: offer, acceptance and consideration. 
The latter is an irrational element for this reason: 
the only form of property necessary in the conception 
of the contract (from the legal standpoint) is 
property in exchange, i. e. property which is mutual 
in all respects except for the fact that in one 
case it is hold by the buyer, and in the other by 
the seller. All the legal view requires therefore, 
is the conception of buyer and seller with equal 
rights, i. e. the conception of the utteranze, for 
the exchange of property, the form of property in 
exchange, is implied in this alone. This we showed 
when we dealt earlier with the "free" contract. The 
idea of consideration, however, ascribes to the 
seller or offeror a first infintessimal part of 
the the actual exchange which is given up by the 
offeree not strictly in exchange. Consideration 
need only be a peppercorn, as the common law says, 
whereas it doesn't even need to be this. Consideration 
doesn't need to exist at all, because all the, elements 
of the Itfreell contract are contained in the utterance. 
This above example contains a number of important 
points which we have made elsewhere. But the 
particular point which it meets here in our present 
concern is the nature of the "less rational" character 
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of the co=on law - it actually comes down to the 
difference made by a peppercorn. A theoretical 
difference this certainly is, since property in 
exchange can only be rationally considered as 
mutual alienation and appropriation, tUat is, not 
involving the slightest "little bit" being alienated 
"first" by one of the parties to the exchange act. 
From the rational legal standpoint, the contract 
is thoroughly binding in the utterance; as Ifogel 
says, 'fit does not need the performance of one or 
the other to become so - otherwise we should havo 
an infinite regress or infinite division of thing, 
labour, and time. " 
1 The empirical naivety of the 
doctrine of consideration leads theoretically to 
just such an infinite division. On the other hand, 
the continental jurists, with their rational 
formulation of contract, only recognise this in a 
negative and passive way -a fact which is proved 
in so far as they only sense intuitively the irrational 
effects of the systematisation of legal thinking 
on the basis of case law. 
Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, p. 24.5. Hegel touches 
upon the essential elements of the legal form 
here. Being a speculative deduction, however, 
Ilegel only gets hold of these elements from an 
"Ideal" standpoint; but in it we observe the 
repulsion of the real basis (having to do with 
"thing, labour and time") as a rational condition 
of t1le legal form as such - whicli is quite 
remarkable. 
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The irrational element in the English formulation 
of the legel elements of contract is the most 
rigorous Indicium possible of the 11degreelt of modern 
common law irrationality in general. This is so 
because it relates to the most direct (common law) 
legal expression of the legal form in general, 
i. e. the private law form, of contract, and therefore 
strips the issue of rational legal expression right 
down to its essential roots. Further, we do indeed 
find in the English form a "less rational" le, - ., al 
expression of its most essential connections as 
a legal form, that is, in the sphere where the 
modern legal form In general is closest to its 
essential nature as a cor. =odity-relation, namely, 
the private law sphere of contract. It is therefore 
not surprising that Weber, for example, is able to 
argue very powerfully in favour of the existence 
of a different t1typell of law in this connection - 
for this very reason (even though he never mentions 
it. ) 
Of course, Weber is not the only writer to 
have overrated the differences of co=on law and 
codified systems of legal reasoning. Such a thesis 
is implicit as a standing part of both Anglo-Anerican 
and continental-European juristic reflection. But 
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for this reason we have been primarily concerned 
with what legal sociology has to say here, i. e. 
because legal sociology 'in Weber at least) has 
the merit of attempting to be scientifically 
explicit in its distinctions. Anglo-American 
jurists in general merely treat as a matter of 
pride "Weir" conmon law methods. 
1 
Juristic 
writers on the continent, on the other hand, are 
more wide-ranging and intellectualist in their 
approach, and testify to the rational superiority 
of their mode of thi-nIcing in just this wayo 
2 
We have dealt with a difference in the "rational" 
expression of modern legality. TheoretIcally it is 
a difference which may be ignored so far as the 
general character of the legal form is con cerned. 
The same is true of such "rational" differences in 
general, i. e. the differences between continental- 
European and Anglo-American legal reason generally. 
Notwithstanding the superior "rationality" of German 
legal abstraction, for instance, the generally 
utilitarian character of this after the Historical 
School hardly becomes worthy of the name of Bentham, 
1. cf. Pollock, 11istory etc.; Bryce, Studies in 
History and Jurisprudence; Holmes, The Corunon 
Laur; Llewellyn, TI-ie Cor-L-non Law Tradition. 
2. Continental juristic writing is more "philosophical" 
than AnClo-Amorican juristic vrriting. cf. for 
instanco, the French -writers, Fouilloo, Charmont, 
Dernoaue - 'Modern French Philosophy, series VII. 
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let alone that of Kant. But this sort of terrain 
we have already covered. 
-36o- 
In Liou of a Conclusion: A Note on Leral Continuity 
Here I shall not attempt to summarlse the 
results of the foregoing pages (as. tUey stand they 
constitute sui=ary-enough results in themselves). 
I shall, on the other hand, here draw attention to 
a theme which has figured largely throughout the 
waole of this work, and -which would not suffer 
brief recapitulation. 
The legal form Is basically a form of articulation 
of Generalised cormnodity-oimership. It is a one- 
sided articulation. Relations between things 
(coLunodities) become conceived as relations between 
persons (legally co-equal individuals), and, 
consequently, relations between (real) persons 
become effectivel-, - subsumed under Vie form of a 
relation between things. T'-iis process, amongst 
other things, we dealt wit-'a in part 1 But as an 
"articulation" of generalised cominodity-oimership, 
the legal form -exists in the way of cateCories, 
abstractions, conceptions; In a word, as something 
which is thout-, Ut. The criticism of modern legality 
therefore becomes the criticism of legal thought, 
and most especially legal t1iought In its most 
articulate forins, in legal philosophy, legal history, 
legal sociolo. -Y. 
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Now thought in general has always the aim . 
of contemplating particular taings in universal terms, 
of uniting the particular with the tu-iiversal, and 
legal thought is no exception to t1ais rule. 
Consequently, the most fundamental particular 
contemplated tmder the legal form, that is to say, 
its most basic category, tUe aZ)stract subject, is 
contemplated in universal terms. But the mere 
fact taat something is thoug r kJllit b-, % no means implies 
that the object of thought has been appropriately 
grasped In its universal connections. Such a, 
result is not achieved by thinking alone. Thus, 
when legal philosophy engages the abstract subject 
a priori., or when legal history and, wIt1i a more 
elaborate web-work of intellectual inventiveness, 
legal sociology posits It at the dwim of civil: Lsation, 
we are by no means bound to accept this universal 
character so attached to it. On the contrary, as 
we have shown again and again, such universal 
connections of the abstract subject are quite 
erroneous and lead to all kinds of untenable 
notions: the f1free" contract in feudal society, 
modern capitalism in ancient society, and so on. 
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The actual imiversal character of the abstract 
subject consists in its generalised character, in 
bourgeois society alone, whereupon "all men" 
become legally co-equal individuals. Dut the 
hallmark of the legal stwidpoint on this question 
is that the determinate (bourgeois) limitation 
upon the universality of the abstract subject is 
systematically overlooked. The history of modern 
legality as the history of an articulation of 
generalised commodIty-oumership, as the history of 
an articulation of the abstract subject, is therefore 
the history of an error. As the commodity-rolation 
becomes merely a relation of legall., co-equal 
individuals, the individual or abstract subject 
becomes, as it -were, a man for all seasons, constant 
as the northern star. The generalised or universal 
character of the abstract subject, behold in the 
legal Gaze, becomes stripped of its determinate 
socio-historIcal connections and is cast sub specie 
aeterni. 
The history of modern legality is the history 
of an error. The error takes on a variety of forms, 
as we have shown: Kantianism, historicism, the 
confounding of generalised co=odity-relations with 
commodity-relations in general, leading to such 
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things as the appearance of the abstract subject 
in Roman la-w, the Roman persona juris gentium in 
modern law and so on and so forth. TUere is no 
need to go over these things again here. But 
there is an important theme linked with the 
persistence and tenacity of the error here, namoly, 
the tlierie of continulty. 
The error of modern legality is its appearance 
as something constant, unchanging, immune from the 
general turmoil of historical circumstances in which 
it is inextricably bound up. The error is basically 
the conception of the abstract subject. If all else 
may change, this remains unchanging. If legality 
always finds itself compromised in one way and 
another due to definite and particular historical 
The idea of the persistence and tenacity of 
tithe error" is one which is particularly 
associated -with the work of the philosopher, 
Bachelard. Bachelard has shoini in connection 
with various subject-matters lio-w the process 
of appropriating knowledge of tUose subjects 
has been persistently hindered by obstacles 
of a psychic nature. cf., for instance, his 
"Psychoanalysis of Fire". But apart from 
the fact that the error of modern legality 
has primarily very little to do with psychic 
reasons,, it is evident that the history of 
modern legality since the eclipse of classical 
thought at the turn of the eighteenth century, 
has nothing to do with the history of the 
scientific analysis of modern legality and 
that, therefore, the persistent error is not* 
of the Bachelardian-type. 
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conditions, if particular laws are made, changed, 
abolished and so forth as a result of tUe most 
immediate demands of the moment, if all else is 
subject to the requirements of the times, the 
abstract subject remains constant. The abstract 
subject becomes the theme of legal continuity. 
Now the theme of continuity in thougUt generally 
has recently come under attack by a number of 
philosophers (I use this description very loosely). 
Foucault, for exaiiiple, warns that "we must rid 
ourselves of a whole mass of notions, each of which, 
in its own way, diversifies the theme of continui-ty". 
lie Goes on to say: 
They (these notions) may not have a very 
rigorous conceptual structure, but they 
have a very precise function. Take the 
notion of tradition: it is intended to 
give a special temporal status to a Croup 
of phenomena that are both successive and 
identical (or at least similar); it makes 
It possible to rethink the dispersion of 
history in the form of the same ... tradition 
enables us to isolate the new against a 
background'of permanence, and to transfer its 
merit to originality, to genius, to'the 
docisions proper to individuals. Then there 
is the notion of Influence, which provides a 
support - of too magical a kind to be very 
amenable to analysis - for the facts of 
transmission and communication; whicU refers 
to an apparently causdl process (but with 
neither'rigorous delimitation nor theoretical 
definition) the phenomena of resemblance or 
repetition; which links, at a distance and 
through/ 
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throuGh timo - as if through the mediation of 
a r, 13dium. of propagation - such- defined unities 
as individuals, oeuvres, notions or tlieories 
... Tliere is the notion of "spirit", wliich 
enables us to establish between the simultaneous 
or successive phenomena of a given period a 
community of meanings, symbolic links, an 
interplay of resemblance and reflection, or 
which allows the sovereignty of collective 
consciousness to emerg? as the. principle of 
unity and explanation. 
This stock-in-trade, tradition, influence, spirit, 
has been par excellence that of legal writers. 
The abstract subject has been diversified by 
precisely these kinds of notions. The abstract 
subject becomes the folk-spirit of the Historical 
School, the "corunon purposes" of the Interest School,, 
Foucault, tlTlie Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 21-2. 
Foucault would undoubtably spurn the 
, 
description 
of "philosopher", preferring perhaps the title 
of "archaeologist". But regardless of labels, 
the overwhelming feeling upon reading his books 
is inescapable, that his tastes, for all the 
tremendous denial, are philosophical. In 
his "Archaeology.. " lie says, "Only those who 
cannot read will be surprised that I have 
learned (to ask my questions) more clearly 
from Cuvier, Bopp, and Ricardo than from Kant 
or Hegel. " (P-307). The questian arises as 
to whether this little line is slipped in for 
the benefit of the illiterates who read his 
book. Since the illiterate cannot read this 
seems doubtful. It is there, I believe, for 
just the reverse category of "readers", the 
fastidious ones, -those whom he secretly suspects 
as 4is best audience, -who will appreciate 
his depth and make of him, in spite of everything 
-a philosopher. Today's philosopher, scratching 
out an area beneath the subtlest of modern 
sciences, the sciences of man. 
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ti-le "socially organised purposes" of tho French legal 
positivists, tile unit of "tradition" in legal 
historiography (e. g. Gierke), the basis of the 
"influence of Bentham" in Dicey, and so on and so 
fortil. By these routes t1ne abstract subject becomes 
insulated, murwaified, sealed-off from the precision 
of its connections with the generalised commodity- 
structure of bourgeois society. 
While on the theme of legal continuity, it is 
appropriate to take note of the following idea: 
"It is our belief, " says Poulantzas, "that it is 
precisely the kind of internally coherent system- 
atisation at the basis of formal logic, a logic 
founded upon the independence of forms and concepts 
from their content, that onables the legal order 
to be attributed with a diachronic stability. " 
1 
Taere is not. aing "precise" about this at all. Formal 
logic is pure abstraction, and applied to legal 
subject-matters. it establisl2es I'diachronle stability" 
or continuity of form no more titan it does in regard 
of any other subject-mattor. It is not the abstraction 
1. Poulant. Zas, "Nature des Ciioses et Droit", p. 264. 
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of formal logic w1aich establishes tile continuity 
of tUe legal order, but tae abstraction of the 
individual, that is, the abstract subject. It is 
tae abstract subject which is "precisely" the theme 
of leZ.; al continuity. The application of fonizial 
logic to legal subject-matters figures primarily 
as a mode of diversifying ti-tis theme in modern 
leg. al philosophy, just as the aforementioned notions 
of spirit, tradition and influence diversify the 
theme of legal continuity In legal history, legal 
historiography and legal sociology. In themselves 
there is nothing i-rrong with formal logic or the ideas 
of tradition, influence etc. It is only (in the 
present case) in connection with tl. ie r,, iys tif i cation 
of the abstract subject that they become distorted 
and one-sided. Apart from this, the application 
of formal logic in the "concept of law", or the 
t1concept of a legal system", 
1 
or some such thing, 
that is to say, the abstraction of common character- 
Istics of all legal systems, this sort of procedure 
least of all "enables the legal order to be attributed 
with a diachronic stability", for its object is least 
cf . Hart, ItTlie Concept of Law" and Raz, "The 
Concept of a Legal Systerilt. 
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of all "the lecal order". Formal logical procedures 
here abstract from 11the legal order" such things as 
"rules" . 
"norms" and logical types thereof in the 
same way that man is abstracted from Socrates, 
red from the rose, colour froi-zi red etc., in the course 
of which, "the legal order" is lost as the cb ject 
of cognition. Formal logic never says what is 
legal about tile rule in the same way that it never 
says what is Socratic about the man, rose-like 
about red, red about colour. 
Tile element of specifically legal continuity 
is the abstract subject, not formal logic. Poulantzas 
conflates the two. The abstract subject is basically 
tile commodity-oinier under conditions of generalised 
commodity production. Only under those conditions 
does such an abstraction arise, for only here do 
all social relations appear the result of isolated, 
independent individuals freely and equally consenting 
to engage therein. In other words, only here is 
the form of all social relations dominated by the 
form of an exchang 
., 
e agreement, by the "cash nexus". 
Consequently, the continuity of tne legal form is 
a rolation of generalised co=nodity production, and 
to turn it into a relation of formal logic or 
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philosophical idealism (wUich Poulantzas also does) 
is tantamount to denying t1iis connection. 
I Formal 
logic was developed by the ancients and in particular 
by Aristotle; so with phi4. osopLical idealism, 
e. g. Plato . 
The continuity of the legal form is a relation 
of generallsed commodity production ' and generalised 
commodity production is alone capitalist production. 
The abstract subject, as the private owner of 
property in its comr-, ton or exchange forra equalises 
the owner of capital on the one side and the owner 
of merely the ability to work (labour-power) on the 
other. But at the same time it. is precisely this 
inequality of ownership in regard of the means of 
production which produces over and over again the 
legal form of equality of oxmers and non-owners 
of these means, i. e. capital, because it is this 
particular relationship of inequality 'which forms 
the basis of production exclusively for exchange, 
of production of all things as co, -modities and, 
consequently, of all social relations as relations 
Similar errors are apparent in Poulantzas' 
later work where he attempts to make the state 
into something- in the nature of a cateeory of 
"autonomy". cf. Poulantzas, "Political Power 
and Social Classes. " 
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between apparently isolated co-equal individuals. 
Once this relationsi'iip of inequality of ownership 
of the means of production is abolished therefore, 
so also is the abstract subject. The element of 
legal continuity is conpletely broken. For this 
reason it is quite absurd to think, as Karl Renner 
did for example, that the overthrow of capitalism 
would bring with it only a few minor technical 
adjustments in the law. Such a view flows directly 
from the belief that the abstract subject is 
historically universal and quite unconnected with 
capitalist production and exchange. Just the 
reverse is the case. And when production 
exclusively for exchanae is replaced by production 
for social needs, that is, when the latter no longer 
has to be minimally Cuaranteed by an ? tint erf erIng" 
state, then the abstract subject raust inevitably 
disappear - whereupon "taking rights seriouslytt 
will no longer be an exercise bound by this inhuman 
abstraction of liumanity. 
1 
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